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1In 1879 Thomas Edison invented the light bulb and built the first power 
station in Pearl Street in Manhattan in 1882, while the German inventor 
Werner von Siemens installed the first electric elevator in Mannheim 
in 1880. Since then, electricity has powered – directly or indirectly –  
the shape and dynamics of urban life. In cities of the developed world, 
we take for granted that electricity feeds the complex systems which 
sustain and sometimes spectacularly fail us. In emerging cities  
of the developing world, a light bulb is still embraced as a symbol  
of civilisation by some, while others celebrate their urbanity in a visual 
cacophony of neon. The Electric City is, in many ways, the crucible of 
patterns of production, consumption and pollution of the 21st century 
‘urban age’ as cities struggle with their impact on the social and 
environmental well-being of the planet. 
After having tackled the urban economy, health and well-being, 
violence, security, social inclusion and design at conferences held 
in – amongst others – Hong Kong, Chicago, New York, São Paulo 
and Johannesburg, the Urban Age returns to London for its eleventh 
conference since 2005. We turn our attention to the challenges and 
responsibilities faced by cities in the digital age as Climate Change 
and economic pressures continue to define our everyday urban 
realities. Since its inception, the Urban Age has studied the spatial 
and social dynamics of over 30 cities in the developed and developing 
world, collaborated with over 40 academic institutions and municipal 
authorities and been attended by over 5,000 speakers and participants 
from urban design, policymaking, research and practice. 
In London we welcome over 60 speakers from 30 cities in 15 countries 
across four continents who take part in the two-day Urban Age Electric 
City conference in the aptly named Shoreditch Electric Light Station 
in central London – a building that in its own history reflects the 
connections between power and the city. It opened as an electricity 
generating station in 1896 to burn rubbish, giving steam for generating 
electricity with the waste used to heat public baths next door.  
The motto above the door is ‘E Pulvere Lux Et Vis, or ‘Out Of The Dust, 
Light And Power’, reflecting a trajectory of sustainable resilience that 
parallels the themes and issues debated by the protagonists of  
the Urban Age.
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his Urban Age 
newspaper revisits 
the notion of the 
‘Electric City’, offering 
a critical reflection 
on contemporary 
innovations in urban 
infrastructures and technologies as we 
become more aware of environmental 
challenges and the threats of Climate 
Change. For over a decade, our research at 
LSE Cities has focused on the relationship 
between the physical and social dimensions 
of cities. Now, we have turned our attention 
to the digital and ecological age, to better 
understand how its technologies and 
infrastructures – powered by electricity – 
are transforming our urban futures, at a 
social and environmental level.
Electricity shaped the architecture of 
cities at the turn of the last century. Arc 
lighting, elevators and trams revolutionised 
the urban landscape and habits of many 
western cities as they expanded rapidly 
to absorb urban migrants. Electricity 
completely transformed cities and urban 
lifestyles, especially in public transport. 
The widespread introduction of petrol-
based vehicles in the post-World War II 
era cities led to a reconfiguration of the 
urban landscape. Yet today, electric power 
continues to fuel the massive expansion 
in public utilities, transport, domestic 
appliances and modern commodities that 
characterise the ‘urban age’ where cities 
consume over 60 per cent of world’s energy 
and contribute to nearly 80 per cent of 
global CO2 emissions. 
Skyscrapers and suburbs, commuting 
and sprawl, ghettos and CBDs have all 
followed on from these past waves of 
technological innovation. Cities have 
grown taller and fatter in the space of a few 
generations. Property values have gone up 
and slums have been created. Commuting 
times have escalated in some cities while 
others have rediscovered the efficiencies of 
the compact city, building on the synergies 
of increased proximity and more efficient 
public transport.
Today, electricity is re-emerging 
as a common denominator of a 
new technological revolution as 
unprecedented advances in information 
and communication systems are matched 
by radical innovation in green energy 
technologies and infrastructures. Much of 
this pervasive innovation nexus of power 
and information is, and will continue to 
be, centred in cities. Smart grid technology 
and the internet of things, battery-powered 
vehicles and shared urban mobility, 
GPS enabled apps for smart phones and 
integrated mobility services, online 
retail and virtual consumption, digital 
collaboration and e-governance are already 
part of our everyday urban experiences.
The more electricity generation is based 
on renewables – such as solar, wind and 
bio-fuels – the more electrification can 
deliver the greening of energy systems 
and cities. Electric mobility, electrically-
powered gadgets and systems, and even 
electric heating and cooling can help make 
cities more environmentally balanced, 
offering more than just cleaner energy. 
Today innovation can be found both in the 
public sector and in private companies. 
Cities like Berlin, Paris and San Francisco 
have been proactive in leading on this 
transition by combining e-mobility with 
car-sharing. BMW, Peugeot and Toyota are 
re-inventing engineering paradigms for 
cars, concentrating on compact, light, and 
energy efficient electric vehicles as part of 
multi-modal provision of mobility in cities. 
Utility companies are beginning to use 
electric vehicles to store renewable energy 
that needs to be taken off the grid during 
peak loads.
But, as the visionary British architect 
Cedric Price noted over 40 years ago 
‘Technology is the answer. But what is 
the question?’ The Urban Age Electric 
City conference has been designed to re-
formulate these questions and initiate a new 
line of research that addresses the wider 
social, political and cultural impacts of the 
new technologies. 
Some of the results of this research 
are presented in the Data Section on 
pages 25-43 of this newspaper. It includes 
an overview of the global geography of 
energy consumption and explores where 
and how electricity is generated and 
where CO2 emissions are most prominent 
in different regions of the world. The 
section goes on to investigate the physical 
structure, governance arrangements and 
environmental performance of twelve 
case studies, adding to the accumulated 
knowledge of Urban Age cities fresh 
evidence form six ‘green pioneers’ like 
Copenhagen, Portland and Bogota. 
These cities, alongside Singapore, Hong 
Kong, Stockholm, New York and Berlin 
have made a step-change in sustainable 
and policies practice, often led by visionary 
mayors and an enlightened electorate. We 
also take a closer look at how London and 
its directly elected mayors have performed, 
after a decade of effective metropolitan 
governance, noting that residential 
waste and car ownership have dropped 
substantially, while fossil-fuel dependency, 
air pollution and per capita levels of 
consumption remain unacceptably high. 
In parallel to this quantitative overview, 
we engage with some of the more profound 
sociological, cultural and political questions 
of the electric urban age though essays and 
provocations included in this newspaper 
and the conference itself. Architectural 
and urban critic Deyan Sudjic defines 
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electricity as both an idea and a thing. It 
has theoretical and practical implications. 
It is the combination of the two which has 
resulted in a particularly strong impact on 
cities. As such, electricity is an invisible 
technology but its physical manifestations 
as basic innovations are easy to detect. 
History, can help us since, in some ways, 
we have been there before. The impact of 
basic innovations on cities is omnipresent, 
a theme elaborated by Climate Change 
economist Nick Stern and his colleagues, 
who argue that cities have both increased 
their appetite for consumption but also been 
at the vanguard of sustainable solutions 
which ‘decouple higher living standards and 
increasing resource consumption.’ 
Author of Triumph of the City Ed 
Glaeser picks up the baton on relating 
form to environmental performance, 
highlighting the economic and 
environmental benefits of higher densities 
of city living and working as a prerequisite 
of urban sustainability. He critiques the US 
model of profligate car-dependency and 
urban sprawl, urging emerging countries 
like India and China to take note that much 
can be achieved by tight and visionary 
urban leadership and the adoption of the 
compact city model. Bruce Katz turns the 
spotlight onto the green economy and jobs, 
highlighting research from the Brookings 
Institution that identifies the potential of 
the green economy for the renaissance of 
US metros, a theme that is echoed by Max 
Nathan analysis of London’s growing digital 
economy sector and the dynamism of the 
Tech-city initiative. 
Sociologist John Urry reminds us  
of the difficulty to predict potential 
development pathways particularly when 
technology is disruptive with respect 
to existing practices. Instead, he offers 
four scenarios of what a potential future 
might be ‘after the car’, informed by our 
acceptance of electric hypermobility. Saskia 
Sassen analyses the effects of such rapid 
transitions and the effect that technologies 
have on urban space. She both endorses 
the effects but recognises the limits of 
intelligent systems in cities, arguing that  
the next phase of technological development 
is charged with negative social potentials 
where we could slide ‘into a managed  
space where sensored becomes censored.’  
Carlo Ratti extends this argument by 
highlighting the potential of new systems 
of information and communication on the 
virtual infrastructure of cities and on their 
impacts on networks of associations  
and interactions. 
In their essays, Richard Sennett and the 
Milgram Group reflect on the ‘stupefying’ 
effect of smart cities, analysing how the 
new urban environments of Songdo and 
Masdar currently being shaped by a new 
generation of urban infrastructures remain 
alien and lack the visual and creative 
energies of conventional urban form. By 
identifying historical precedent, Sennett 
warns that new tools can have deadening 
rather than liberating effects and that our 
first instinct is to blame the machine itself 
instead of asking ourselves how new urban 
technologies can be used more intelligently, 
raising questions about urban design 
and people engagement. Dan Hill and 
Maarten Hajer delve deeper into the social 
dimensions of smart cities in an ecological 
age, arguing for greater awareness and 
experimentation in the use of new urban 
technologies and making more of their 
political potential. In his closing overview, 
The Politics of Climate Change, Tony 
Giddens reflects on how technological 
innovation has to be a core part of any 
successful climate change strategy, but 
that the state and government must have a 
significant role in making such innovation 
possible, suggesting that now is time to call 
for a ‘return to planning’.
This brief synopsis of the arguments 
laid out in this newspaper suggests that 
we are not taking the Electric City at face 
value. We use this term as a catch-phrase to 
capture the social, economic, cultural and 
political complexities of what comes under 
the general banner of ‘smart cities’. We 
recognise that these dimensions need to be 
better understood before new technologies 
are accepted by citizens who are highly 
sceptical of technological fixes and worried 
about affordability and data protection. At 
the same time, urban policymakers and city 
leaders seem hesitant to embrace change 
and impose untested technologies. They are 
also concerned about the risks of investing 
in what might turn out to be the ‘wrong’ 
technology at extremely high costs. It is out 
hope that this conference will stimulate 
debate and bring clarity, offering new 
insights into the social and environmental 
sustainability of cities.
Ricky Burdett is Director of LSE Cities and 
the Urban Age. Philipp Rode is Executive 
Director of LSE Cities and the Urban Age.
Electricity has allowed buildings to be turned 
inside-out (Lloyd’s of London)
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ities are shaped as 
much by ideas as 
they are by things; in 
either case more often 
than not they are the 
result of unintended 
consequences. The car, 
which is clearly a thing rather than an idea, 
was meant to offer personal mobility, rather 
than lead to the emergence of out-of-town 
shopping, toxic air pollution and traffic 
jams. The standard shipping container, also 
a thing, was meant to speed up loading, cut 
down handling costs and pilfering.  
It did all that, but, rather more visibly, it 
also wiped out every up stream dock,  
wharf and warehouse in the world, and 
eventually resulted in Canary Wharf 
becoming London’s second financial centre.  
The three-electrode vacuum tube, or 
thermionic valve as it is known in the 
United States, was developed as a switch 
and an amplifier. It has done more than 
either the car or the shipping container 
to change the urban world. It has put 
electricity to work.
As for ideas: there are the obvious 
ones, from the obvious sources. The urban 
theorists who believed in zoning, the 
modernists, who wanted a tabula rasa, and 
the followers of the picturesque, such as 
Camillo Sitte, who understood the city as a 
work of art. But there are also the kind  
of ideas that are less immediately obvious 
in their relevance to the nature of a city, but 
which may have the biggest impact in the 
long term. These might include the legal 
codes that result in certain kinds of leases, 
the political ideas about participation or 
centralisation that impact on how decisions 
about what to build, and what not to build 
are taken. And the fuel subsidies that may 
encourage one form of transport over 
another, and thus favour some forms of 
urbanism over others. All of these are ideas 
that are perhaps just as responsible for the 
way in which our cities work as the things 
that we use to make them, and to move 
around in them. But perhaps because things 
are more visible than ideas, and because 
we have grown increasingly suspicious of 
big ideas about cities, we have concentrated 
perhaps too much on the way we use things 
rather than on thinking about their effects 
and their potentials.
Electricity is both an idea, and a 
thing. As a result it has had an unusually 
pervasive grip on our attitudes towards 
urbanism. It has not always been the same 
idea. For Benjamin Franklin, electricity 
was about understanding the nature of 
natural phenomena. Earlier scientists 
found that they could use electricity to 
give the appearance of resurrection to 
dead frogs. For over a century, electricity 
seemed closer to sorcery or magic than to 
production. It was only at the end of the 
nineteenth century that it began to offer 
solid industrial applications, and to start to 
shape cities. Electricity morphed from the 
valve to the transistor, and then the semi-
conductor, triggering the digital revolution 
that quickly put paid to the analogue world. 
The digital revolution could be understood 
as the culmination of the electric age. From 
wireless connection to GPS navigation, it 
certainly seems to be offering what looks 
very much like magic. 
As an idea, electricity is what the Soviet 
Union promised to adopt as the road to 
the future. Elsewhere, out of the grip of the 
totalitarians, electricity was the inspiration 
that showed a way forward out of the age of 
steam and heavy machinery. The dams built 
by the Tennessee Valley Authority offered 
electrification as the new-deal escape 
from poverty. The steam-age city was soot 
streaked, and smog bound. It depended 
for its mobility, its factories, and for its 
comfort on the begrimed stokers confined 
below ground and below deck whose back-
breaking toil fed the boilers. Electricity 
seemed as far removed from this sweat-
soaked reliance on muscle power as the 
digital economy now is from the analogue. 
Some electric power might still depend 
on coal-fired power stations, but they are 
out of sight, and out of mind. At the point 
of delivery electricity seemed as if it were 
clean, manageable, and efficient.
In the early twentieth century, 
electricity as celebrated by the Futurists 
was equated with effortless power, with 
city streets blazing with light, and with 
an irreversible break with the past. 
Electricity made the city more connected, 
metaphorically as well as literally. The 
endless city can be understood as a force 
field, its energy crackling over huge areas  
of apparently unconnected fragments of 
urban tissue, and connecting them. It is 
notable in this context to remember that 
the London Underground map of 1931 
owes its graphic language to an electric 
circuit diagram: not so much a metaphor 
as a tactical way of making sense of the 
navigation of a complex system. 
Electricity was always a thing too.  
A thing that has had a massive impact  
on the form and density of cities.  
Otis lifts, streetlights, tramlines, air 
conditioning, neon and escalators 
changed the face of the first industrial 
metropolises. Berlin, London, New York 
City and Chicago as they are today would 
not be possible without electricity. And 
not only in the physical sense, but in 
their political organisation too. For better 
or worse, electricity made possible the 
technology that sidestepped literacy, and 
allowed politicians to speak directly to the 
masses eighty years ago. There is nothing 
new about the impact of technology on 
civic strife, whatever the claims made for 
Blackberry-fuelled mayhem in the streets  
of London’s Hackney and Haringey last 
year, or of Twitter in the Arab spring.  
If Hitler’s rise to power was aided by his 
skill as a radio broadcaster, it was also the 
transistor radios in the backpacks of the 
French conscripts in Algeria that allowed 
them to hear Charles De Gaulle’s order  
to them to disobey their mutinous officers 
and so put down their attempt at a coup.
In the last two to three decades we 
have been overwhelmed by the impact 
of all the things that electricity makes 
possible, without perhaps the perspective 
to go on seeing electricity as an idea. It is 
in part because we have lost the ability to 
be impressed or charmed by speculations 
about the nature of the future. The fading 
appeal of the Expo movement demonstrates 
the sense of ennui that we have acquired 
in speculations about the future and the 
place of technology in it. The Expo was 
once the most elaborate prototype for urban 
innovation. Joseph Paxton’s prefabricated 
Crystal Palace, covering an awesome 
800,000 square feet (74,322 m2) haunted 
the imagination of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. Subsequently the Expo 
became a much less inspiring arena in 
which Robert Moses met Walt Disney, and 
where urban theory collided with popular 
culture. From the first Paris Exposition to 
the Brussels Expo of 1959, from the City 
Beautiful of Chicago to the starry-eyed 
futurism of New York in 1939, from the 
welfare state optimism of the Festival of 
Britain in 1951 to the grim corporate vision 
of New York in 1964, each of the fairs 
sloganised a particular view of urbanism 
that grew progressively more banal.
The live TV broadcast was introduced 
to America at the World’s Fair. Norman 
Bel Geddes designed Futurama, the 
enormous General Motors display that 
proudly declared itself the city of tomorrow 
with its 500,000 scale-model buildings 
and its one million trees and 50,000 cars, 
10,000 of which actually moved. They 
were exhibits that opened the way for 
Robert Moses to start driving expressways 
through the Bronx, and demolishing 
swathes of Manhattan. In 1964 New York 
staged a second Expo, once more under the 
direction of Robert Moses. Walt Disney 
offered his services to several of the big 
commercial exhibitors, and afterwards 
he returned the compliment. He hired 
William Potter, one of Moses’s aides at 
the 1964 fair, to offer guidance on his own 
plans to build a city. Together they worked 
on Epcot, the Experimental Prototype 
Community of Tomorrow, which, to judge 
by Disney’s ambitions, was mooted as a 
direct answer to Jane Jacobs’ anxieties 
about the future of the city. ‘There will be 
no slum areas, because we will not let them 
develop. There will be no landowners, and 
therefore no voting control. People will 
rent houses, instead of buying them, and at 
a modest rental, there will be no retirees, 
everyone must be employed.’ We recoiled, 
or, worse, we sniggered at what dreaming 
about the future had been reduced to if 
Epcot was what it had become. If the Expo 
has declined into senility, it is all the more 
important to find ways to understand the 
impact of the electric city, not just as a 
deluge of things, but in its significance for 
our notion of what the city can be. We are 
far too dependent now on electricity to be 
able to do without it.
In less developed urban societies, the 
installation of electric street lighting, and 
the sense of security it brings at night to 
previously threatening streets, is still an 
early signal of infrastructure investment, 
and the maturity that comes with it. Despite 
the breezy way with which we continue to 
take the efficacy of Moore’s Law for granted, 
and assume that computing power will 
continue to double every year or two, for 
a halving of the cost, the developed world 
cannot take it for granted that the lights 
will always stay on. Britain’s reluctance 
to face the challenge of building a new 
generation of power plants, and German 
anathema to nuclear power are just two 
examples of the vulnerability of modern 
economies to electricity shortages. India’s 
massive power cuts in the last year are 
another reminder that the future for the 
BRIC nations is also problematic.
To explore the idea of the electric city 
offers a powerful way of understanding 
urbanism as it is being reshaped. Using 
the word at all involves looking back at 
ideas about the future, which belong to a 
historical moment less jaded than our own. 
It is to take a perspective that has not been 
desensitised by decades of technological 
innovation, so rapid, and so relentless that 
we have lost the ability to wonder, or even 
be surprised about what it has to offer.
Electricity made the key elements of 
the modern city possible in successive 
technological generations. Early on it 
was the metro system. More recently 
it was the Internet. The impact of what 
electricity brought into being has changed 
fundamentally the geography of the city, 
and the way we live in it, and the way in 
which we interact with each other. Now we 
need to see what it can offer for the near 
future. It can encourage both anti-urban 
developments, and their antithesis. We 
need to find ways in which to emphasise 
the latter at the expense of the former. 
Electricity has made new spaces, both 
physical and virtual, possible. It has 
powered technologies that have shaped the 
grain of life in the city. The electric city 
could be taken to mean a city policed by 
number-plate recognition systems, kept 
moving by car-share schemes, and crowd 
monitoring on the underground network, 
and Oyster cards that track every journey 
taken on every bus and metro line in a city.
The electric city that they delineate 
is both infinitely more transparent and 
more opaque than urbanism in its more 
traditional form. An electric city is a city 
of rippling neon and LEDs at night. An 
electric city is one that that is continually 
surveyed by surveillance cameras, a city 
navigated by GPS systems that make 
London taxi drivers’ painstakingly acquired 
knowledge as nostalgically useless as the 
vinyl record some of us cannot bear to 
discard. The city’s anonymity and privacy 
are under threat as never before from 
Google’s cameras, Apple’s location-based 
services and pervasive security. The iPhone 
leaves an indelible trail, and so do the 
Oyster card and the cash machine. This is 
turning the city into a compound in which 
every action is known, every form  
of behaviour can be predicted, every 
dissident suppressed. 
The way in which we navigate and 
socialise has been transformed. So has 
the way in which crime, politics and 
consumption work. The discouraging thing 
about almost every new technology is how 
what begins as radical and empowering so 
quickly turns into part of the apparatus, 
if not of repression then of consumerism. 
In urbanistic terms, if the impact of 
electricity powered digital development is 
to undermine the physical city, the Internet, 
which, like all authentic cities has both its 
light, and its dark side, must step up to the 
plate, and stand in as the new public realm. 
Crime and vice hover at the edges of virtual 
space that also encompasses the great free 
library that is Wikipedia, the explosion of 
online archives, and the market stalls that 
are open source designs. It has become 
a polyglot mix of the inspirational and 
the banal. Meanwhile, Twitter is the 
twenty-first-century equivalent of the 
lavatory wall, a place for the scurrilous 
and the anonymous to leave their mark, 
combined, if we are being generous, with an 
electronic version of the posters on Beijing’s 
democracy wall. 
Electricity has transformed our 
distribution systems, and working practices. 
If we have no need to work in an office, 
we are never really out of it now. We have 
no need for record shops, no need for 
bookshops soon, and no need for post 
offices. But there is plenty of call for big 
out-of-town sheds for distribution. All the 
things that people have been speculating 
about for a couple of decades have 
happened. John Lewis set about making a 
real investment in e-commerce only two 
years ago. In that time it has grown to 
represent £1 in every £5 it takes at its tills. 
Why would it think about the investment in 
bricks and mortar that a department store 
with the same turnover as its online sales 
would need? Christopher Bailey’s fashion 
shows for Burberry are now instantly 
streamed across the globe: no need then  
for a front-row seat in the tent when you  
can watch on your smart phone in a bar,  
or on a beach.
Does the impact of immateriality of 
the electric city in the end undermine the 
essence of urbanism, or reinforce it?  
The electric city offers the possibility of 
feedback loops, and of making political  
and technical decisions in real time. It is 
both an echo chamber for the global  
village idiot, and a genuinely liberating  
and empowering phenomenon. But for it  
to remain a positive force, we cannot turn 
into passive consumers.
Deyan Sudjic is Director of the Design 
Museum in London.
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ities have clearly played 
a major role in the 
creation of the problem 
of anthropogenic climate 
change and they will 
form a central part 
of any response. No 
effective global collaborative agreement 
to tackle climate change can be delivered 
without the full involvement of cities. 
Yet the evidence suggests that measures 
that make cities work better in terms of 
emissions and sustainability, are also 
measures that make them work better  
as prosperous and attractive places to live 
and work. 
Cities are well placed to lead the process 
of low-carbon innovation. They combine 
a mix of specialisation and diversity 
derived from a concentration of people 
and economic activity that generates a 
fertile environment for innovation in ideas, 
technologies and processes. They produce 
and distribute the resources that provide 
better livelihoods for urban and rural 
residents alike. Their size and economic 
complexity mean that city-specific problems 
such as congestion, waste, education and 
crime require considered, city-specific 
public intervention. At the same time  
high population density and compactness 
can allow for economics of scale  
and collaboration. 
Greenhouse gas emissions are directly 
related to income. Per capita incomes 
are generally higher in cities than in 
surrounding rural areas, generating higher 
average per capita demand related to major 
emissions sources. But not all cities are the 
same. There is an enormous variation in 
emissions among cities with similar per 
capita incomes as a result of local climatic 
conditions, their energy mixes and industry 
shares, as well as the extent to which they 
simply export their emissions. It is the last 
point that tends to make most developed 
world urban areas look far better than  
they actually are, as it ignores emissions 
linked to their material consumption  
and the embodied energy generation that 
occurs elsewhere. 
But emissions have also been associated 
with differences in settlement patterns, 
leading to an underlying tendency to lower 
average per capita emissions in denser, 
compacter cities. Consequently, even when 
appropriately acknowledging that cities are 
not self-sufficient entities and ought to share 
responsibility for carbon-intensive activities 
beyond their boundaries, some world 
metropolises seem to be relatively energy 
and carbon efficient, whether measured by 
unit output or per capita. Paris, São Paulo, 
London, Dhaka, Hong Kong and Tokyo 
have among the world’s lowest levels of 
energy intensity – about one-quarter of that 
of the five highest scoring cities and less 
than half of the fifty-city average1.
Cities with limited urban sprawl and 
integrated urban transit systems have 
in many cases become affluent with low 
emissions per head. Their relative resource 
efficiency is mainly a result of greater 
transport energy efficiency due to reduced 
distances and greater shares of green 
transport modes, greater heat and cooling 
energy efficiency in buildings, due to lower 
surface-to-volume ratios of compacter 
building methods, and lower embedded 
energy demand for urban infrastructure 
due to greater utilisation. But compact, 
well-managed cities with intelligent 
infrastructure can also be more attractive 
to footloose workers than suburban or 
rural communities. Inner-city Paris, Rome, 
Barcelona and London, together with 
New York, Singapore and Tokyo provide 
examples of creative, growing city centres 
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with access to a variety of amenities, 
including green space. Dense cities tend to 
have lower per-capita emissions, provided 
they are also served by good public 
transport systems2. 
With shorter transport networks and 
less diffuse utility infrastructures, denser 
cities generate significant savings in 
operating costs, running to thousands of 
US$ per year for the average household3. 
But suburban living remains popular, so 
dense cities need to be carefully planned 
to attract wealth creating individuals 
who can choose other options. Without 
coordinated planning, cities will be at risk 
of ‘locking in’ to long-lived, high-carbon 
capital infrastructure that will be costly 
to reverse. Not surprisingly, cities that 
today are regarded as green leaders have a 
track record in long-term and integrated 
planning, particularly related to land use 
and public transport infrastructure.
Implementing greenhouse gas reduction 
strategies can pay economic dividends 
beyond reduced risks of the great potential 
damage associated with climate change. 
It can drive efficiency and allow cities to 
reduce waste and cut costs. Cities offer a 
unique environment to innovate, develop 
and scale up new ideas and processes. 
These promote the growth of clusters of 
expertise in knowledge-intensive green 
production sectors. Cities have become 
laboratories for action on climate change 
where learning and experience induces 
further innovation and falling cost in new 
technologies. Integrated recycling networks, 
electric mobility based on renewable 
energy production, methane capture and 
combined heat and power have relied on 
ready access to new technologies and skilled 
engineers and installation experts, which 
are all easier to access in a compact urban 
environment. Scale economy benefits of 
urbanisation mean that cities can capitalise 
on developing ‘green’ investments, such as 
integrated public transit, sewers and water 
systems, congestion pricing, smart grids, 
smart buildings and decentralised energy 
networks4 According to some reports,  
urban regions already produce ten times 
more renewable technologies patents than 
rural regions5. 
Climate policy also yields mutual 
benefits at the local level, while investment 
in attractive and successful cities will 
yield climate benefits. Lower particulate 
pollution reduces health care costs, 
increases city attractiveness, and promotes 
competitiveness, while reduced waste 
makes for a more attractive environment 
(for example through reduced use of 
landfill) and enhanced energy security by 
limiting reliance on imported energy and 
raw materials6. This means policies must 
be well planned: for example, efficiently 
reducing congestion and emissions requires 
complementary measures on public 
transport, cycling, electric and shared 
vehicle infrastructure, urban planning, 
zoning and carbon pricing. During 
economic downturns, such programmes 
can boost job creation and stimulate 
activity, especially in ‘shovel-ready’ sectors 
such as building efficiency retrofits, 
broadband infrastructure and retooling 
manufacturing. Policies to increase 
vegetation and green spaces not only reduce 
the heat island effect, but also improve 
resilience to flooding. 
Implementing Bogotá’s TransMilenio 
bus system was primarily motivated by an 
urgent need for cost-effective, high-capacity 
urban transport, congestion reduction 
and improving the quality of life locally 
rather than aiming to reduce global carbon 
emissions. However, this scheme has not 
only reduced emissions, it has shortened 
travel time and lowered congestion at 
peak times by 40 per cent7. Overall, health 
benefits in cities as a result of green 
transport strategies are particularly  
high as they combine emission reduction,  
increased physical activity levels and road  
safety. Health and safety benefits have  
been estimated as 5 to 20 times greater  
than the cost for integrated non-motorised  
and public transport measures in diverse 
cities such as Bogotá, Morogoro and Delhi8 
and these are in addition to the substantial 
benefits in terms of saving time  
and resources. 
Transport contributes around  
22 per cent of the world’s energy related 
greenhouse gas emissions. Of about ten 
billion trips that are made every day in 
urban areas around the world, a significant 
and increasing share is with carbon and 
energy intensive private motorised modes. 
Until now, many aspects of commuting 
and transport design have been wasteful 
and inefficient. Even within the European 
Union, a highly urbanised region with 
ambitious carbon reduction policies in 
place, transport-related CO2 emissions 
increased by 36 per cent between 1990 and 
2006, while other key sectors have achieved 
at least modest reductions9. In the UK,  
the cost of public transport relative to 
private transport has risen sharply over  
the past twenty years, compounding the 
waste from congestion. Congestion of roads 
in the UK causes estimated annual losses  
of around GB£7 to 8 billion, around  
0.5 per cent of the GDP (US$11 to 12.6 
billion; €8.1 to 9.3 billion)10. Costs are 
even higher in developing countries with 
rapidly growing cities unable to catch up 
with population growth and motorisation. 
The costs of congestion in Buenos Aires are 
estimated at 3.4 per cent of local GDP, in 
Mexico City 2.6 and in Dakar 3.4 per cent11.
Time losses, wasted energy, higher 
accident risks and the negative impact on 
the quality of life make a powerful case for 
strategies to reduce congestion. London’s 
congestion charge reduced congestion by 
an estimated 30 per cent between February 
2003 and February 2004, in comparison to 
the same period in previous years12 and CO2 
emissions from traffic inside the charging 
zone were cut by 19.5 per cent13. Mexico 
City and Bogotá have introduced number 
plate restrictions with measurable impacts 
on congestion and air quality14. Efficient, 
affordable and reliable public transport 
alternatives further reduce the appeal of the 
private car. In recent years, more established 
cities of the global North, like Copenhagen, 
Amsterdam, London and New York, have 
consistently invested in pro-cycling and 
walking strategies.
Electricity and heat production 
contribute 37 per cent of global energy 
related carbon emissions15. Some cities  
have invested heavily in clean electricity  
and heat production such as photovoltaic  
(PV) systems located on building roofs  
and facades, or in dedicated open areas.  
In Freiburg, PV systems cover 13,000 
square metres (139,931 square feet) of the 
city’s building surfaces – including the 
main railway station – while San Francisco 
operates the largest city-owned solar power 
system in the United States16. Further 
opportunities are offered by wind energy, 
with turbines typically located outside city 
boundaries. The ‘London Array’ offshore 
wind-turbine system is projected to produce 
1,000 MW, enough to power 750,000 
homes17. These investments typically carry 
a higher up-front cost than conventional 
electricity:
a thing  
and an idea
global 
problems :
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n the 1970s, Jane Jacobs argued that 
we could minimise our damage 
to the environment by clustering 
together in high-rises and walking 
to work, and this point has been 
eloquently argued by David Owen 
in his book Green Metropolis (2009). 
We maximise our damage when we insist 
on living surrounded by greensward. Lower 
densities inevitably mean more travel, and 
that requires energy. While larger living 
spaces certainly do have their advantages, 
large suburban homes also consume much 
more energy. Anyone who believes that 
global warming is a real danger should see 
dense urban living as part of the solution. 
Over the next fifty years, China and India 
will cease to be poor rural nations, and 
that’s a good thing. They – like the United 
States and Europe before them – will move 
from rural to urban living. If billions  
of Chinese and Indians insist on leafy 
suburbs and the large homes and cars those 
suburbs entail, then the world’s carbon 
emissions will soar. The critical question is 
whether, as Asia develops, it will become 
a continent of suburban drivers or urban 
public-transit users. 
Matthew Kahn and I have put together 
a carbon inventory of new housing 
throughout the United States. We wanted to 
determine the amount of carbon emissions 
that come from building a typical new 
home in different parts of the country, so 
we based our estimates primarily on homes 
built over the last two decades. About 
20 per cent of the US’s carbon dioxide 
emissions are related to residential energy 
use, and almost another 20 per cent are 
associated with our motor vehicles.  
An average family in the United States buys 
about 1,000 gallons (3,785 litres) of petrol 
a year, which is associated with about ten 
tons of carbon dioxide. It may be easier to 
imagine American families buying more 
fuel-efficient cars than giving up on car-
based living altogether, but historically the 
bulk of variation in petrol usage among 
various people over various periods of time 
comes from total distances travelled, not 
from fuel efficiency. Cars now average about 
22 miles per gallon (9.35 km per litre), and 
the big difference is whether you drive 300 
miles per year or 30,000, which depends 
on whether you live in a city or a suburb. 
Kahn and I found that area density and 
distance to the city centre are both strongly 
associated with petrol usage. The average 
household living in a census tract with 
more than 10,000 people per square mile 
(3,861 per km2) uses 687 gallons (2,600 
litres) of petrol per year, while the average 
household living in an area with fewer than 
1,000 per square mile (386 per km2) (about 
one household per acre / 4,000 m2) uses 
1,164 gallons (4,406 litres) of petrol per year. 
The density of one’s home 
neighbourhood matters because most car 
trips aren’t commutes downtown. People 
drive millions of miles to buy groceries, 
to go out to eat, and to pick their children 
up from school. The density of shops and 
schools in an area determines the average 
distance of those trips. In a city, you often 
walk to a restaurant. In a low-density area, 
eating out might entail a 25-minute drive 
each way. Holding family income and size 
constant, petrol consumption per family 
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energy generation, but with the potential for 
significant energy cost savings in the longer 
term, greater energy security, and the ability 
to drive innovation in dynamic export 
technology sectors. 
Copenhagen’s district heating system, 
which captures waste heat from electricity 
production, normally released into 
the sea as hot water, has helped reduce 
emissions and shaves €1,400 (US$1,907) off 
household bills per annum. It is estimated 
that people in metropolitan Portland, 
Oregon, save US$2 (€1.47) billion annually 
through coordinated changes in land use 
and transport policies over the last three 
decades. These include modest increases in 
building density, light rail transit schemes 
and policies to encourage walking and 
cycling. In many European cities, recycling 
levels are in the region of 50 per cent of 
domestic waste, while Copenhagen sends 
only 3 per cent of its waste to landfills18. 
Buildings contribute 25 per cent of the 
world’s energy-related greenhouse gas 
emissions19. The imposition of tough 
building standards and mandatory energy 
certificates, as well as the provision of 
tax incentives and loans, has also had a 
measurable impact on energy demand in a 
number of European and American cities20.
Integrated technologies will help make 
dense complex cities work efficiently and 
consume more collaboratively. Cities 
provide a critical mass of potential users 
for a wide range of IT-based services, 
which build upon complex physical 
infrastructure systems (such as roads, rail, 
cabling and distribution systems buildings). 
A broadband digital infrastructure can 
connect people to people, people to city 
systems and city systems to city systems, 
allowing cities and their residents to 
respond to changing circumstances in 
near real-time. Improved monitoring and 
measurement of resource flow patterns 
will allow more informed infrastructural 
investment decisions21. In addition, smart 
transport systems are being used to tackle 
congestion, facilitate road-user charges 
or supply real-time information on traffic 
problems – examples include Stockholm’s 
congestion tax and Singapore’s electronic 
road pricing. Amsterdam currently trials 
smart work centres that allow workers to 
use local office facilities rather than having 
to commute to their main office22.
From a policy perspective, therefore, 
this is not only about the construction of 
the infrastructure for roads, buses and 
railways; it is also about their pricing and 
management, regulations applying to the 
location of homes, the use of cars and the 
design of cities. It concerns the structure 
of workplaces and practices affecting 
conventions for physical attendance. Many, 
or most of these, involve networks in some 
shape or form in which the decisions of an 
individual on where to live, how to move, 
how to interact and how to commute have 
powerful effects on others.   
Given the growing evidence of a 
virtuous circle associated with green cities 
and prosperity, the question arises why not 
more cities commit to green growth. Firstly,  
the payback from investment in energy 
efficiency is not immediate and usually 
requires an additional up-front investment. 
Liquidity constraints and limited access to 
capital may therefore preclude profitable 
investments. Secondly, the gains from 
energy efficiency and renewable investment 
may not have been recognised yet. As fossil 
fuel and other scarce resources continue to 
rise in price, and as the policy environment 
clamps down on waste, this should change. 
However, even where clear gains have 
existed in the past, there have been  
a number of barriers such as split incentives, 
managerial shortcomings, weak monitoring 
and a lack of capacity and expertise 
preventing optimal investment in  
resource efficiency.
The global low-carbon energy market 
is expected to triple to US$ 2.2 trillion per 
annum by 202023 while global investment 
in renewable energy jumped 32 per cent 
in 2010, to $211 billion24. A broad range of 
successful cities will increasingly specialise 
in higher-end business services, which can 
include activities such as environmental 
consulting and intermediating carbon. 
Clearly, opportunities will vary from city 
to city in accordance with income levels, 
policy frameworks, industry compositions 
and available options for low-carbon 
transition. Further empirical investigation 
is required, and this demands the 
development of a consistent urban database 
and improved assessments of best practice. 
Yet this does not mean that cities should 
wait for perfect information before taking 
into account the latest understanding of 
climate change when making long-term 
planning decisions. How cities develop is 
part of the climate problem, but it can also 
be part of the response. 
Successful cities will effectively engage 
citizens in decision making, while enabling 
local actors in government, business and 
the community to build a harmonious and 
creative environment to live and work. 
Effecting policy action is often easier at the 
city level where policymakers are closer, 
physically and culturally, to their citizens 
than national governments. All cities have 
opportunities to guide urban planning and 
prevent the expansion and lock in of high-
carbon infrastructure. Fast growing cities 
are today planning and committing to long-
lived urban structures, which afford either 
unique opportunities or unforeseeable 
risks, while old established cities will need 
to think about how to replace and retrofit 
existing capital and infrastructure. 
Cities are complex heterogeneous 
entities that share some common properties. 
There is no ‘one size fits all’ solution, but all 
cities have scope to improve efficiency, make 
greater use of renewable resources and 
improve the environment for innovation, 
with significant economic as well as 
environmental returns. The investments 
and strategic decisions made over the next 
few years will determine where the winners 
and losers will be in rising to the challenge 
of a sustainable future.
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n the first decades of this century 
there are many indicators of car 
decline in the West. There has 
been the spectacular collapse of 
some American iconic car firms 
that defined the mobile twentieth 
century. The city experiencing  
the most rapid population and economic 
decline in the States is Detroit, the world’s 
‘car city’. The global supplies of oil are 
running low, with one new barrel discovered 
for every four used. The US has recorded  
the first drops in car mileage for a generation 
or so; new cohorts of young Americans  
or Europeans desire the latest smartphone 
rather than a car. Millard-Ball and Schipper 
conclude from their extensive review that 
travel activity has reached a plateau in 
various western countries. Some societies 
have reached, or are even passing ‘peak travel’.
And the worldwide growth of population 
of some billions makes it impossible for the 
oil-based car system to be available around 
the world, and especially across Asia, 
on even a European scale. Since around 
2005 there has been a major shift in global 
politics towards searching for low-carbon 
energy and forms of transport with much 
experimentation seeking to move away from 
a high-carbon world. There are a number of 
very different alternative scenarios for the 
middle of this century, when the steel-and-
petroleum car system that we have come to 
know and love may be no more. 
First, the effects of the politics of climate 
change, the peaking of oil supplies and 
periodic economic crises could generate 
local sustainability. Travel would be 
substantially reduced and far more local. 
There might be some cars around but their 
monopolisation of roads would have long 
passed. The global population would be 
smaller through worsening healthcare and 
reduced food supplies and urban centres 
would have fragmented. There would be 
a global shift towards lifestyles and forms 
of movement that are more local, smaller 
in scale and that use less energy. Friends 
would be chosen from neighbouring streets, 
families would not move away when new 
households are formed, work would be 
found nearby, education would be sought in 
local schools and colleges, the seasons would 
determine which foodstuffs were consumed, 
and most goods and services would be 
simpler and produced nearby. Global GDP 
would be smaller but wellbeing might be 
higher for those who are part of this ‘small is 
beautiful’ localisation of the future.
A second alternative, a bleaker version 
of the first, can be termed ‘regional 
warlordism’. In this ‘barbaric’ future there 
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per year declines by 106 gallons (401 litres) 
as the number of residents per square mile 
doubles. These facts remind us that mass 
transit isn’t the only way to lower petrol 
consumption. If people lived in denser 
areas, they’d travel far smaller distances 
and use much less petrol, even if they still 
drove to work. Public transportation emits 
carbon too, but most forms of public transit 
are a lot more energy efficient than driving 
vast distances in our own personal petrol 
burners. For example, the New York City 
Transit system uses 42 million gallons (159 
million litres) of diesel fuel and 14.8 billion 
MW of electricity each year to deliver 2.6 
billion trips to its riders. That works out to 
an average of 0.9 pounds of carbon dioxide 
per trip – a tenth of the 9 pounds of carbon 
dioxide emitted in an average car trip. 
Kahn and I predicted the amount of 
petrol that an average family with about 
US$60,000 (€46,866) of income would 
consume in every census tract and every 
metropolitan area in the country. While 
every other area in our sample was 
associated with more than 1,000 gallons 
(3,785 litres) of petrol per year, the average 
household in the New York metropolitan 
area was connected with fewer than 850 
gallons (3,217 litres) of petrol per year. 
While people in the United States as a 
whole are more than fifteen times as likely 
to drive themselves to work than use public 
transportation, New York City residents 
are more than twice as likely to take mass 
transit than drive to work. Throughout 
the country, big cities mean less driving. 
On average, when population doubles, 
per-household carbon dioxide emissions 
due to driving decline by almost a ton per 
year. In almost every metropolitan area, 
city dwellers consume a lot less petrol than 
suburbanites. Predictably, some of the 
biggest city-suburb gaps are in older areas, 
like New York, where the average urban 
family consumes more than 300 gallons 
(1,136 litres) of petrol less per year than 
its suburban counterpart. Cities are also 
greener than suburbs because urbanites 
use less electricity. Bigger, denser cities, 
where people own smaller homes, use 
less electricity. The average single family 
detached home consumes 88 per cent more 
electricity than the average apartment 
in a building of five or more units. The 
average suburban household consumes 27 
per cent more electricity than the average 
urban household. When we standardise for 
income and family size, we find that central-
city residents use less electricity in 44 out of 
the 48 metropolitan areas that we analysed. 
To form a total estimate of household 
carbon emissions, we just add together the 
emissions from driving, electricity, and 
heating, and add public transit. 
So how should we interpret all 
these data? Simply put, if we wanted to 
reduce emissions by changing our land-
development policies, more US residents 
should live in denser, more urban 
environments. 
Higher-density construction in the 
United States and Europe will reduce 
carbon emissions, but the most important 
battles over urban development in the 
coming years will be waged in India and 
China. About half of US homes in 2000 
were built between 1970 and 2000, so 
let’s assume that about half of America’s 
housing stock 30 years from now will 
also be new. If every pro-density effort is 
wildly successful in the US, emissions from 
driving and powering these new houses 
might fall by 50 per cent. That would be 
a great achievement, reducing America’s 
household carbon emissions by 25 per 
cent and the US’s total emissions by 10 
per cent. Yet from this momentous shift, 
world carbon emissions would fall by only 
2 per cent. That calculation is not meant 
to excuse inaction, but rather to make the 
point that the United States is something 
of a sideshow in the long-run battle against 
climate change. The US has trillions of 
US$ of infrastructure built around the 
car, and any developed country changes 
slowly. India and China are changing fast, 
and they have a lot more people than the 
US does. If carbon emissions in India and 
China rose to American per capita levels, 
the world’s carbon consumption would 
increase by 139 per cent, even if their 
population stayed the same. The biggest 
environmental benefits from supporting 
higher-density development in the United 
States may well be in helping to persuade 
the Chinese and Indians to build up rather 
than out. Today, the United States is the 
world’s second biggest carbon emitter; on 
average, Americans emit about 20 metric 
tons of carbon dioxide per person per year. 
The Chinese are producing almost 5 tons 
of carbon dioxide per person per year and 
the Indians 1 ton. If the Chinese per capita 
carbon emissions rose to American levels, 
this would lead to an extra 20 billion tons of 
carbon emitted every year, increasing world 
carbon emissions by 69 per cent. 
So it’s essential that we encourage these 
countries to keep their carbon emissions 
at the more modest European levels, rather 
than emulating current American energy 
use and development patterns. Today, 
China’s carbon emissions are largely 
industrial. Like the black smoke that once 
surrounded Pittsburgh or Manchester, they 
are the by-product of a great industrial 
power on the rise. So far, China’s households 
are remarkably parsimonious energy users. 
Matthew Kahn, Rui Wang, Siqi Zheng 
and I did a city-by-city analysis of China’s 
household carbon emissions, similar to the 
one that we did for the United States. While 
the typical household in the Washington 
DC area generates 43 tons of carbon dioxide 
per year, the typical Beijing household emits 
only 3.997 tons – and Beijing is one of the 
brownest places in China. In more than 60 
per cent of the Chinese cities we examined, 
carbon dioxide emissions per household ran 
at 2 tons a year or less. Household emissions 
in Daqing, China’s oil capital and brownest 
city, are one fifth of emissions in San Diego, 
America’s greenest city. Chinese household 
emissions are driven by home heating and 
electricity. As countries develop, warmth 
comes first, long before air conditioning. 
While half of US household emissions 
reflect personal transportation, only a tenth 
of Chinese emissions currently come from 
cars. The relative paucity of driving and 
air conditioning in China keeps current 
emission levels low, but we can hardly 
expect an increasingly prosperous Chinese 
population to forego the luxuries that 
Americans take for granted. If anything, 
the case for air conditioning in India seems 
even stronger. 
A generation ago, both China and 
India were solidly rural. They did little 
environmental damage because, like 
all poor places, they used little energy. 
Over a fifty-year period, however, they’re 
achieving the same industrial and urban 
transformation that took centuries in the 
West. The result is an inevitable explosion in 
energy consumption, which is today helping 
to drive up oil prices and that could produce 
extraordinary increases in carbon emissions 
in the future. There is, however, a middle 
way that combines prosperity and growth 
with fewer environmental risks. That path 
involves high-density urban living, not the 
cars of American exurbs. Growth patterns 
in India and China offer both hopeful and 
disturbing signs. On the plus side, the great 
cities of both nations are enormously dense. 
Mumbai has more than 50,000 people per 
square mile (19,305 per km2), about double 
the density of New York City. Kolkata and 
Bangalore are above 20,000 per square 
mile (7,722 per km2). Shenzhen, the rapidly 
growing metropolis in mainland China, 
across the water from Hong Kong, has 
more than 15,000 people per square mile 
(5,792 per km2). These densities fit well with 
buses and trains and lifts, but make car 
usage practically impossible. The world will 
be safer if China’s future involves hyper-
dense places made more comfortable with 
better public transportation and high-rise 
residences. But there are also warning 
signs. Car usage in both India and China 
is soaring. Chinese car ownership hit 60 
million vehicles in 2009, with an annual rate 
of increase of over 30 per cent. A few more 
30 per cent years, and China could have 500 
million cars by 2020. Meanwhile, India’s 
Tata Group made headlines by producing a 
US$2,500 (€1,953) car, and Tata’s cars could 
put a billion Indians behind a wheel, if they 
can handle the traffic jams. A billion Indian 
drivers will emit a lot of carbon.  
There is a powerful whiff of hypocrisy 
associated with energy-mad Americans 
– and I’m part of this group – trying to 
convince Asians to conserve more. One 
distinguished economist likened it to a 
‘nation of SUV drivers trying to tell a 
nation of bicyclists not to drive mopeds’. 
My awkward suburban life is certainly 
no model of green living. The only way 
the West can earn any moral authority 
on global warming is to first get its own 
house in order. As long as the US leads 
the developed world in per capita carbon 
emissions, we’ll never be able to convince 
China and India and the rest of the 
developing world to do anything other 
than emulate our own energy-intensive 
lifestyles. The West also needs to embrace 
a smarter form of environmentalism. In 
the first phase of environmentalism, when 
the objective was just to make people care 
about nature, the exact policy prescription 
was less important than raising public 
consciousness. Today the stakes are higher. 
We need instead to focus on those proposals 
that will have a meaningful impact on 
climate change. Smart environmentalism 
needs to embrace incentives. Ken 
Livingstone’s congestion charge showed the 
power of using prices to get people out of 
their cars. This can be done in other cities. 
Fuel efficiency is unlikely to be the only 
answer, because Jevons’s paradox reminds 
us that as engines and appliances get more 
efficient, they will also be used more. If the 
future is going to be greener, then it must be 
more urban. Dense cities offer a means of 
living that involves less driving and smaller 
homes to heat and cool. For the sake of 
humanity and our planet, cities are – and 
must be – the wave of the future. 
Ed Glaeser is Fred and Eleanor Glimp 
Professor of Economics, at the Faculty of Arts 
and Sciences, Harvard University.
This text consists of edited extracts from E. Glaeser, Triumph 
of the City, Pan Macmillan, 2011, reproduced with permission 
of the author and the publisher.
Copyright © 2011 Edward Glaeser
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medium to long-term training, compared to 
23 per cent of US jobs on average. The pay-off 
is higher wages, as the median wage in the 
clean economy is almost US $44,000 for the 
average occupation, higher than the national 
equivalent of slightly over US$38,000.
America’s 100 largest metropolitan 
areas, which take up only 12 per cent of 
its land mass but harbour two-thirds of 
the population and generate 75 per cent 
of the country’s GDP, are driving growth 
in the clean economy. In 2010, the top 100 
metropolitan areas in the US constituted 
almost 64 per cent of clean economy jobs 
overall, and an outsized share – 74 per cent 
– of jobs in cleantech industries, including 
extraordinarily high shares of jobs in solar 
photovoltaic, battery technologies, smart 
grid, and wind energy. Innovative clean 
jobs are predominantly located in the top 
100 metropolitan areas because these places 
concentrate the assets that drive innovation, 
from initial research to commercialisation 
and, ultimately, to deployment. 
Metro economies, of course, do not exist 
in the aggregate. Each metropolitan area has 
a distinctive starting point and distinctive 
assets, attributes, and advantages. Brookings 
research has profiled the clean economy 
potential of each of the top 100 metropolitan 
areas. Four of these – New York, Los 
Angeles, Chicago, and Washington –  
are supersized job centres, with more than 
70,000 jobs each in the clean economy in 
2010. The New York metropolitan area alone 
has more than 152,000 clean economy jobs, 
while other major metropolitan areas, such 
as Philadelphia, San Francisco, Atlanta, 
Boston, Houston, and Dallas, are also large 
clean job centres, with more than 38,000  
jobs each in 2010. 
Yet this is not just about the largest 
metropolitan areas. A number of small 
and medium-sized metropolitan areas, 
including Knoxville, Tennessee, Harrisburg, 
Pennsylvania, and Toledo, Ohio, have  
more than 3.3 per cent of their jobs situated 
in the clean economy, while Albany,  
New York, leads the way with clean jobs 
accounting for an impressive 6.3 per cent  
of its total employment.
The power of cities and metropolitan 
areas is the power of agglomeration, 
networks, and clusters. Our research found 
that clusters – the proximity of firms to 
businesses in related industries – boost 
metropolitan areas’ growth performance 
in the clean economy, and also that 
metropolitan areas facilitate clustering. 
There are numerous examples of clean 
clusters throughout the US, including 
professional environmental services in 
Houston, solar photovoltaic in Los Angeles, 
fuel cells in Boston, wind in Chicago, 
water industries in Milwaukee, and energy 
efficiency in Philadelphia.
As US continues to struggle with the 
challenge of high levels of joblessness – 11.1 
million jobs are needed by the most recent 
estimates – and an overall sluggish economic 
recovery, how does one unlock this engine of 
growth in its cities and metropolitan areas?
A strong policy platform is critical 
for the clean economy to realise its full 
potential. In an ideal world, an economy 
shaping of this magnitude should start at the 
national scale, with the federal government 
implementing policies to scale up markets 
to catalyse demand for clean economy 
goods and services, and finance to produce 
and deploy more of what the US invents,  
drive innovation by investing in advanced 
R&D at scale and over a sustained period of 
time, and align its policies with cities and 
metropolitan areas to realise the synergies of 
clustering and place.   
But, as mentioned before, political 
polarisation and fiscal retrenchment at the 
federal level will likely prevent this from 
happening. Fortunately, the US has a default 
proposition when the national government 
falters – US states act as ‘laboratories of 
democracy’, and cities and metropolitan 
areas act as the laboratories of innovation.
 America’s states, cities, and metropolitan 
areas are awash with leadership. This 
‘Pragmatic Caucus’ of political, business, 
civic, university, and environmental leaders 
prize place over party, collaboration over 
conflict, and evidence over ideology. And 
this Caucus is building the clean economy 
the hard way – from the ground up, despite 
political odds and fiscal obstacles. 
There is no shortage of policy innovation 
and political commitment to highlight in 
America’s states and metropolitan areas.  
To scale up markets, California has set 
an aggressive renewable portfolio standard 
(RPS) that mandates 33 per cent come 
from renewable sources by 2020. With this 
strong foundation, San Jose and other cities 
and counties in California are doing their 
part to facilitate consumer adoption by 
streamlining or even eliminating building 
permitting for solar panels. 
 To drive innovation, Wisconsin has 
created the School of Freshwater Sciences 
at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee 
to leverage that metro’s rising position in 
the “blue economy.” The Milwaukee Water 
Council is building on this, spearheading 
a network of scientists and companies to 
realize Milwaukee’s ambition to be a global 
hub for freshwater research, firm creation 
and business expansion.  
To catalyse finance, Connecticut recently 
created the Connecticut Clean Energy 
Finance and Investment Authority.  This 
Green Bank, capitalised with some US 
$50 million annually, could accelerate the 
generation, transmission and adoption 
of alternative energy in the state. At the 
municipal level, Connecticut’s neighbour 
New York City has capitalized an Energy 
Efficiency Corporation to spur the financing 
of energy efficiency in the building sector. 
And, finally, smart metros are now 
moving to build out their distinctive 
industry clusters.  In Greater Seattle, for 
example, the Puget Sound Regional Council 
has developed a business plan to cement that 
metro’s natural position as a global hub of 
energy efficient building technologies.  The 
smart public-private initiative to date is the 
establishment of a facility to test, integrate 
and verify promising energy efficient 
products and services before launching them 
to market. Significantly, this metro vision is 
being supported by the State of Washington, 
which has committed to match any federal 
investment in the testing network.
These examples from states and 
metropolitan areas demonstrate that the 
US – and the world – is in the early stages of 
a clean economy revolution. This revolution 
will be determined, shaped, and delivered 
by cities and metropolitan areas, both in 
mature economies and rising nations alike. 
As in any industrial revolution, benefits will 
accrue disproportionately to those firms and 
communities that are the first movers, the 
first inventors, the first adaptors, and the first 
producers. To update an old maxim, “to the 
innovative belong the economic spoils: jobs, 
investment, and a higher quality of life.”
Will the US step up to the challenge? 
Over the next four years, President Obama 
will let us know.
Bruce Katz is Vice President and Director 
of the Metropolitan Policy Program at the 
Brookings Institution.
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london’s
tech-city
ince the late 1990s,  
a vibrant high-tech  
scene has been 
developing in Inner 
East London. The 
neighbourhoods around 
Clerkenwell and Shoreditch form the core of 
this cluster, with the Old Street roundabout 
– also called ‘Silicon Roundabout’ – at 
its heart. Since 2010, the Coalition 
Government has led a high-profile drive to 
accelerate its economic development: the 
‘Tech City’initiative. Launching the strategy 
in November 2010, and drawing heavily 
on the imagery of Silicon Valley, David 
Cameron set out an agenda to develop Inner 
East London into ‘one of the world’s great 
technology centres’1. By March 2012, George 
Osborne was hailing Tech City as central  
to Government’s industrial strategy2.
Ministers are right to get excited. 
Inner East London plays an important 
role in the capital’s digital ecosystem. In 
recent research that I led for the Centre for 
London (CFL)3 we found that on a broad 
count, the cluster contained over 3,200 
digital economy firms in 2010 – double 
the count of 1997. That business base is 
particularly strong on digital content 
industries, and now includes global players 
like MindCandy, Unruly, Songkick and 
Last.fm. The area also contains over 48,500 
digital economy jobs, increasing its share of 
London’s tech employment by a third since 
1997 – and in 2010 it continued to gain jobs 
while digital economy employment in the 
rest of the city fell. 
With the area approaching critical mass, 
policy and industry voices are starting to 
think about the next phase of Inner East 
London’s digital evolution – a corporate 
invasion? 3D printing, and a revival of 
manufacturing? This article explores a third 
scenario – the development of a smarter, 
greener core. The area has been quietly 
hatching a number of ‘cleanweb’ firms, and 
has the beginnings of a green ecosystem, 
with networks, meetups and accelerators in 
place. Over the past year, angels and venture 
capital (VC) players have been picking up 
interest. But as with London’s wider digital 
economy, there are real challenges ahead. 
Smart city, clean tech, cleanweb  
Terminology matters here. Precise 
definitions of the ‘smart city’ are elusive, as 
LSE’s Ayesha Khanna points out. For some 
it’s a city that uses advanced technologies 
to manage energy, lighting and transport 
infrastructures more efficiently. For 
others it’s a city that places the minimum 
demands on the environment. In practice, 
it’s probably both. Certainly, the smart 
city agenda is driven by the diffusion of 
new digital technologies and systems 
(broadband and mobile broadband, 
cloud computing, big data and the social 
web). It’s also driven by urbanisation 
and by the challenges of updating and 
retrofitting urban infrastructures, and 
by policymakers’ increasing awareness of 
limits on current economic development 
paths. As the world develops more cities, 
especially in the Global South, we need to 
find more efficient and more sustainable 
ways to help them run.  
We also need a sense of the smart city 
product space. Paul Miller, of Bethnal 
Green Ventures, talks about ‘cleantech 
and cleanweb’. Cleantech is the physical 
green economy – involving electric and 
driverless cars, smart grids, smart meters, 
PV cells. Cleanweb is online technology 
for information and organisation – crowd-
sensing apps and maps, environmental 
information, online marketplaces. These 
aren’t always wholly distinct: US firm 
SolarCity, for instance, offers design, 
installation, finance and online monitoring 
of domestic solar energy systems. 
On the ground, two very different 
versions of the smart city are appearing. 
Carlo Ratti and Anthony Townsend dub 
these ‘top down’ and ‘bottom up’4. Top 
down smart cities are masterplanned 
demonstration projects – think Masdar 
in Abu Dhabi, or Cisco’s ‘city in a box’ in 
Songdo, South Korea. Bottom up smart cities 
are messier, more complex, building and 
retrofitting new services on top of existing 
social media networks and technological 
infrastructures. For a city like London, 
it’s this social, citizen-powered approach 
that’s most likely to take off. London faces 
multiple challenges: a growing population, 
overloaded transport systems and an 
energy-inefficient housing stock. But it is 
also developing smarter systems – such as  
the congestion charge, the Oystercard and 
‘Boris Bikes’ – which offer  glimpses of how a 
smarter capital might work in the future. 
Cleanweb products and services, which 
focus on making existing infrastructures 
work better, are particularly attractive for 
London policymakers. And London’s digital 
businesses, with their strengths in web 
design, apps and digital content, are well 
placed to develop new tools and ideas. 
Going green in East London
Over the past five years, a green layer has 
gradually developed in the East London 
digital scene. These firms are mostly very 
small and very young, and are operating 
in both cleanweb and social smart city 
product space. Some offer online apps 
and tools – such as Carbon Culture5 (a 
community platform to engage people in 
saving energy), Gnergy6 (web apps to assess 
and improve energy performance) or Pad 
Partners7 (using social networks to source 
home energy efficiency advice). Others have 
developed green transport marketplaces, 
like Carbon Voyage8 (online car sharing 
and journey matching) and Loco2 (pan-
European train booking). A third group 
are more focused on hardware and systems, 
such as Cosm9 (a platform to connect smart 
devices like energy monitors), Fairphone10 
(an ethical mobile) and Mastadon C11 
(greener cloud computing, which sends 
work to the most energy-efficient location). 
Amee12 is, arguably, the daddy of East 
London’s cleanweb scene. Founded five 
years ago, the firm now has 13 staff and 
offices in London and San Francisco. 
n the United States, the broader 
discourse about the benefits and 
viability of a clean economy, like 
most other critical national issues, 
has become mired in partisan and 
ideological divisions.  The 2012 US 
Presidential campaign provided 
only the latest example of the deep chasm 
that separates our political parties. On the 
one hand, Republican Presidential nominee 
Mitt Romney, who supported a state green 
energy fund as Governor of Massachusetts, 
criticised the Obama Administration for 
an ‘unhealthy obsession with green jobs’, 
while President Obama defended his 
administration’s investments in renewable 
energy projects over the past four years and 
argued that Governor Romney policies show 
a ‘disdain for green energy’.
This partisan debate at the national 
level occurs at a time in which US federal 
government support for the clean energy 
and energy-efficiency sectors are likely to 
decline, even though President Obama has 
just been re-elected for another term. In 
the past several years, through subsidies, 
loan guarantees, and tax expenditures, the 
US government became a major supporter 
of the nascent clean economy, committing 
more than US$150 billion to clean energy 
projects between 2009 and 2014. Over the 
next few years, however, it is likely that 
federal support will be radically reduced as 
numerous programmes and policies are set 
to expire, from production tax credits for 
wind energy to investment tax credits for 
solar energy. In total, 63 of the 92 federal 
clean energy finance policies that were in 
place in 2009 will have expired by 2014. 
Given the difficult budget challenges the  
US government faces as it attempts to 
control the skyrocketing federal deficit, it is 
likely that many of these programmes will 
be scaled back if not eliminated altogether.
The irony, of course, is that in the 
midst of uncertainty and division at the 
federal level there is a large, diverse, and 
growing clean economy emerging in the US, 
concentrated primarily in America’s largest 
cities and metropolitan areas. Over the past 
two years, Brookings research has identified 
nearly 2.7 million clean jobs, making the 
clean economy nearly 60 per cent of the size 
of the America’s IT sector (4.8 million jobs), 
and larger than its fossil fuel industry  
(2.4 million jobs). These jobs span five major 
categories – renewable energy; energy 
and resource efficiency; greenhouse gas 
reduction, environmental management,  
and recycling; agricultural and natural 
resources conservation; education and 
compliance – and naturally break down 
into 39 fine-grained segments. Renewable 
energy, for instance, has 9 segments, 
including solar and geothermal power and 
renewable energy services, while energy and 
resource efficiency has 13 separate segments, 
from electric vehicle technology to water 
efficient products.
Beyond these large groups, Brookings 
also identified a group of young, innovative 
‘cleantech’ industries that cross multiple 
categories and show enormous growth 
potential. This portfolio of segments, 
including wind power, battery technologies, 
biofuels, and smart-grid technology, grew 
about 8 per cent a year between 2003  
and 2010, twice as fast as the rest of the  
US economy.
The clean economy is not just broad and 
diverse; it is disproportionately productive 
and export-oriented. In 2009, US clean 
economy establishments exported almost 
US$54 billion, including about US$49.5 
billion in goods and an additional US$4.5 
billion in services, making the clean 
economy twice as export-intensive as the 
national economy. Over US$20,000 worth 
of exports is sold for every job in the clean 
economy each year compared to just US 
$10,400 worth of exports for the average 
US job. The export orientation of the 
clean economy today provides a platform 
for more exports tomorrow. With rising 
nations rapidly urbanising, the demand for 
sustainable growth in all its dimensions will 
only grow, and the US has the potential to 
serve that demand. 
The American clean economy also 
supports a production-driven innovation 
economy. In fact, 10 per cent of clean 
economy jobs are in science and engineering 
fields, compared to 5 per cent in the US 
overall, and 26 per cent of all clean economy 
jobs are involved in manufacturing, 
compared to just 9 per cent of jobs in the 
US economy as a whole. Manufacturing 
accounts for a majority of the jobs in over 
half of the clean economy segments, with 
many sectors having a super-majority of 
production-oriented jobs. Solar and wind 
energy, for example, have more than two 
thirds of their jobs in manufacturing. And 
some segments, including appliances, 
water-efficient products, and electric 
vehicle technologies have over 90 per cent 
of their jobs in manufacturing. Clean 
manufacturing is a growing sector, part of 
an overall resurgence of manufacturing in 
the US over the last few years. 
Finally, the clean economy is 
opportunity rich, providing prospects for 
a wide range of American workers, and 
good wages up and down the skills ladder. 
Forty-five per cent of all clean jobs are held 
by workers with a high-school diploma or 
less, compared to only 37 per cent of US 
jobs. Once a worker enters the field, they 
are more likely to receive career-building 
training, as 41 per cent of clean jobs offer 
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would be oil, gas and water shortages 
and intermittent resource wars within 
the context of extreme weather events 
and energy shortages. There would be 
the breakdown of many mobility, energy 
and communication connections that 
now straddle the world. There would be 
a plummeting standard of living, a re-
localising of movement, an increasing 
emphasis upon local ‘warlords’ controlling 
recycled forms of mobility and weaponry, 
and relatively weak governments. 
Infrastructures would collapse and there 
would be increasing separation between 
different regions. Cars and trucks, and buses 
and trains, would rust away in the deserts 
or be washed away in floods. Often regions 
would be at war with their neighbours, 
especially for control of water, oil and gas,  
as prefigured in Mad Max 2’s portrayal of  
the future.
A third alternative is ‘hypermobility’. 
The current patterns of mobile lives based 
on new communications and transportation 
would develop on an extreme scale. The 
resource shortages and effects of climate 
change would turn out to be less significant, 
at least for the rich North of the globe, partly 
because a magic bullet would overcome 
the limits of fossil fuels and provide a new 
mobility future. People’s movement would 
become more extensive and frequent with 
novel fuels and vehicles. Personalised 
air travel, São Paulo writ large, would be 
common as unfashionable cars would 
remain stuck on the ground. A Corbusier-
inspired future would beckon all to the skies, 
including regular flights into space with 
Virgin Galactic! The final frontier would 
indeed be overcome with a verticalisation  
of cities.
Finally, there is a post-car electric future. 
The digital and the transportational would 
be integrated. Here software intelligently 
would work out the best means of doing 
tasks, whether this would involve meeting 
up or getting to some place or event or 
simply staying put. Some effects of meeting 
up would be effectively simulated through 
virtual communications that are as good 
as meeting face to face. ‘Digital lives’ would 
develop into life instead, so much so that 
there would be less need for travel, especially 
over long distances. Much business, social 
and family life would not be face to face. 
Manufacturing on demand could be enabled 
by 3D printing and the replacement of 
the long supply chains of container-based 
manufacturing systems.
Personal travel would involve small, 
ultra-light, smart, probably battery-based 
vehicles that would be hired, a bit like 
bikes can now be hired in London, Paris 
or Barcelona. Streets would be full of often 
speed-controlled micro cars, demand-
responsive minibuses, bikes, electric bikes, 
hybrid vehicles, driverless rapid transit 
systems and pedestrians. Ideally these 
would be seamlessly integrated with larger-
scale public transport. Smartphones, or 
their successors, would control access and 
payment for multiple and interconnected 
forms of mobility. Neighbourhoods would 
be reengineered to constrain sprawl. Carbon 
allowances would be allocated, monitored 
and individually measured through new 
apps. There would be less freedom to 
walk, drive or move without traces being 
left and some payment extracted. Such a 
digital system would be like an Orwellian 
airport city and would need to be subject to 
energetic democratic control.
So there are four futures, and all have 
their costs, dangers and injustices. None is 
simply preferable, none is the most likely to 
develop, and all may be contested. And the 
best is not necessarily the one which will 
develop. How might the last of these  
be realised?
Certainly the combination of high 
oil prices, extreme weather events, and 
stagnating economic growth indicate some 
green shoots of a powering down of fast 
oil-based travel within parts of the rich 
North. The beginning of this century is like 
the beginning of the last one, when the car 
system was being assembled out of many 
inventions, discoveries, tinkerings, and new 
marketing. Something similar is taking 
place today, and a whole new socio-technical 
system may emerge out of very disparate 
elements, of technologies, materials, policies, 
payment systems and social practices that 
are like islands of an archipelago that may 
turn out to be components of a new system.
Central here would be some shift from 
an ownership to an access economy, as 
Jeremy Rifkin has long advocated. It is also 
something much trialled with car clubs and 
new car-hire schemes. Car manufacturers 
are experimenting with pay-as-you-go 
schemes for electric vehicles (EVs). Daimler, 
Peugeot and others expect these to attract 
younger customers familiar with access 
payments for Internet services. Better Place 
will charge by the mile; indeed if the EV 
is highly subsidised or even free (and then 
effectively recycled) payments would just 
be by distance. Central would be so-called 
‘near-field communications’ to enable 
the supply of interchangeable mobility 
services to be accessed, paid for, but not 
predominantly owned.
By the middle of this century a post-
car system could emerge unexpectedly, 
off-centre, not from a current home of the 
car. Examples here could be electric bike 
innovation in China, a Better Place EV 
battery replacement system in Israel, public 
transport integrated systems in Brazil, the 
Bay Area becoming the EV capital of the US, 
Chinese officials making China the world’s 
largest producer of EVs and setting up 
recharging throughout Wuhan, and so on. 
But there are formidable technological, 
economic, organisational and social 
problems in engineering this system to 
push the steel-and-petroleum car system 
aside. It is necessary that EVs, whether 
with four, three or two wheels, come to be a 
socio-technical system that over time makes 
the steel-and-petroleum system obsolete, 
instead of merely providing extra vehicles 
for eco-prestige seekers. Also significant 
here would be the prevention of the rebound 
effect, of fun and fashionable EVs being so 
well used that extra mileage occurs. And 
this says nothing about how the electricity is 
itself generated, although EVs are up to four 
times as efficient as petrol-driven vehicles, 
although the use of coal as the most common 
fuel for generating electricity is a major 
concern here.
During the twentieth century it seemed 
that oil-based mobile lives would spread to 
all continents and most peoples, albeit with 
huge inequalities. That century operated as 
though there was a free lunch to be enjoyed 
at the expense of the next century, with half 
the world’s oil being burnt and in a way that 
resulted in changing global climates. Now 
we are in that century we find that futures 
are not at all rosy, that the car and its high-
carbon friends have left little standing in 
their wake. 
By the end of this century the steel-and-
petroleum car system that we have come 
to know and love will be no more. If there 
will be cars, they will be mainly housed in 
museums, if museums still exist. Cars, one- 
to two-ton monsters powered by refined 
oil, built of steel, privately owned, seating 
at least four people, and with their own 
territory called roads and car parks, will be 
seen as dinosaurs, remnants of the twentieth 
century. People may gawp at them a little, 
like 1950s American cars are now gawped 
at by tourists on the streets of Havana. Cars 
will be so last century! The car system will 
not be around by the end of this century,  
but none of the alternatives are without 
major costs and risks. Much indeed is up  
for grabs.
John Urry is Distinguished Professor of 
Sociology at Lancaster University.
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Amee offers a combination of aggregated 
environmental information, carbon/energy 
audits and data/tech management consultancy 
services. Amee was the first of the scene’s 
cleanweb firms to get major VC investment, 
now helping to seed the next generation: 
founder and chairman Gavin Starks is now 
Chief Executive of the Open Data Institute, 
and Amee alumni are involved in the London 
Cleanweb network – ‘because we don’t want 
to bluescreen the planet’ – which organises 
meetups, talks and hack days13.
Such social infrastructure is an 
important part of the local ecosystem 
for young firms. Bethnal Green Ventures 
(BGV) is another14. An accelerator for 
social/environmental start-ups, BGV offers 
a combination of seed funding (GB£15,000 
/ US$23,877 per firm), a peer group, 
structured networking and mentoring, as  
well as shared workspace at Google Campus. 
BGV is increasingly in demand – working 
with six firms at a time, they interviewed 50 
candidates for its latest cohort, and expect 
to see more in the next round. 
BGV’s Paul Miller notes rising angel 
and VC interest over the past 12 months. 
The Tech City initiative has shone a bright 
light on the area; more importantly, variable 
experiences with cleantech investments 
have pushed many US investors towards 
cleanweb, where capital requirements are 
lower and returns potentially higher. 
The future
So what next for East London’s nascent 
green economy scene? London’s cleanweb 
firms feel well positioned. Their great 
shared asset is the collective knowledge 
and resources of the wider urban digital 
economy. Cleanweb activity builds on 
London firms’ skills in programming 
and digital content – perhaps more than 
physical engineering. As far as East London 
goes, cleanweb goes with the grain. 
The next few years won’t be easy, 
however. Many of the challenges are 
common to all digital start-ups: the CFL 
research identified problems around skills, 
finance, workspace, connectivity and 
mentoring that may prevent firms growing 
to scale.  Even so, green digital economy 
firms may have it harder than others.   
One challenge is reaching paying 
customers, both in the UK and abroad. 
Gavin Starks notes that ‘the main challenge 
is making environmental issues carry 
enough financial weight to be relevant to 
businesses.’ Paul Miller suggests a wider 
British cultural aversion to ‘buying things 
off start-ups’ – shared across public and 
private sectors. 
Accessing finance is another issue. 
CFL found a number of companies 
bootstrapping, or relying on family and 
friends. Those who had approached 
angels or VC for equity had often had 
disappointing experiences – many 
providers lack knowledge of digital sectors 
and are often very risk-averse, problems 
compounded by VC firms’ lack of physical 
presence in – and thus knowledge of – the 
area. These issues are amplified for very 
novel technologies like cleanweb (Amee, 
notably, got its first VC money from New 
York and the South Bay). These constraints 
may ease in the years to come, as more US 
investors arrive and specialised VC and 
boutique operations like Passion Capital, 
Amadeus and Seedcamp step up operations. 
The UK’s Technology Strategy Board is also 
helping out, with GB£1.25m (US$1.99m) 
on the table for innovative energy-efficient 
computing ideas and £1m (US$1.59m) for 
energy harvesting technologies. 
A third challenge will be the continued 
supply of physical workspace. Shoreditch 
and Clerkenwell are dense urban areas, with 
limited space for new building. Tech City 
has brought welcome attention, but is also 
contributing to rising property costs. Many 
policymakers hope that digital firms will 
migrate to brand new spaces in the Olympic 
Park, Stratford City and the Royal Docks. 
The iCity development, on the former 
Olympic Broadcast and Media Centre, is 
hoping to attract a mix of major players and 
start-ups. Siemens’ The Crystal exhibition 
centre is intended to kick-start a Green 
Enterprise District. No doubt some firms 
will head further East, but many have little 
interest in doing so. At present, there are  
few obvious connections between the  
grassroots cleanweb scene around Shoreditch,  
and shiny new buildings further East.    
A fourth big issue is the policy 
environment. As with many frontier 
technologies, this kind of activity needs 
government support – through legislation, 
enabling frameworks and funding tools. 
National and local government are both 
actively focused on the digital economy, 
although the strategy and policy mix can 
be improved (see the CFL study for more on 
this). For cleantech and cleanweb firms, the 
wider policy environment is also key. The 
lack of certainty on flagship UK initiatives 
like the Green Deal, for example, makes 
life harder for nascent providers, as do 
ongoing rows about support for renewables. 
And the failure of the Copenhagen climate 
negotiations has knocked substantial sums 
off firm valuations. 
Finally, we need to consider the bigger 
picture. Smart city optimists suggest a 
new electric age for cities is beginning 
to appear. As Carlota Perez would put it, 
cleantech and cleanweb technologies have 
already arrived, and the next two decades 
will see a ‘deployment period’, as they 
become embedded in urban structures15. 
Pessimists, like Robert Gordon or Tyler 
Cowen, suggest we’ve already wrung the 
maximum innovative potential out of 
the Internet, and those gains have been 
relatively small16. My personal view is that 
there’s still great potential for the diffusion 
of new technologies into smart city products 
and services. It’s certainly one plausible – 
and encouraging – possible future for East 
London’s vibrant digital economy.
Max Nathan is a Research Fellow at LSE 
Cities and at the Spatial Economics Research 
Centre, LSE.
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urbanising
technology
eriods of rapid transition 
have heuristic potentials. 
The velocity of change 
itself makes novel 
patterns legible. When 
the object of study 
is cities, legibility is 
even more pronounced insofar as the 
material reality of buildings, transport 
systems, and other components of spatial 
organisation are on the surface, so to speak. 
Simultaneous rapid transformation in 
several cities with somewhat comparable 
conditions also makes the variability of 
such spatial outcomes visible, even when 
they result from similar novel dynamics. 
Our global modernity is one of those 
periods of rapid change. Major advances in 
building and other technologies have left a 
massive imprint on urban space.
What stands out is that these 
technologies have not been sufficiently 
‘urbanised’.1 On the one hand, cities 
tend to urbanise technologies – it is not 
quite feasible to simply plop down a new 
technology in urban space. This becomes 
clear in the fact that the spatial formats 
through which density is constituted vary 
sharply across cities; it means that each city 
partly reshapes even standard technologies. 
On the other hand we need to push this 
urbanising of technology further, and 
in different directions. For instance, the 
elusive quality we in the West have come to 
call urbanity and tend to associate with a 
high-density centre might take on different 
shapes in other cultures. The notion of 
cityness helps us take some distance from 
that western notion and allow for a far 
greater variability in what constitutes 
urban density and its technologies. This 
opens up a whole field for research and 
interpretation, and invites us to reposition 
western notions of urbanity and to explore 
a far broader range of articulations of 
building technologies and urban space.
A first step into this exploration of what 
it means to urbanise technology is to engage 
the notion of intelligent systems, a rapidly 
expanding input for cities. In other words, 
what does it mean to use intelligent systems 
without de-urbanizing cities? 
The limits of intelligent systems
Much of what is put under the ‘smart city’ 
umbrella has actually been around for 
a decade or more. Bit by bit (or byte by 
byte), we have been retrofitting various 
city systems and networks with devices 
that count, measure, record, and connect. 
The current fashion, however, centres 
around a costlier, difficult to implement 
vision. Rather than retrofitting old cities, 
the buzz today is about building entire 
smart cities from scratch in a matter of 
a few years (hence the alternative name 
‘instant city’) at what seems to be an 
average price of US$30 to US$60 billion 
(€23.5 to €47 billion). Building such a city 
is a daunting proposition. But I think the 
biggest challenge is more conceptual: it is 
the need to design a system that puts all 
that technology truly at the service of the 
inhabitants, and not the other way around: 
the inhabitants as incidental users. 
The best known example of an instant 
smart city is the now famous Songdo 
International Business District, an 
intelligent city near Seoul that is equipped 
with advanced sensors and monitors from 
Cisco Systems, among others. The city’s 
multitasking devices are able to open and 
close, turn on and off, or stop and start 
everything: from the toaster to the video 
conference with your boss, or the video 
camera view of your child at play – and that 
is just from the perspective of workers. All 
of this can be done from both your home 
and your office, though the distinction 
between the two becomes increasingly 
fuzzy in a fully ‘sensored’ city. Songdo is 
also about recycling and greening: it is built 
on reclaimed land and deploys all the latest 
green technologies.
The other famous example would be 
Masdar City, in Abu Dhabi. Designed to be 
carbon free, it is both more scientific, yet, in 
many ways, less ‘business intelligent’ than 
Songdo. It is common to emphasise the 
commercial side of Masdar as a showcase 
for products from firms around the world. 
But I think it is incorrect to simply see it as 
a commercial showcase. I would describe 
it as a laboratory, or what social scientists 
refer to as a natural experiment: a piece 
of real life that functions as a window, 
allowing us to learn about an abstract, 
complex condition (for example, a fully 
intelligent and green large city), that we 
cannot replicate in a university laboratory.
Masdar has the same upper and lower 
worlds that all cities have, but in this 
instance the lower world includes much 
more than the usual pipes and tunnels. 
In Masdar it also includes a hidden trove 
of advanced technologies for handling 
all of the basic urban systems: all that 
flows in and out of the city, whether water 
or refuse, is measured and monitored 
and thus produces information. In this 
sense, everything in Masdar is considered 
significant. Even refuse is not simply refuse 
– it is a source for building knowledge. 
Meanwhile, the upper part of Masdar, built 
on a raised platform to give the technology 
‘plumbers’ access to the pipes, is a showcase  
for an enormous variety of green technology.
All of this brings me to the second 
reason why I think of Masdar as a 
laboratory, albeit a lived-in one: few 
places in the world will be able to replicate 
Masdar. It is a multi-billion US$ investment 
for 40,000 residents. While the retrofit 
innovations of Amsterdam Innovation 
Motor (AIM) can be replicated throughout 
the world, in rich and poor cities alike, it is 
unlikely that anyone will replicate Masdar.
At the other end of the scale is China, 
which is also building cities – at least 20 of 
them are on the drawing board as I write. 
China will need to house well over 300 
million people in the next few years. Its 
new cities will be planned and intelligent 
but they will not be little Masdars. They 
will be giant cities. They will have generous 
budgets of several hundreds of thousands of 
US$ to plant and maintain millions of trees, 
and, with luck, they will have bike lanes and 
photovoltaics everywhere. That would be  
a good practical beginning. We need both:  
Technology is now part of way-finding  
in cities (South Bank, London)
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a laboratory for the ideal as well as  
the practical solution.
What comes next is worrisome
The first phase of intelligent cities is 
exciting. The city becomes a living 
laboratory for smart urban technologies 
that can handle all the major systems a 
city requires: water, transport, security, 
waste, green buildings, and clean energy. 
The acts of installing, experimenting, 
testing, or discovering can all generate 
innovations, both practical and those that 
exist mainly in the minds of weekend 
scientists. This is thrilling. And these are 
projects that will involve foreign and local 
inventors, scientists, technologists, firms, 
artists, and curious tourists from around 
the world. This phase is likely to create a 
public conversation, not just between the 
residents and the city’s leadership, but also 
horizontally, among citizens comparing 
notes. It could lead to a new type of open-
source network:  instead of simply having 
IT workers detect and fix software and 
recode to solve problems as they see them, 
there would be a collective upgrading and 
problem-solving dimension involving 
citizens, a sort of open-source urbanism.
But the ensuing phase is what worries 
me; it is charged with negative potentials. 
From experimentation, discovery, and 
open-source urbanism, we could slide 
into a managed space where ‘sensored’ 
becomes ‘censored’. What stands out is the 
extent to which these technologies have 
not been sufficiently ‘urbanised’. That is, 
they have not been made to work within 
a particular urban context. Consider the 
sharply varying kinds of architecture and 
building types that have evolved around the 
world in response to the need for increased 
density. Masdar looks nothing like Songdo. 
And compare Dubai and London; both 
have dense centres but they are built in 
very different styles. Technology systems 
that might work in one city might not be 
desirable in another. But it also tells us that 
a city can urbanize that technology and 
wire its capacities into an older concept of 
the urban or into a whole new visual order. 
The push to urbanise technology
We need to push this urbanising of technology 
further, and in different directions.
Wherever I go in the world, I find at least 
some technologists, urbanists, and artists 
who are beginning to ‘urbanise’ technology. 
Cloud9, a Barcelona-based project that 
mixes science, technology, and architecture 
is a good example, one that draws and needs 
all types of people – children, professionals, 
and tourists alike. When this happens, 
the city becomes a heuristic space; it talks 
with the average resident or visitor rather 
than simply commanding them. The 
technology becomes visible and explicit 
and can be understood by any passer-by. 
I have long thought that all the major 
infrastructures in a city – from sewage 
to electricity and broadband – should be 
encased in transparent walls and floors at 
certain crossroads, such as bus stops or 
public squares. If you can actually see it all, 
you can get engaged. Today, when walls are 
pregnant with soft- and hardware, why not 
make this visible? All of our computerised 
systems should become transparent.  
The city would become literally a publicly 
shared domain.
The challenge for intelligent cities 
is to make the technologies they deploy 
responsive and intellectually/practically 
available to the people whose lives they 
affect. Today, the tendency is to make them 
invisible, hiding them beneath platforms 
or behind walls – hence putting them in 
command rather than in dialogue with 
users. This secluding of technologies 
reduces the possibility that intelligent cities 
can promote open-source urbanism.
Open source urbanism?
Taking the urbanising of technology to the 
next stage would increase and diversify 
the articulations between technology and 
urban space. It would unsettle current 
internal boundaries in cities and cut across 
the traditional domains – the economy, the 
polity, the social, culture. Technology and 
the environment can come together in many 
more ways than they do today in most cities. 
‘Urbanised’ technology can make 
the city a heuristic space. It could tell the 
average resident or passer-by something 
about the most advanced types of applied 
technologies used in cities and about the 
variability of spatial forms through which 
these uses of technology work and become 
legible to the passer-by. This variability 
of spatial formats can become a powerful 
representation of the many ways in which 
technologies can be urbanised. It can show 
how multiple applied technologies within 
a city also make the diverse interactions 
that can take place in urban space visible, 
thus having the double effect of being both 
operational and inform the passer-by on 
what it means to urbanise technology. This 
brings to the fore the differing degrees of 
openness of cities. I prefer to think of this as 
the incompleteness of cities, which means 
that they can constantly be remade, for 
better or for worse. It is this incompleteness 
that has allowed some of the world’s great 
old cities to outlast kingdoms, empires, 
nation-states and powerful enterprises. 
Let me take the imagery of 
incompleteness further. Powerful actors can 
remake cities in their image. But cities talk 
back.2 Sometimes it may take decades, and 
sometimes it is immediate. We can think 
of the multiple ways in which the city talks 
back as a type of open-source urbanism: 
the city as partly made through a myriad 
of interventions and little changes from the 
ground up. Each of these multiple small 
interventions may not look like much, but 
together they give added meaning to the 
notion of the incompleteness of cities, the 
city as somewhat of a mutant. 
In sharp contrast, I think there is a 
futile search to eliminate incompleteness 
in the model of ‘intelligent cities’ as 
propounded by and through the purveyors 
of increasingly massive intelligent systems. 
The planners of intelligent cities make these 
technologies invisible, and hence put them 
in command rather than in dialogue with 
users. One effect is that intelligent cities 
become closed systems, and that is a pity. It 
will cut their lives short. They will become 
obsolete sooner. And, as these complex 
technical systems become obsolete, they 
may drag down with them the buildings 
within which they are housed. This becomes 
particularly acute given the accelerated rate 
of technological obsolescence. 
Beyond the imagery of open-source 
urbanisms, can we strengthen the positive 
scenario of the city’s incompleteness 
by actually deploying open-source 
technologies in a variety of urban contexts? 
Can we urbanise open-source technology 
itself, and might the complexity of urban 
settings help us do so?  
As a technological practice of 
innovation, open source has not quite been 
about cities, but about the technology. Yet 
it resonates with what cities have and are at 
ground level, where its users are. The park 
is made not only with the hardware of trees 
and ponds, but also with the software of 
people’s practices. A good example here is 
the turnaround of New York’s Riverside 
Park from being a no-go zone in the 1970s 
to being a park for all those who wanted to 
use it, in part because dog owners started to 
walk their dogs in large numbers. Having 
a dog was itself an effect of feeling insecure 
in a city of high murder rates and much 
mugging. But the city allowed people to 
talk back: get a dog, walk your dog, usually 
a routine of mornings and evenings which 
produced a group effect, and you recover 
the territory of the park. This shows us 
how the mix of urban space and people’s 
daily practices generated a public good –no 
matter how selfish the dog walkers might 
have been. I see here an urban capability at 
work.3 The proliferation of farmers’ markets 
was also not a top-down decision. It resulted 
from a mix of conditions, primarily the 
desire of city residents to have access to 
fresh produce. A thousand individual 
decisions created a possibility for viable 
farmers markets. 
Could urbanising open source 
technology and its cognates generate such  
capabilities? Sorts of events whereby many 
individuals react to conditions in similar  
ways to produce perceptible civic outcomes: 
buying dogs/recovering the park, or wanting  
fresh produce/creating farmers’ markets? 
And how can this open sourcing be used to 
better predict and avoid negative outcomes? 
How can we urbanise actual technology? 
In many ways, cities tend to urbanise 
technologies semi-autonomously, since it is 
still not quite feasible to simply plop down a 
new technology in urban space. It requires 
modifications, mediations. Major advances 
in building and other technologies have left 
a massive imprint on urban space. This is 
perhaps most visible in the sharp increases 
in density and networked systems that the 
new technologies have made possible. But a 
closer look suggests that these modifications 
have to do with overcoming rigidities  
and risks, especially risks catalogued  
by insurance companies. This mode is  
then only vaguely one of urbanising  
the technology. 
Since open source is different from those 
technologies and technological applications, 
I am interested in understanding how it 
can take us to the next step. I see in open 
source a DNA that resonates strongly with 
how people make the city theirs, or urbanise 
what might be an individual initiative. 
And yet, as a technology it has mostly not 
engaged the city. I think that it will require 
making. We need to push this urbanising 
of open source technology to strengthen 
horizontal practices and initiatives. Leading 
urban civic institutions matter in this effort, 
but they tend to verticalise the work of 
making the urban. I think of this project 
as a sort of ‘Urban Wikileaks’. By this I 
mean, for instance, vertical institutions 
that begin to leak some of their power and 
bureaucratic control to a more generic 
operational space that enables citizens to 
work with at least some of what is useful in 
those leaks. This is akin to horizontalising 
what is now vertical, imposed by top-down 
authority and expertise. Developing an 
Urban Wikileaks would take cities in a very 
different direction from the intelligent city 
model – and for the better.
There is much work to be done. 
Recovering the incompleteness of cities 
means recovering a space where the work of 
open-sourcing the urban can thrive.
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Carlo Ratti and Anthony Townsend
n 25 January 2011 the 
streets of Cairo erupted 
in protest against the 
then President Hosni 
Mubarak’s repressive 
Egyptian regime. Over 
the next 72 hours the 
government shut down the country’s 
Internet service and mobile phone system 
in an attempt to squelch the rebellion. To 
no avail: a rich ecosystem of Facebook 
conversations, Twitter outbursts and chat 
room plans had already unified millions of 
Cairo’s people, who continued the relentless 
uprising. The government backed down 
and restored communications to keep the 
country’s economy on life support, but the 
masses kept up the pressure until Mubarak 
resigned two weeks later. 
Just weeks before, during Tunisia’s 
‘Dignity Revolution’, dissident blogger and 
protest organiser Slim Amamou used the 
mobile social app Foursquare to alert his 
friends of his 6 January arrest. By ‘checking 
in’ at Foursquare’s virtual depiction of the 
prison in Tunis where he was being held, 
Amamou revealed his location to a global 
web of supporters and immediately grabbed 
the international spotlight. The news stories 
sparked further uprisings, and long-time 
president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali was  
soon ousted. 
Across the archipelago of places where 
the ‘Arab Spring’ revolts played out, 
citizens used new Internet applications 
and ubiquitous mobile phones to wage 
a battle over the soul of their cities, 
shifting resources back and forth, from 
cyberspace to ‘cityspace’. Contrast those 
transformations with a handful of large 
urban development projects that have 
been vying to be crowned the model 
‘smart city’ of the future. Furthest along 
are the comprehensively pre-planned, 
walled community of 50,000, Masdar, 
outside Abu Dhabi, Songdo City in South 
Korea, and PlanIT Valley in Portugal, 
where experiments to determine how 
future cities will be built are carried out by 
governments, real estate developers, ICT 
companies, and designers. 
But as models, these top-down projects 
pale in comparison to the emergent 
form of intelligence that is bubbling up 
from millions of newly cyber-connected 
residents. Truly smart – and real – cities 
are not like an army regiment marching 
in lockstep to the commander’s orders; 
they are more like a shifting flock of birds 
or shoal of fish, in which individuals  
respond to subtle social and bhavioural 
cues from their neighbours about which 
way to move forward. Although the mobs 
in Cairo and Tunis appeared unruly, their 
actions resulted from digital coordination 
of human activity on an unprecedented 
scale. Hundreds of thousands of people 
appeared in Tahrir Square in Cairo because 
text messages and tweets summoned 
them – reflecting an immensely powerful, 
democratic and organic alternative vision of 
the smart city. 
Rather than focusing on the installation 
and control of network hardware, city 
governments, technology companies and 
their urban planning advisers can exploit a 
more ground-up approach to creating even 
smarter cities, in which people become the 
agents of change. With proper technical 
support structures, the populace can 
tackle problems such as energy use, traffic 
congestion, health care and education more 
effectively than centralised dictates can. 
And residents of wired cities can use their 
distributed intelligence to fashion new 
community activities, as well as a new kind 
of citizen activism. 
Going beyond urban efficiency 
Why are countries racing so haphazardly 
to implement smart cities? Why is IBM 
forecasting US$10 billion of revenue in its 
Smarter Planet initiative by 2015? What is 
happening at an urban scale today is similar 
to what happened two decades ago in 
Formula One. Up to that point, success on 
the circuit was primarily credited to a car’s 
mechanics and the driver’s capabilities. But 
then telemetry technology blossomed. The 
car was transformed into a computer that 
was monitored in real time by thousands of 
sensors, becoming ‘intelligent’ and better 
able to respond to the specific conditions of 
the race. 
In a similar way, over the past decade 
digital technologies have begun to blanket 
our cities, forming the backbone of a large, 
intelligent infrastructure. Broadband fibre 
optic and wireless telecommunications 
grids are supporting mobile phones, 
smartphones and tablets that are 
increasingly affordable. At the same time, 
open databases – especially from the 
government – that people can read and add 
to are revealing all kinds of information, 
and public kiosks and displays are helping 
both literate and illiterate people to access 
them. Add to this foundation a relentlessly 
growing network of sensors and digital-
control technologies, all tied together by 
cheap, powerful computers, and our cities 
are quickly becoming like ‘computers in the 
open air’. 
The vast amount of data that is 
emerging is the starting point for making 
efficient infrastructure programmable 
so that people can optimise a city’s daily 
processes. Extracting information about 
real-time road conditions, for example, can 
reduce traffic and improve air quality. In 
Stockholm’s road-pricing scheme, cameras 
automatically identify licence plates of 
vehicles entering the city centre and charge 
drivers’ accounts up to SEK60 (US$9, €7) 
a day, depending on where the cars go. The 
system has shortened the waiting time for 
vehicles traversing the central district by 
up to 50 per cent and has reduced pollutant 
emissions by up to 15 per cent. Similar 
technologies can help bring down water use 
(one example is being used by the Sonoma 
County Water Agency in California) and 
provide better services to citizens. 
Building from the bottom up 
If we focus on sociability as the starting 
point for design and tapping into citizens 
as the source of innovation, how do we go 
about crafting a smarter city? 
An ideal beginning is to leverage the 
growing array of smart personal devices we 
all wield and recruit people as the sensors 
of a city, rather than relying only on formal 
systems embedded into infrastructure. 
The traffic function on Google Maps is 
a good example. Instead of building a 
costly network of dedicated vehicle sensors 
along roads, Google constantly polls a 
large network of anonymous volunteers 
whose mobile devices report their up-
to-the-minute status, which reveals 
where traffic is flowing, has slowed or 
stopped. The information is delivered to 
drivers via mobile mapping applications 
in various ways: as coloured overlays 
indicating traffic speeds, as estimated 
driving times that account for delays, 
or as a factor in determining alternative 
routes. These handy data allow users to 
see the circulatory network of the city in 
real time and understand the constantly 
changing cost in time of getting from 
point A to point B. Although Google is 
certainly not a grassroots platform, this 
example shows how peer-to-peer sharing 
of sensory data can have a huge impact in 
helping to manage urban infrastructure. 
This scenario also shows how smart cities 
can be both sociable and more efficient 
without imposing order from above; you 
choose the best route based on your peers’ 
observations instead of being directed by 
traffic engineers. 
Google’s traffic app leverages a large 
base of existing consumer devices. But 
bottom-up approaches to sensing can also 
provide rapid, cheap deployment of new 
kinds of sensors that measure and record 
data about people’s activities, movements, 
surroundings and health. As recently as 
2009, Paris had fewer than a dozen ozone 
monitoring stations. To greatly expand 
this official data stream, the Green Watch 
project, overseen by Internet think tank 
Fing, distributed 200 smart devices to 
Parisians. The devices sensed ozone and 
noise levels as their wearers went about their 
daily lives, and the ongoing measurements 
were shared publicly through the Citypulse 
mapping engine. In the first trial, more 
than 130,000 measurements were taken 
in a single city district. The experiment 
showed how a grassroots sensory network 
could be deployed almost in an instant – at 
dramatically lower costs than expanding 
the city’s archaic fixed stations. The  
project also showed that citizens could  
become deeply engaged in environmental  
monitoring and regulation. Ultimately,  
sensors for grassroots networks will be  
built into everyday objects: phones, vehicles  
and clothing. 
Bottom-up approaches are also 
leveraging the sociability of cities to change 
patterns of activity. As the booming 
popularity of local shopping networks 
such as Groupon and LivingSocial shows, 
connecting local businesses and city 
dwellers through mobile social networks is 
a powerful catalyst for action. These new 
ways of scripting the city can create more 
lasting kinds of social touch points, too. 
The Foursquare mobile social network that 
Amamou used in Tunis can also turn going 
out into a kind of mobile game. It crowns 
the most frequent visitor to every cafe, bar 
and restaurant as the ‘mayor’ – a reference 
to the ‘self-appointed public characters’ 
described in 1961 by urbanist Jane Jacobs in 
The Death and Life of Great American Cities. 
Like the corner gossips that Jacobs argued 
were so critical to neighbourhood cohesion 
and safe streets, Foursquare’s mayors 
remind us that even the most intelligent of 
digital cities are vital because they are filled 
with interesting and accessible people. 
Carlo Ratti is Director of MIT Senseable City 
Lab. Anthony Townsend is research director 
at the Institute for the Future, Palo Alto.
This article is partially based on Carlo Ratti & Anthony 
Townsend, 2011, The Social Nexus, Scientific American (305), 
pp. 42-48.
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ensemble of these faceless buildings meant 
to create a sense of place. The structures 
are programmed simply as functions. 
Uniform architecture need not inevitably 
produce a dead environment, if there is 
some flexibility at the ground plane. In 
New York, for instance, the ground plane of 
essentially monotonous residential towers is 
subdivided into small irregular units, which 
yield, along the Third Avenue in the 1920s 
or again the 1960s to the 1990s, a sense of 
neighbourhood. But in Songdo, lacking that 
elemental principle of diversity within the 
block, there is nothing to be learnt from 
walking the streets. And user intelligence of 
urban space arises basically from ground-
plane experience.
When working in Mumbai, Urban Age 
research found Songdo-like efforts at urban 
design to be counterproductive. In Dharavi, 
a city in itself of nearly a million people, 
many efforts have been made to erase the 
anarchy that seems to reign on the streets, 
to push the built environment upward, off 
the street, in order to make it more orderly. 
These efforts have largely failed, rejected 
by people who instead use their own street 
smarts for survival. 
A Smart Smart City
A more intelligent attempt to create a smart 
city comes from work currently under way 
in Rio de Janeiro. Rio existed long before 
the computer, and its history includes 
the appearance of massive poverty and of 
violent crime, but equally of complex and 
living tissues of local life. Its collective 
physiology is not that of a well-balanced 
organism, made worse by its topography, a 
city subject to devastating flash floods. Yet 
its inhabitants, struggling against the odds, 
have made a life for themselves which most 
of them prize.
The role of new information 
technologies in such a city could not be 
more different than that in cities designed 
from scratch like Masdar and Songdo. Led 
by IBM, with assistance from Cisco and 
other subcontractors, the technologies 
have been applied to forecasting physical 
disasters, to coordinating responses to 
traffic crises, and to organising police 
work on crime. The new command centre 
for these activities, IBM’s local director 
tells us, looks forward to getting the city 
in reasonable condition to host the next 
Olympic Games. To make this centre 
work has required more political effort 
than sheer technological innovation, 
since Rio’s government bureaucracy has 
been a landscape of isolated silos; the 
implementation of new technology has 
required an engaged mayor.
The advent of computerised information 
sharing has not been entirely benign, in 
the eyes of some citizens, since the police 
can now be more coercive more effectively 
– and technological modernisation, like 
other forms of modernisation, can be used 
as a cover for disempowering or physically 
dispossessing the poor. Still, the principle 
of machine use here is coordination rather 
than prescription, as were the cases in 
Masdar and Songdo. The technology is 
meant to be responsive to conditions not of 
its own making. 
It could be objected that this comparison 
is unfair. Would not people in the favelas 
prefer, if they had a choice, a pre-organised, 
already-planned place in which to live? The 
research Urban Age has carried out over the 
last years suggests that once urbanites rise 
above the poverty level, they in fact don’t. 
The prospect of the orderly city has not be 
a lure for voluntary migration, neither in 
the past to European cities, nor today to the 
sprawling cities of South America and Asia. 
If they have a choice, people want a more 
open, indeterminate city in which to make 
their way: that is how they can come to take 
ownership over their own lives. 
Open and Closed Systems
There is a formal issue involved here: the 
contrast between the determinative and 
the coordinative use of technology shows 
at a deeper level the difference between a 
closed and an open system. Put simply, a car 
engine is a closed system while a discussion 
is, or should be, an open system. More 
detailed, in a closed system unforeseen 
activity is either integrated into the existing 
rules – the algorithms – of the system, or 
expelled as irrelevant ‘noise’. Both feedback 
loops and exclusion help the closed system 
maintain equilibrium. Whereas in an open 
system, balance is not so much the aim: 
the system is programmed to evolve, being 
open to the unforeseen, changing its very 
structure as it absorbs new data. ‘Noise’ 
is valued. Another way to think about the 
difference is that open and closed equate 
linear and non-linear. In a closed system, 
when change occurs it is meant to happen in 
a one-after-another problem-solving fashion, 
whereas the process of change in an open 
system does not try to resolve all conflicts; 
its greater emphasis on chance means that 
the system inhabits non-linear time.
Cities are open, non-linear systems. 
They grow in unpredictable ways, which 
would be missed by closed-system thinking. 
For instance, increasing population density 
in cities follows an erratic, non-linear path 
– even more so in today’s Asian and Latin 
American megacities than in the European 
cities of the nineteenth century. It would be 
bad science if we tried to model this growth 
using closed-system concepts of equilibrium 
and integration. Again, at a certain point 
large size and high density make for new 
urban forms; Rio is something more of a 
public realm than the addition of all its 
individual streets. The danger of much 
closed-system urbanism is to treat the city 
instead as nodes and locales that can be 
added up, a linear progression up from the 
small to the large or down from the large 
to the small. Exactly this kind of urbanism 
appears in the planning of Masdar and 
Songdo.
Informality
In sum, a better use of new technologies 
would focus more on coordination than 
on command, and it would suppose an 
evolutionary, open system rather than 
a steady-state, closed system. Further, 
smart-smart urbanism should follow 
specific planning principles, privileging 
the complexity of ground-plane design, 
recognising the cognitive value of 
pedestrian experience. The result would be 
that technology might aid informal social 
relations rather than repress informality 
in the name of coherent control. The use of 
Facebook in the Arab Spring of 2011 is an 
obvious and extreme example of doing so, 
but in more peaceful urban conditions why 
should we want to marry the technological 
and the informal?
Informal social processes are the genius 
of the city – the source of innovation 
economically and the foundation of an 
arousing social life. Technology must be 
part of the process of giving the city that 
informal energy – and can do so, if we think 
of our new technological tools as enabling 
the open systems of the city.
Richard Sennett is Professor of Sociology at 
LSE and New York University.
the stupefying 
smart city
Richard Sennett
hroughout the history 
of technology, new tools 
have come into being 
before people know 
how to use them well. 
This is the problem we 
face with today’s new 
‘smart city’ tools – the CCTV cameras, 
motion sensors, and computers capable of 
processing immense amounts of data. The 
problem is in a way understandable. It takes 
a long time and much experiment, entailing 
failure as well as success, to plumb a tool’s 
possibilities. This was the case, for instance, 
of the hardened-edge scalpel, which 
appeared in the sixteenth century: surgeons 
required nearly a century to figure out best 
practices and innovative operations with a 
super sharp knife. 
But tools for the smart city come with 
a sting in the tail. Their application can 
inhibit experiment by ordinary urbanites 
in their everyday lives. A large city can be 
thought of as a complex organism whose 
innards do not work perfectly in sync, 
whose parts do not add up to a unified 
whole. Yet there is something valuable just 
about these dissonances. They can create 
opportunities economically, when someone 
seizes on a market irregularity, while 
lack of coherent control enables personal 
liberty, and disorder might make subjective 
experience rich and multi-layered – at least 
novelists from Defoe to Proust hoped so. 
To take advantage of these possibilities, 
the big city needs to be learnt. The risk is 
that new technologies might repress the 
inductive and deductive processes people 
use to make sense, for themselves, of the 
complex conditions in which they live. The 
smart city would then become a stupefying 
smart city.
When a new tool proves deadening 
rather than liberating in use, our first 
instinct may be to blame the machine 
itself. That is what Lyon’s silk weavers in 
the eighteenth century did; they attacked 
mechanised looms as ‘perfidious works of 
the devil’. Instead of blaming the machine, 
we want to ask how the new urban 
technologies can be used more intelligently 
– which is more a question about urban 
planning and vision than about machinery. 
What kinds of urban design empower 
people in the street to experiment with 
their behaviour, and to draw their own 
conclusions from those experiments?
In the 1930s, urbanists like the 
American Lewis Mumford and architects 
like the Swiss Sigfried Giedion worried 
about machines and materials in relation 
to urban design. Mumford challenged 
the urban planners’ uncritical embrace 
of the automobile; Giedion attacked 
the architects’ conservative use of new 
building materials. Digital technology 
has shifted the technological focus to 
information processing. This can occur 
in handhelds linked to ‘clouds’ or in 
command and control centres. The issue 
is: who controls such information and how 
is this information organised? Which in 
turn raises new issues of urban design. The 
questions the technology poses are much 
more profound than which software to buy.
In this light, I want to make first a 
comparison between designs that create 
a stupefying smart city and designs that 
envision a stimulating smart city. By 
drawing this contrast, a formal issue then 
appears: that of the difference between a 
closed and an open system.  And a social 
possibility emerges as well: the use of 
stimulating, open system technology to 
render the city more informal. My own 
comments here draw on a decade of 
research done by Urban Age on the visual 
and social conditions that can enable 
urbanites to take ownership over their lives.
Two Stupefying Smart Cities
Imagine that you are a masterplanner 
facing a blank computer screen and that 
you can design a city from scratch, free to 
incorporate every bit of high tech into your 
design. You might come up with Masdar, 
in the United Arab Emirates, or Songdo, 
in South Korea.  These are two versions of 
the stupefying smart city, Masdar the more 
famous, or infamous, Songdo the more 
fascinating in a perverse way.
Masdar is a half-built city rising out 
of the desert, planning of which has been 
overseen by the master architect Norman 
Foster. The plan comprehensively lays 
out the activities of the city, in which 
technology monitors and regulates the 
function from a central command centre. 
This is to conceive of the city in ‘Fordist’ 
terms – that is, each activity has an 
appropriate place and time. Urbanites 
become consumers of choices laid out for 
them by prior calculations of where to shop 
or to get a doctor the most efficiently.
Such practical knowledge is always 
necessary; the question is how urbanites 
get it. Foster’s idea is that there is a one-
way flow from the central command centre 
(CCC) to the handheld. The handheld (that 
is, the urbanite) can report information, 
but the CCC makes the interpretation 
of what it means and how the handheld 
should act upon it. Masdar is an extreme 
in this, and also in conceiving that no 
knowledge of the city has to be fought for. 
So there’s no cognitive stimulation through 
trial and error, no personal encounter 
with resistance. User-friendly in Foster’s 
plan – expensive fantasy that it is – means 
choosing menu options rather than creating 
the menu.
There is a further issue here: creating 
a new menu entails, as it were, being in 
the wrong place at the wrong time. In 
nineteenth-century European cities, for 
instance, new markets for semi-legal 
goods developed at the supposedly dead 
zones near the city’s walls; so in twentieth-
century American cities like Boston, new 
‘brain industries’ developed at the edges, 
in places whose zoning never imagined 
their growth. Foster’s idea of the city on 
the contrary assumes a clairvoyant sense of 
what should grow where. Put crudely, the 
city is over-zoned: the algorithms of the 
CPU do not envision their own violation.
Songdo represents the stupefying 
smart city in its architectural aspect. It 
is no accident that Songdo is so badly 
designed. The massive units of housing 
are not conceived as structures with any 
individuality in themselves, nor are the 
The virtual and the physical create new spaces  
of association (Royal Festival Hall, London)
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Dan Hill 
he promise of smart 
sustainable cities is 
predicated on the 
harmonious interplay 
of three forces: the 
dynamics of social 
media, allied to the 
analytics of Big Data, generated by a ‘self-
aware’ urban infrastructure. Can these 
three forces be held in a productive tension? 
Can we harness emergent urbanism to the 
centralising tendencies of smart urban 
infrastructure? Are the biases inherent 
within social media consistent with the 
need for a broader civic empathy to address 
urban sustainability? Are we working with 
the primary drivers of urban life, or with 
the secondary drivers of infrastructural 
efficiency? As Cedric Price said in the mid-
1960s: ‘Technology is the answer. But what 
is the question?’ This essay focuses on the 
issue that in smart cities, as much as with 
any other technology-led visions, we spend 
too little time thinking about questions.
The vision of the smart city tends to 
focus on feedback loops generated by 
infrastructure, buildings, and vehicles, 
often by people looking for clients among 
national and municipal governments. But 
the city is something else: it consists of 
its people. We do not make cities to make 
buildings and infrastructure, we make cities 
in order to come together, to create wealth 
and culture. As social animals, we chose the 
city so that we could be with other people. 
Buildings, vehicles and infrastructure are 
mere enablers, not drivers. 
To see the city as a complex system to 
be optimised, made efficient, made smart, 
is to read the city along only one axis. But 
luckily, we are seeing more ‘smart citizens’ 
than ‘smart cities’; citizens use social media 
and related technologies to organise and 
act, through a flurry of crowd-sourced, 
crowd-funding platforms and collaborative 
city making. This crowd-led smart city 
needs no marketing and little urban 
infrastructure. It relies on loosely joined 
up open networks overlaid onto the city. 
Active citizens are knitting together their 
own smart city, albeit not the one envisaged 
by the systems’ integrators and technology 
corporations. Might this process alone 
deliver resilient urban environments?
The answer may be in the weak signals 
that indicate citizens are increasingly 
engaged in making decisions about 
their cities. Again, at its most viscerally 
obvious, we can see this in Tahrir Square, 
Zuccotti Park, Athens, Madrid, or recent 
underreported protests in urban China. 
Yet for all their impact, Occupy, the Arab 
Spring and last year’s UK riots have not 
projected any kind of alternative structure 
for a new, resilient decision-making culture. 
Their effects tend to be unpredictable  
and uneven. 
Beyond these flashpoints, however, 
we can see numerous examples of a more 
systemic change: urban activism becoming 
urban activity. They enable the exploits 
of urban activists – today’s equivalents 
of the heroics that produced New York’s 
High Line, London’s Coin Street, or Renew 
Newcastle in Australia, for instance – to be 
shared, copied, translated and scaled. What 
these emerging tools deliver is a blueprint 
for more rapid, even, and sustained change. 
Due to the inherent dynamics and platform 
characteristics of social media, such tools 
suggest a new interface with the city that 
could, potentially, alter the way in which 
most citizens interact with it.
Over the last year many cities have 
witnessed an explosion in crowd-sourcing 
and crowd-funding platforms. In the wake 
of the increasingly high-profile crowd-
funding platform Kickstarter, and popping 
up at the rate of one every couple of weeks, 
new platforms include Neighborland, In 
Our Backyard, SpaceHive, Brickstarter, 
Neighbor.ly, Change By Us, Give A 
Minute, Smallknot, Joukkoenkeli, Lucky 
Ant, I Make Rotterdam, as well as several 
more general crowd-funding services, 
occasionally bent into shape to serve as 
urban incubators – such as Indiegogo, 
PeopleFundIt, PleaseFundUs, Crowdfunder, 
and Kickstarter itself.
Behind all these initiatives sits the basic 
notion that someone thinks of and pitches a 
local project, and people in the community 
‘back’ that idea, typically donating small 
amounts of funding. The network effects 
of social media and the architecture of 
contemporary websites enable the projects 
to be tracked, discussed, updated, voted 
upon and funded. Several crowd-funding 
projects indicate that they might be able 
to generate significant resources, certainly 
enough to build catalytic funding at the 
start of projects, alongside mechanisms for 
otherwise backing, discussing or sharing 
best practice or tacit knowledge about how 
to get things done.
This last aspect may be key. 
Traditionally, ‘bottom-up’ urban activism 
is the province of an individual who wants 
to give up every weekend for years, battling 
bureaucracy and inertia. They have to learn 
w
from scratch in each instance, as there are 
no breadcrumb trails to follow. With new 
platforms deployed, activism might become 
something akin to plain old activity, in 
which citizens are more deeply woven into 
the fabric of their city’s decision making, 
by leaving traces for others to follow. This 
is the kind of thing the Web has done since 
day one. 
Entirely new governance models are 
implied as a result, with far more frequent, 
open and active engagement than a vote 
in the municipal elections every four 
years. City halls rarely have a meaningful 
‘suggestions box’ on the front door, and 
these new platforms could be just that. By 
shifting where and how ideas come from, 
they might reverse a NIMBY (Not In My 
Backyard) tendency such that it becomes 
YIMBY (Yes In My Backyard!) through 
genuine collaboration and participation 
in city making, in stark contrast to the 
dreaded ‘consultation’.
Equally, such systems might be read 
as ‘desire paths’ for a more ongoing, 
everyday form of deliberative democracy 
in urban governance. The promise is 
that, through the familiar transformative 
effects of ‘The Network’, the practice of 
urban development itself might change 
radically. This is in direct contrast to the 
public perception of the current system, 
where lumbering and opaque urban 
planning functions as a countervailing force 
against developers and politicians who are 
inevitably ‘on the make’. 
The premise behind this argument is 
that citizens want to engage in their city; 
that it is citizens, not planning departments 
or property developers, who are best placed 
to notice, suggest, aggregate and drive a 
certain kind of urban intervention. This 
‘Kickstarter urbanism’ is typically oriented 
towards the small things in cities – let’s turn 
this parking lot into a community garden, 
let’s renovate a co-working space, let’s start 
a bike-sharing scheme – rather than taking 
on urban governance models, or attempting 
to fund large-scale infrastructure.
This in itself is not a criticism: what city 
would not benefit from people caring about 
the small things? But is there maybe the 
lingering sense that this might be a little 
‘bread and circuses’? A stream of micro-
distractions to occupy the community, 
focusing citizens on trying to crowd-
fund a park bench while the big boys in 
government get on with the big stuff – 
education, transport systems, energy policy, 
grand civic buildings, housing, and so on?
Social media can help catalyse an Arab 
Spring, but when used for a more local issue 
elsewhere – like Neighborland,enabling  
a proposal to extend commuter rail in  
Denver – it only attracts 50 ‘neighbours’  
who agreed with the proposal. Their  
well-meaning comments are unlikely to  
change the situation much – that billions  
of dollars would need to be found, 
somehow, from within a culture not 
particularly predisposed to funding 
sustainable public transit. Neighborland is 
a wonderful example of a new platform, but 
it is, in itself, not enough to create a new 
decision-making culture for making more 
sustainable decisions. 
Although omnipresent, social media 
still betray the cultural conditions they 
were created in. NYU/Harvard Law School 
researcher Alice Marwick’s analysis of 
social media centres on the assertion 
that they breed what she calls ‘status 
seeking behaviour’ (‘self-branding’) 
within a ‘competitive attention economy’, 
transposing a Silicon Valley-derived 
model of neo-liberal principles onto social 
organisation. Douglas Rushkoff described 
a related set of biases in his book, Program 
or Be Programmed, in which he identifies 
decentralising or individualising tendencies. 
For Malcolm Gladwell, the critique rests on 
a variant of ‘bread and circuses’, that social 
media do not generate ties strong enough 
to engender the genuine action required to 
change a regime – or perhaps a city. Either 
way, side-stepping the question of ideology, 
if we accept that sustainability ultimately 
requires an intrinsic selflessness – right 
now, it is about subsequent generations, 
distant lands, global conditions, and often  
it is not in my backyard – then this should 
be, at the very least, a red warning light on 
the dashboard. 
All of this can be contested, of course. 
Clay Shirky’s response to the Gladwell’s 
critique, for instance, must be taken on 
board. He says that while digital networks 
‘do not (necessarily) allow otherwise 
uncommitted groups to take effective 
political action… they do, however, allow 
committed groups to play by new rules.’ 
The Network’s ability to connect can, 
of course, enable civic empathy as much 
as it destroys it – depending on how we 
work with its tools and materials. There is 
genuine potential in the new tools, if we see 
them as sketches and not as solutions. One 
might take these settling design patterns 
and scale them up to a new form of urban 
governance, based on more frequent, more 
engaged, shared decision making, and not 
simply in bread and circuses mode. And 
one could shape those governance cultures 
in such a way that they counterbalance the 
potentially destructive individualistic biases 
within social media, enabling citizens to 
act with meaningful responsibility for their 
city. Government is there to take disruptive 
innovations and productively absorb them 
into a resilient system, such that it smothers 
social inequalities and generates broader 
access. That goal need not be solely achieved 
through our current systems of increasingly 
disengaged citizenship. 
There is only one way to find out what 
balancing act might thrive under these new 
conditions, and that is to try it. ‘Trying it’ 
means considered, iterative prototyping of 
user-centred platforms; local experiments 
that can nonetheless scale up, and that are 
produced by designers, coders and city 
managers who understand both the Web 
and the city. There is no fundamental reason 
why municipalities could not work in this 
way, in terms of their strategic positioning, 
function and history. What if government 
was directly and boldly prototyping 
new versions of itself, using these new 
technologies: starting small, pivoting 
and scaling up, as all robust, resilient 
and popular contemporary systems do? 
It might be that a sense of public good, of 
civic responsibility, could be found within 
such a re-calibrated approach to municipal 
government. 
We are in a radically different urban 
condition than the post-Enlightenment 
era in which we invented the modern 
municipality. Not just in terms of built 
fabric, whose significance is overplayed due 
to its sheer obviousness, but in terms of our 
highly interconnected patterns of living. 
The nature of our challenges are entirely 
different, with climate change the clearest 
example. The very idea of the city as a public 
good fundamentally rests on our ability 
to transform our municipalities for the 
twenty-first century. And the very idea of 
the sustainable city relies on understanding 
that the city is a public good.
For if sustainability requires us to 
think long term, we must surely create 
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here parks, boulevards 
and towering 
skyscrapers now await 
an increasing influx of 
inhabitants, not so long 
ago there used to be only 
water, just plain, grey 
ocean. On 610 hectares (2.35 square miles) 
of reclaimed land in the greater Seoul 
area, at a projected cost of US$35 (€27) 
billion, Songdo City is being built from 
scratch. Conceived in the wake of the Asian 
economic crisis, the city is located in a free 
economic zone and intended to become 
an important business hub in Northeast 
Asia. A 7.5 mile (12 km) long suspension 
bridge connects Songdo with Incheon 
International Airport, placing it within an 
hour or two from many major metropolitan 
areas in the region: the ideal place to set 
out from for an afternoon business meeting 
in Tokyo or a weekend shopping spree in 
Shanghai. Songdo has been hailed as a ‘city 
of the future’1, and as an ‘experimental 
prototype community of tomorrow’2. As a 
complete greenfield development, it stands 
the unique chance of becoming one of the 
first genuinely smart and ubiquitous cities, 
and thus a role model for similar projects 
all over the world, designed to house the 
hundreds of millions who are projected to 
move into cities in the near future.
The vision for Songdo is largely 
technological, driven by an engineering 
perspective. In recent years, a number of 
companies have recognised the apparently 
huge potential for modern information 
technologies to transform the cityscape. 
IBM has launched its Smarter Planet 
initiative, for example, while Siemens 
has established a fourth company sector 
focusing on infrastructure and cities. 
Cisco, an American company specialising 
in networking equipment, is heavily 
investing in urban innovations with 
its Smart+Connected Communities 
programme. Cisco in particular is heavily 
involved in Songdo and considers it a 
‘model for smart cities around the globe’3.
Cisco’s brochures summarise the central 
idea behind building smart cities with a 
remarkable statement: ‘the foundation for 
the city of the future will be the network 
and the information it carries’4. Supposedly, 
one starts with the network and everything 
else will follow. Of course, this network has 
a technological component that links up 
with different infrastructure systems, like 
transport, health care, education, or energy. 
But in the end it will serve the needs of the 
people, support the social networks in the 
city and beyond. This essay is an attempt to 
elaborate on the issues that are involved in a 
vision of the city as network5.
Connecting people through things
Looming in the background is the familiar 
vision of the Internet of Things, which 
predicts an extension of the Internet 
into ever more realms of the physical 
world. An increasing number of objects 
will be recognisable through ID tags, 
will be equipped with sensors to collect 
information, and will, through radio 
transmitters, be integrated into the larger 
network. Supposedly, this will create smart 
and sensing environments that can adjust to 
human needs in sophisticated ways. There 
will be a steady flow of information that 
links the physical with the social world and 
the data cloud. To a considerable extent, 
the Internet of Things has already become 
reality. Many mobile phones or CCTV 
cameras are integrated in this network now, 
and other objects, like cars or televisions, 
are likely to follow soon. In Songdo, IT 
specialists experiment with tele-presence 
systems that are supposed to deliver 
education, healthcare, and government 
services directly into the homes. Lampposts 
equipped with public Wi-Fi, CCTV and 
information services are set up all over  
the city.
As the Internet expands, the principles 
that now govern the digital world will 
increasingly determine the physical world 
and the conditions of urban living. The 
infrastructural networks will become 
increasingly autonomous and less 
dependent on human intervention. And yet, 
their ultimate purpose remains to connect 
people and their needs. As the techno-
social networks around us grow tighter, 
the social and the technological spheres 
will become increasingly interdependent. 
The data stored in the networks will 
make our steps through the cityscape 
increasingly predictable and, eventually, 
also controllable.
The skewed city
From a social perspective, objective  
physical space has always been an 
illusion, if a persistent one6. Networks 
are a much more adequate representation 
of the social world; of friendships, 
romantic relationships, family bonds, or 
professional interactions. Humans pertain 
to a large number of highly complex and 
interconnected networks. Each of these 
comes equipped with its own metric 
system, determining the distances between 
the various actors in society. These metrics 
often differ enormously from each other 
between networks and also from physical 
space. Indeed, most social networks are 
only remotely constrained by their physical 
substrate: one may live at a distance of  
a thousand miles from a good friend, but 
in terms of a friendship network be direct 
neighbours.
A major force driving infrastructural 
evolution has consisted in the need to 
overcome the various restrictions imposed 
by physical space in order to enable more 
flexible social networks. With regards to 
communication, the advent of the Internet 
is certainly one of the biggest leaps towards 
making physical distances irrelevant.
As modern information infrastructure 
allows citizens to become enmeshed in a 
growing number of ever more complex 
and interconnected networks, traditional 
places and boundaries of the social sphere 
rearrange themselves, or completely 
disappear. With respect to physical space, 
the network structures of the city become 
increasingly skewed. Once familiar 
locations, like the library, the travel agency, 
the flea market or the department store, lose 
their spatial reference points and dissolve 
into a diffuse data cloud. Long established 
boundaries, which were once all referenced 
by physical space, between home and work, 
the public and the private, the commercial 
and the non-branded, or the urban and the 
rural, become increasingly blurry. 
The network as carrier of social evolution
To further emphasise why networks are 
so important for understanding the social 
dimension of city life, it is useful to refer 
to a somewhat obscure social theory 
developed by the French sociologist Gabriel 
Tarde in the last decades of the nineteenth 
century. Tarde insisted that everything 
social results from repeated imitation, 
which is only occasionally interrupted 
by more or less ingenious invention. The 
theory holds the germ of a powerful idea, 
recently popularised through Oxford 
biologist Richard Dawkin’s concept of 
the meme7. In an analogy to the gene, 
a meme is the basic entity that drives 
cultural and social development according 
to evolutionary principles. Supposedly, 
evolution is not restricted to the genome but 
results whenever the following conditions 
are fulfilled: there must be a) a copying 
mechanism, b) the possibility for mutations 
in a copy, and c) a selection mechanism that 
singles out those copies that are particularly 
well adapted to the environment.
If Tarde were right and much of the 
dynamics of the social sphere is guided 
by imitation, then the development of 
traditions and customs should indeed 
follow evolutionary principles, but also the 
development of more specific everyday, 
professional, or even technological 
skills. There is little reason to doubt the 
significance of imitation to our social 
lives. From the first days in this world, 
throughout the various phases of education 
and training, we are constantly copying 
skills and behaviours from others: from  
role models in the family, among friends,  
at school, or at work. And only every once 
in a while we step back and try to reflect 
on what we are actually doing, often in an 
attempt to introduce small mutations in 
order to optimise.
Why is this perspective on social 
evolution relevant for the view of the city 
as network? Because social networks have 
in essence become the topologies that 
determine the dynamics of imitation. 
Copies of certain ideas and behaviour are 
now mainly exchanged via the links of 
social networks. Network structures thus 
determine who can serve as role model, and 
from whom we can imitate. It is therefore 
crucial to grasp the basic principles of the 
networks in which we are entangled.
A science of networks
Until the 1990s, graph or network theory 
was largely a mathematical specialism 
with very few everyday or real-world 
applications. This changed completely with 
the advent of the computer and its power 
to analyse large datasets, and also with the 
emergence of the Internet and the World 
Wide Web as examples of large network 
structures. Today, the study of real-world 
networks has become a major industry in 
various scientific fields, including biology, 
engineering, and the social sciences8. 
The emerging science of networks has 
helped unearth some general principles 
that are realised in many social and 
technological networks. Most networks 
arise from feedback mechanisms, for 
example, where the simple fact that a 
certain node already has a large number 
of links increases the probability that it 
will acquire new ones, in the same way as 
a person who already has many friends is 
likely to make new friends more easily: not  
because he is such a great guy, but just 
because it is nice to have popular friends.  
As a result of such feedback mechanisms 
many networks have a similar structure: 
with very few extensively linked nodes,  
and a large majority of nodes with only  
a small number of links.
If we follow that principle, obnoxious 
YouTube videos apparently become viral not 
so much due to their content, but somewhat 
paradoxically due to their very popularity. 
Also, the rise of websites like Amazon, 
Facebook, eBay or Google is due in part  
to feedback mechanisms, and a subsequent 
winner-takes-it-all phenomenon. These  
are obvious examples, in which changes  
in network structure have a decisive impact 
on economic and social conditions9. As  
the Internet expands into the physical 
world, one can only speculate on how the 
basic principles of large-scale networks  
will further transform our social and 
cultural lives.
Linking things and data
A number of interesting questions arise in 
connection with the integration of objects 
into the Internet. Will future smart and 
sensing infrastructures have a memory 
of past interactions, like websites like 
Amazon, Google or Facebook now have? 
Will these infrastructures at one point 
become personalised10, as those websites 
are, presenting a best guess of what a user 
wants on the basis of their history? Such, 
and similar possibilities are already being 
explored at innovative research centres like 
the Media Lab11 at MIT. It is quite plausible 
that smart infrastructures will one day, in 
the not too distant future, be so flexible  
as to predict and respond to specific user 
needs. Simple examples may be adaptive 
lighting in public places, or adaptive driving 
behaviour of cars. 
This sketch of some general features of 
the networked city and society leaves us 
in a better position to assess if places like 
Songdo indeed constitute a step towards 
the city of the future. Songdo seems 
determined by an engineering vision, by 
the technologically possible. However, at 
least up to its current state of development, 
it largely fails to address the social 
ramifications that are directly implied by 
the technological innovations used. Future 
city designs will have to more profoundly 
consider certain topics, like the shift in 
spatial relations implied by changing 
network structures, or the increasing 
dissolution of familiar social spaces and 
boundaries. They will also have to take 
into account that cityscapes will become 
increasingly dominated by the flexible, 
personalised, and responsive infrastructures 
that are a direct consequence of the Internet 
of Things. All these developments lead to 
a further merging of the social and the 
technical spheres, eventually realising a 
cyborg vision of the city as a complex socio-
technical network.
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decision-making cultures that not only 
take the tendencies of these swirling 
vortices of individualism and short-
termism into account, but actively counter 
them. Like judo, we might need to use the 
powerful dynamics of social media against 
themselves. Otherwise these opposing 
forces may cause shared cultures to tear 
themselves apart. 
What possible models for cooperative 
urban governance might emerge? Do we 
need a city in which citizens understand 
that they are part of a wider, more holistic 
system, and act accordingly? To be actively 
engaged with, as opposed to being passively 
observed and ‘fed back to’, as is the case 
with most myopic smart city visions? How 
might we enable patterns of sustainable 
living that nonetheless recognise that 
cities thrive on the very unpredictability 
and inefficiency of citizens; that the 
city’s ecosystems will refuse to settle in 
‘natural equilibrium’? How might we 
guide and shape a resilient city through 
shared governance cultures based on its 
incompleteness, openness and a sense  
of possibility, recognising that the city is  
a process, not a mere accretion  
of infrastructure?
Are we sure that these ideas – drivers 
and enablers, unpredictability and 
inefficiency, prototyping and pivoting, 
personal and civic responsibility, active 
citizens and active municipalities, the city 
as public good, recalibrated governance – 
are part of the emerging smart city vision? 
For these are all part of what makes a city 
work, what makes a resilient city and  
what makes a good city rather than just  
a smart city.
Dan Hill is the CEO of Fabrica.
energetic
society
Maarten Hajer and Hiddo Huitzing
he Dutch urban 
developer Dirk 
Frieling noted that 
‘rather than a densely 
populated country, 
The Netherlands is 
more like a sparsely 
populated city’. His words are still reason 
for pause for thought. Cities do not end 
at their municipal limits, and, in fact, 
they often spread out over regions. This 
is significant, especially because people 
who interact with each other, face to face 
in business districts, universities or city 
centres, often commute on regional scales. 
CEOs seldom live on their companies’ 
doorsteps. These kinds of cities are 
constructed from a kaleidoscope of places 
and experiences. A city’s diversity, the 
activities that take place within it, and 
the mutual relationships between its 
inhabitants often determine that city’s 
strengths or weaknesses. A city is not only 
morphology: it is also about connections 
and spatial structures. Strong cities have 
energy, which cannot be attributed to 
the actions of local government. Yet, 
government has an important role to play 
in engendering such energy. The task is 
to determine what kind of governance 
philosophy would fit such a city, to generate 
a new form of energetic urban society.
The resolution of big issues is 
conventionally thought to require large 
government decisions. In this case, 
however, thinking big may not be the 
answer to today’s problems. We have left the 
era of Le Corbusier behind. For the twenty-
first century, the strength of the city must 
be sought in new relationships between 
government, citizens and the business 
community. All too often, government 
agencies alienate themselves from citizens, 
taking the moral high ground and 
intervening in a top-down manner. 
In the ‘energetic society’, city 
governments can make more and better use 
of the energy embedded within a society, 
shaping its policies through positive and 
negative incentives, and setting medium- 
and long-term public goals. Sustainability 
is one such goal. Between now and 2030, 
the world must find a way of decoupling 
human welfare from the use of the earth’s 
resources and its environmental effects. 
The relationship between the residential 
environments and global issues is 
abundantly clear to anyone tracing the 
origins of our food, transportation or home 
furnishings. The urban hinterland covers 
the globe and includes a huge variety of 
services, goods, materials, as well as flows 
of money, people and information. Every 
day container ships from around the world 
enter the port of Rotterdam to deliver flat 
screens, smartphones and the latest fashion 
items to cities and surrounding areas. The 
production and distribution of food, for 
example, involves a meticulously planned 
global logistics chain. Our daily lives are 
local in perception, but global if we take 
the logistics of production, use of resources 
and resulting emissions into account. Both 
citizens and public administrators seem to 
realise that liveable, clean cities are likely 
to be the champions of the future; not only 
because of the size of their share in the 
use of physical resources, but also because 
cultural change must begin within cities, in 
order to continue along the road we are on. 
The fossil fuel era will not end because 
of a lack of coal, just as the Stone Age 
did not end because people ran out of 
stones. Literature on ‘the history of 
the environment’ shows that major 
breakthroughs were often attributed to a 
reorientation of values, with city dwellers 
always playing an important role. Such 
shifts in values can be seen today in 
societies where citizens want to generate 
their own power, and where companies 
that base their business cases on green 
operational models are the leaders and 
frontrunners in their field. However, 
government policy is lagging behind. When 
urban civil society adopts these new values, 
a new perspective on the future of cities will 
emerge.
Just as ‘high carbon’ could soon become 
synonymous with ‘high risk’, conversely 
a low-carbon profile could boost a city’s 
image. The idea of a liveable, innovative 
city with a good air quality that makes 
efficient use of increasingly expensive 
resources is a visible leitmotiv for many 
urban administrators. But even so, the 
question is how to harness the energetic city 
to achieve a sustainable world. The answer 
will not come from large-scale governance 
delivering a masterplan, but will require 
individual administrators channelling 
societal energy in the right direction.
A society of well-educated and articulate 
citizens places large demands on public 
administration. Attempts to ‘capture 
and store’ CO2 emissions underground 
in empty gas fields, has proven difficult 
and controversial in the Dutch town of 
Barendrecht, and the main reason is that its 
citizens were treated as if they were objects. 
The debate was framed in technological 
terms, with little consideration for their 
desires and fears. This emphasis on 
technology is also apparent in the thinking 
around sustainable cities. Solutions that 
regard the inhabitants of cities as objects are 
likely to be met with resistance, irrespective 
of whether those solutions come from a 
top-down government, or from a top-down 
technocratic perspective. Moreover, around 
70 per cent of European cities that will be 
in existence in 2050 are already here. Over 
the coming decades they will merely be 
expanded or retrofitted to varying degrees. 
The main challenge facing these cities will 
be to improve and restructure existing 
urbanisation. With respect to the future, it 
will, therefore, be today’s cities that lead us 
into the next phase.
The examples show that the transition 
towards a sustainable society cannot 
be achieved by government decree or 
technology alone, and certainly not 
without the participation of urban citizens. 
Increasingly, citizens, businesses and local 
governments are taking the initiative, 
obtaining their information from online 
networks. A scenario in which public 
administration focuses on governance, 
instead of being a government agent, must 
be created through collaboration between 
citizens and government. Only then can 
both parties approach each other in a 
positive way, resolving disagreements 
and facing challenges such as urban 
agriculture, local energy generation, and 
the setting of climate-neutral goals. In the 
business community this can be observed 
in the strategic reorientation of companies 
like DSM, Unilever, Tesco and the Van 
Gansewinkel Groep. The key feature of 
these initiatives is the evident shift in values, 
not the change in CO2 emission levels. 
These changes put the government into a 
somewhat awkward position; society, in 
these cases, is more involved in the complex 
difficult transition than the government 
itself. Although this concerns only a small 
part of society, it could also present an 
opportunity for policy to play a role.
A recent report by the Dutch 
government on ‘The Energetic Society’ states 
that government currently does not utilise 
all of the creativity and learning capacities 
present within society. Concepts such as 
‘Empowered Deliberative Democracy’ 
(EDD) and ‘information society’ give 
a new perspective on the political and 
institutional dimension of the energetic 
society. EDD was developed as a concept 
in 2001 to describe the innovative ways in 
which governments can utilise the energy 
and impact of ordinary citizens to achieve 
institutional reform. Combining everyday 
practice with communication, responsibility 
and deliberation, it extends beyond 
abstract issues (such as conflicting values, 
justification) and focuses on concrete issues 
(such as repairing potholes, improving 
schools and managing nature reserves). 
One of the basic principles of EDD is to 
focus on specific, tangible problems, the 
engagement of ordinary citizens and public 
administrators at a local level, and to jointly 
search for solutions to those problems. The 
technical possibilities offered by Web 2.0 
to create two-way communication, as well 
as the increase of information available, 
provide the right circumstances for hands-
on involvement of articulate citizens and 
companies in formulating sustainability 
and local environmental policies.
Urban citizens within the energetic 
society also create new structures 
themselves – by calling on the government 
to take responsibility, by focusing attention 
on tangible problems, and by searching 
for solutions through deliberation. In 
such cases, existing rules can hinder the 
development of new, previously unimagined 
and unconventional forms of collaboration, 
particularly in the field of energy. Surplus 
heat can, for example, be used to heat 
houses, flat school roofs can provide space 
for solar panels that generate power for their 
neighbourhood, and PV installations are 
cheaper when they are bought and installed 
in bulk. However, citizens are discouraged 
from collaborating in these unconventional 
ways by rules and costs, such as higher 
taxation on small-scale consumption, which 
become barriers to using innovative social 
sources of energy. 
The twenty-first century may very 
well see a return to spruced up versions of 
former social forms of collaboration, such 
as cooperatives and societies – citizens’ 
associations, focused on incorporating 
sustainability into their own local 
environments. People who want to generate 
their own power, or grow their own food, 
are becoming united and can now make use 
of the knowledge and experience available 
on the Internet. In San Francisco, if you 
consider installing PV panels to your home, 
you can analyse costs and benefits through 
a website using aerial photos to estimate 
the size of your roof surface, after which 
a database will provide information on 
local regulations and the procedures to be 
followed. Should you wish to do so, you 
could unite with your neighbours online, 
and jointly purchase such solar systems (see 
http://1bog.org; http://zonability.com). The 
same applies to urban agriculture, where 
citizens worldwide share their knowledge 
and experience of innovative techniques 
to grow vegetables indoors, using hydro-
culture techniques (see www.rndiy.org; 
www.windowfarms.org) and exchange 
practical knowledge on how to start a 
temporary farm on a patch of wasteland 
(see http://enablingcity.com/). In these 
cases the government would just have to 
stand back and watch, doing what they 
find most difficult: do as little as possible. 
Citizens must be given the opportunity to 
get organised, and, together with public 
administrators, search for solutions. Only 
then would the energetic information 
society function properly. 
The core challenge for the energetic 
city is sustainability. Citizens and 
administrators are already involved in this, 
each in their own way. Companies consider 
sustainability in terms of financial returns 
and investment security. Multinationals 
consider the greening of cities, including 
new infrastructure, as one of the major 
investment opportunities of the future. 
Governments would do well to recognise 
both the value and risks of this energy, and 
to distinguish the physical from the cultural 
dimension. A clean economy is feasible, but 
it implies far-reaching adjustments. 
The use of resources and emission 
levels of greenhouse gases, such as CO2, 
should be around five times lower than 
they are today. This requires government 
to take on a large role, starting with the 
commitment to seriously address the issue, 
by using effective, traditional tools such 
as pricing and regulation, and especially 
by identifying new revenue models. But 
cultural shifts need to take place as well. 
Initiatives taken by citizens, businesses 
and local administrators on their own may 
be insufficient to find solutions to the big 
problems of climate change, but they are 
indispensable components in reassessing 
the economy and the thinking on welfare 
and well-being. Without these cultural 
changes, reducing the burden on the 
environment and natural resources by a 
factor of five will be impossible. 
Jointly, these initiatives within society 
can help create a widely shared vision of 
a new, stronger one. A smart, social and 
sustainable city creates an attractive image. 
Cities and the Internet, at both the local 
and global level, together are the breeding 
ground for ideas and shared visions of a 
sustainable society. However, to achieve 
the required 80 to 95 per cent reductions, 
we need both a local government that 
encourages and loosens the reins and a 
national government that helps to scale 
up promising initiatives and enables their 
widespread implementation.
Maarten Hajer and Hiddo Huitzin 
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the 
politics 
of climate 
change
Anthony Giddens
ow do we plan for a 
future that is inherently 
uncertain and in order 
to limit risks which, 
since we have no prior 
experience of them, 
cannot be assessed 
with complete precision? How can the 
mistakes made by the previous generation 
of planners be avoided? Planning in the 
old days was based on forecasting, but 
the limitations of this method are by now 
well known. It works best for short-term 
scenarios and also in cases where present-
day trends are to some degree set in stone. 
In the case of energy forecasting in Britain, 
for instance, we know that the existing 
generation of power stations will need 
replacing within a certain timescale. 
We often want to predict the future 
in order to change it and where our 
attempts to change it become part of that 
future. This situation holds in the case 
of climate change. One way of dealing 
with it is by backcasting: asking what 
changes have to be made in the present 
in order to arrive at alternative future 
states. A successful outcome is imagined 
in the future, and different scenarios are 
calculated as to how it might be reached. 
We are talking therefore of alternative and 
plural futures, where adjustments, even 
radical revisions, are made as time unfolds 
and then built into other scenarios. This 
approach is essentially the one used by 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC). The distinct advantage over 
traditional forecasting is that it allows much 
greater space for unforeseen contingencies 
that might dramatically alter predictions 
made at any specific date. 
The point of backcasting is not to reveal 
what the future will be, but to weigh up 
future options and policy goals. Backcasting 
is especially relevant for environmental 
and energy planning issues, since they fit 
the circumstances to which the approach is 
most relevant. These are that the context is 
complex, a major reorientation of current 
trends is demanded and a timescale of 
several decades or more is involved. There 
are many examples across the world. A 
project was instituted in the Netherlands 
in the late 1990s, for example, to look 
for alternatives to meat production and 
consumption. Its key assumption was that 
by 2040 new protein foods should replace 
40 per cent of current meat consumption. 
The foods would have to be at least as tasty 
as the most popular forms of meat, while 
having superior health value, among other 
qualities. The project considered how tastes 
might change to promote acceptance of 
such foods. It concluded that new protein 
foods could be produced 10-30 times more 
efficiently than meat, as measured in terms 
of reducing emissions, while at the same 
time producing a health bonus1.
Backcasting sounds technocratic. In 
fact, it almost always involves a visionary 
element, since, by definition, it projects 
a future that is different from that seen 
from the present. Of course, forecasting 
will not disappear and will continue to 
be part of government planning. It is 
obvious that backcasting and forecasting 
are often complementary. Take, as an 
example, planning for the future of the 
water industry in Australia, a country 
suffering from droughts that are probably 
influenced by global warming and 
where water is becoming an ever scarcer 
resource2. Cynthia Mitchell and Stuart 
White argue that forecasting can identify 
policies that will produce results in the 
short term – it can help pluck the low-
lying fruit. Backcasting is needed to think 
more radically about future possibilities. 
Forecasts about security of water supply 
in urban areas in Australia indicate major 
problems in guaranteeing adequate supply 
within a few years. Several policies that 
could quickly make a difference within 
the existing water system were identified, 
such as installing water-efficient shower 
heads and tap regulators, dual flush toilets, 
waterless urinals, taps operated by sensors 
and local water collection and recycling. 
In Queensland, where there have been 
prolonged periods of drought, reductions in 
customer demand of up to 30 per cent have 
been attained using such measures.
Backcasting, however, has helped 
suggest more far-reaching innovations.  
At the moment it is commonly assumed 
that water, sewage and storm-water systems 
should be considered and planned for 
separately. Thinking ‘backwards’ from a 
hypothetical situation of a total water cycle 
has produced quite a different perspective…
In thinking about planning, especially 
over the longer term, we find ourselves back 
with risk and uncertainty. Planning sounds 
like a straightforward process, but this is 
far from the case: it is highly complex and 
contingent. One of the main reasons for 
this is the fact that predictions, forecasts 
and plans that are made become themselves 
part of the universe of events that they are 
about. In an important sense they have to, 
since the point is to shape the future. Yet, 
at the same time, an inherent element of 
unpredictability is introduced and has to  
be coped with. Trying to alter public 
attitudes towards risk is a key part of 
planning policy…
A return to planning 
… For most of the time and for the 
majority of citizens, climate change is an 
issue at the back of the mind, even if it 
is a source of worry. It will stay that way 
unless its consequences become visible and 
immediate. In the meantime, no strategy is 
likely to work if it concentrates solely upon 
provoking fear and anxiety, or if it is based 
on instructing people to cut down on this or 
that, and also on expecting them to monitor 
that process on a continuous basis. 
A different approach is needed from 
the one currently prevalent at the moment. 
It must place an emphasis on positives as 
much as on negatives, and on opportunities 
rather than on self-induced deprivations. I 
would set out its main principles as follows. 
Incentives must take precedence over 
all other interventions, including those 
which are tax-based. ‘No punishment for 
punishment’s sake’: in other words, punitive 
measures should either supply revenue 
that is spent directly for environmental 
purposes, or be linked in a visible way with 
behaviour change – and preferably both. 
The drivers of petrol-guzzling vehicles, 
for example, should face heavy tax duties 
for the privilege, as heavy as is politically 
feasible, under ‘the polluter pays’ principle. 
Clear and self-evident options for behaviour 
management are available: switch to smaller 
cars or drive less.
The positives must dominate. This isn’t 
as difficult as it might sound. Take the issue 
of making homes more energy efficient. 
There are several countries in the world that 
have managed to make major progress in 
this respect. How have they done so? Not by 
trying to scare people, but by emphasising 
the advantages of having homes that 
are snug, protected against the elements 
and which also save money. An example 
comes from Sweden, which was achieved 
by placing a strong emphasis on what was 
called ‘community, style and comfort’. 
Low-carbon practices or inventions that 
initially have only limited appeal can be 
fundamentally important if they set trends, 
or if they are seen as in some way iconic3. 
Most initiatives, whether social, economic 
or technological, are, in the early stages, 
open only to a small elite. In California, for 
example, there are long waiting lists for the 
hydrogen powered Lifecar, although the 
first models will be extremely expensive. 
However, investment in such a car will 
provide the opportunity to see whether the 
vehicle might have a wider market, and also 
gives it an avant-garde cachet. This is what 
happened with the Toyota Prius hybrid car, 
nearly a million of which have been sold 
worldwide. It was a vanguard model in the 
sense that it stimulated other manufacturers 
to start producing low-emission vehicles, 
whether hybrid or not. 
Most initiatives that have successfully 
reduced emissions so far have been driven 
by the motivation to increase energy 
efficiency, rather than the desire to limit 
climate change. This observation applies to 
whole countries as well as to regions, cities 
and the actions of individuals. People are 
able to grasp and respond to this perspective 
more easily than they have done to climate 
change, with all its surrounding debates and 
complexities; it is not difficult to present 
energy efficiency in a positive light. What 
is at stake, as mentioned earlier, is energy 
efficiency in the economy as a whole, since 
efficiency gains in one context are of little 
or no value if savings made are spent on 
energy-consuming activities elsewhere.  
The fundamental problem at the moment  
is to make clean energy sources competitive 
with fossil fuel energy sources, whether 
through public provision of subsidies or 
through technological advance. Utility 
companies in the US have been offering 
electricity generated from wind or solar 
sources to consumers since the late 1990s. 
Initially, take-up was very small, since  
the prices were not competitive. In early 
2006 Xcel Energy in Colorado and Austin 
Energy in Texas offered tariffs below those 
of the regular energy sources. Austin 
Energy encouraged its customers to sign  
up for ten-year energy contracts, and was 
able to prosper even when the price of 
electricity dropped. 
The role of technology in promoting 
low-carbon lifestyles is bound to be 
considerable. Technological innovation 
rarely determines what people do, since 
we often react to it in ways in which its 
initiators did not suspect. Thus, when 
the telephone was invented in 1876 as a 
signalling device; no one imagined that it 
would become so intrinsic to our lives as 
a medium of talk and conversation4. Yet, 
at the same time, our lives can change 
dramatically through such interaction with 
technology. It is said that we are creatures 
of habit, and it is often true, especially if 
habits become addictive. Yet this is far 
from always the case – we can change our 
behaviour quite rapidly and dramatically, 
as has happened, and on a global level, with 
the arrival of the Internet.
Government should be actively 
encouraging the creative economy and 
the creative society, even when these don’t 
seem to have an immediate bearing upon 
climate change, since creativity has to be the 
order of the day. Richard Florida, who has 
written extensively on the subject, argues 
persuasively that the creative sectors of 
the economy – where innovation, lateral 
thinking and enterprise can flourish – are 
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LSE Cities investigates the links between social and physical 
dimensions of cities. Over the last year, our research has focused  
on the environment and climate change in a series of projects  
that investigate how cities are becoming more innovative in  
promoting the green agenda. Some of this research is summarised 
in the following pages of the Urban Age Electric City newspaper, 
providing a global overview of energy consumption and pollution 
patterns and detailed comparisons of density, transport and 
governance between established Urban Age cities – London,  
New York, Berlin, Istanbul, Mumbai and São Paulo – and a selection  
of ‘green pioneer’ cities – Hong Kong, Stockholm, Copenhagen, 
Portland, Singapore and Bogotá. 
This graph captures the key relationships that drive much of LSE Cities’ research on cities, by mapping social 
and environmental dimensions of cities against each other. In countries across the world urbanisation has 
been accompanied by an increase in well-being – but also by unsustainable environmental impacts. Only a 
few highly urbanised countries have low environmental impact, but almost all countries with high levels of 
human development are urbanised.  Achieving sustainability – a human footprint that fits within the earth’s 
bio-capacity while allowing for social wellbeing – has proved elusive. Nevertheless, considerable variation in the 
environmental footprint of urbanised societies provides evidence that certain forms of urban living are more 
sustainable than others. The challenge for future cities lies in learning from the world’s green leaders to ensure 
cities provide for human flourishing by using innovation, design and technologies to live within the earth’s 
ecological limits.  
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increasingly becoming the driving force 
of the economy as a whole. Florida rejects 
the idea that creativity – the capacity 
to innovate, to question conventional 
wisdom – is limited to the few. Creativity 
is a ‘limitless resource.... It’s a trait that 
can’t be handed down, and it can’t be 
owned in the traditional sense.’5 R&D 
investment is important, but in pioneering 
responses to climate change, we need to be 
bringing science, the universities and social 
entrepreneurs closer together. 
Step changes or ‘tipping points’ aren’t 
confined to the field of climate change 
science. They apply to social and economic 
life too – that was the context, in fact, in 
which the author who popularised the term, 
Malcolm Gladwell, originally discussed 
it6. We should be looking to create tipping 
points when it comes to the transition 
to low-carbon lifestyles. From small 
beginnings, much larger changes can occur 
when a certain threshold is reached. 
Governments have an important role 
in ‘editing choice’, and, in pursuing that 
aim, they shouldn’t be afraid to take on 
big business when it is necessary to do 
so. Corporations influence our choices in 
many direct and indirect ways – the state 
shouldn’t be reluctant to take a leaf out of 
their book. For instance, supermarkets 
usually place sweets and chocolates close 
to the exit, where customers line up to 
pay for their purchases. The reason is that 
at that point they are open to impulse 
buying, having relaxed after making their 
main purchases. Given the advance of 
obesity, I see no reason why such a practice 
shouldn’t be either prohibited or actively 
discouraged (although thus far it has 
not). How far we should go with choices 
that affect carbon consumption is a moot 
point. Some examples of choice editing 
appear to be completely unobjectionable. 
We could, for example, we could propose 
that heating and air conditioning should 
be organised in such a way that everyone 
knows immediately how much they are 
spending at any given time. The effect would 
be even more powerful if we knew how our 
expenditure rated compared to that of our 
neighbours. A study showed that heavy 
users made bigger cuts in consumption 
if a smiling face was inscribed on bills 
below the average, with a frowning face 
on the bills of those having higher than 
average expenditure. Other examples are 
more complicated. I see no civil liberties 
issue in cases where our behaviour is being 
significantly influenced, or manipulated, 
already by companies, and where the  
object of government policy is to counter 
that influence7. 
Technologies and Climate Change
Ambitious attempts have been made to 
anticipate how the spread of renewable 
technologies will transform modern 
economies. Some speak of the coming of 
a new industrial revolution, which will 
be initiated by such technologies. The 
American political thinker Jeremy Rifkin 
argues that the great changes in world 
history have taken place when new sources 
of energy have emerged in tandem with 
developments in communications. The 
convergence of coal-based power and 
the printing press gave rise to the first 
industrial revolution. Previous forms of 
communication would not have been 
able to handle the social and economic 
complexities introduced by the new forms 
of technology. The ‘second industrial 
revolution’ started in the late nineteenth 
century. It was marked by the invention 
of electric communication, beginning 
with the telegraph and branching out 
into the telephone, radio and television. 
These developments converged with the 
emergence of oil as a major form of power 
generation and as the dominant source of 
energy for transport. 
We now stand on the verge of a ‘third 
industrial revolution’, Rifkin says, which 
will have as its backdrop the development 
of networked communication, represented 
by personal computers and the Internet. 
The potential of these technologies lies in 
their convergence with renewable energy. 
We can envisage a global energy economy 
where millions of people produce renewable 
energy and share it with others through 
national and international power grids – 
as happens today with information. Just 
as personal computers have vastly more 
power than the early machines, which took 
up several rooms, so intelligent energy 
networks will become more powerful  
and ubiquitous than anything we know  
at the moment. 
Rifkin has his favourite renewable 
energy source to help point the way ahead: 
hydrogen8. Hydrogen, he says, is the 
‘forever fuel’, since it is the most ubiquitous 
element in the universe – and it produces no 
greenhouse gas emissions. Fuel cells using 
hydrogen are already being introduced into 
the market for home and industrial use. The 
top-down energy regime that exists today 
with the emphasis on oil and gas will be 
replaced by decentralised energy production 
and use. It will be ‘the first truly democratic 
energy regime in history’9.
Such ideas aren’t particularly 
compelling. In the first place, they reflect a 
view in which history is driven in large part 
by technology, a partial notion at best. The 
dating and nature of the supposed second 
industrial revolution are vague – as can 
be seen by the fact that other authors who 
propose similar ideas come up with quite 
different versions of when it happened and 
what its content was. Some, for example, 
date it 40 or 50 years later than Rifkin does. 
No one knows as yet what role a specific 
energy source such as hydrogen might 
play. Moreover, technologies never operate 
on their own – they are always embedded 
in wider political, economic and social 
frameworks, which are likely to govern 
both how they develop and what their 
consequences are. 
In addition, the ‘next industrial 
revolution’ hasn’t as yet actually happened. 
The original industrial revolution did not 
occur in a conscious way. The next one, 
however, has to be created as a deliberate 
project to protect us against future 
dangers – a very different situation. We 
don’t know how things will turn out. It 
could be, as Rifkin hopes, that energy and 
politics will march in line – decentralised 
network systems, rooted in communities, 
will replace current forms of political and 
economic power. It is the vision that many 
in the green movement would like to see 
realised. I’m not sure such an outcome is 
either likely or desirable. Certainly, it is 
very possible that most households will help 
create energy, rather than just consume 
it – as is already the case, for example, 
with feed-in tariffs. However, we will also 
need coordinated energy management on a 
national as well as an international level. 
Technological innovation has to be a 
core part of any successful climate change 
strategy and the same is true of energy 
policy. The state and government must 
have a significant role in making such 
innovation possible, since a regulatory 
framework, including incentives and other 
tax mechanisms, will be involved. What role 
should this be exactly? The issue overlaps 
with that of planning. For a while, it became 
conventional wisdom that markets cannot 
be second-guessed. Nor can we predict 
with any precision where innovation will 
happen. Today the pendulum is swinging 
back again. Various technologies or non-
fossil-fuel energy sources are touted as the 
answer to our need to reduce emissions; 
large amounts of investment are flowing 
into them. People are again placing bets on 
the future.
Anthony Giddens is Life Fellow of King’s 
College at Cambridge University and 
Emeritus Professor at LSE.
Edited extracts from A Giddens, The Politics of Climate 
Change, Polity Press, 2009, reproduced with permission of 
the author.
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geography of 
energy consumption
Where people live and how much they consume are inextricably linked. Yet, their  
patterns of distribution do not match up. People living in the highly concentrated 
urbanised regions of eastern China and the Ganges Valley in India have modest 
consumption patterns compared to the oil and petrol-guzzling habits of those in the  
more sparsely populated regions of North America and the Middle East. There are  
equally varied patterns between the established urban areas of Europe and the US and 
the more widely scattered, but dense cities of Latin America and Africa. Reflecting global 
disparities in wealth, lifestyles and consumption, these data show that a person living in 
the United Arab Emirates is likely to use 40 times more energy than a Bangladeshi, while  
a UK citizen consumes less than half of his US counterpart, but twice as much as a 
Mexican, and slightly less than a Dane.
 
Electricity is a major component of the world’s energy mix. Yet, despite living in the 
‘electric age’, electrification differs substantially between countries, swinging from less 
than 5 per cent of total energy in Nigeria and Nepal, to more than 50 per cent in Sweden 
and France. But a high share of electricity does not necessarily deliver environmental 
benefits. Generation is still dominated by carbon emitting fossil fuels, and electricity is not 
always the most efficient energy choice for uses such as heating and cooling in buildings. 
Aside from electricity, most of the world’s energy consumption involves directly 
burning fossil fuels, such as oil for transport, coal for making steel and cement industries 
and gas for heating. Despite recent improvements in some countries in procuring energy 
from renewables, they make up only 13 per cent of the world’s total consumption – mostly 
hydro-electricity in high-income countries and biomass for cooking and heating in low-
income countries. 
The map combines ’ambient 
population density’, a measure 
that indicates the 24-hour average 
of population distribution within a 
square kilometre across the world’s 
surface, with energy consumption 
data. The pie charts illustrate 
energy consumption patterns in 
53 countries, with the size of the 
pie charts reflecting the average 
amount of ‘primary energy supply’ 
per person (a measure of the 
consumption of raw energy sources 
such as oil, coal and gas, before 
conversion processes such as oil 
refining or electricity generation). 
The yellow portion of the pie 
charts represents the proportion of 
primary energy used for electricity 
generation – including combined 
heat and power generation. The 
energy used to generate electricity 
is categorised as either coming from 
‘renewable’ sources (hydro, wind, 
solar, biomass, geothermal, waste, 
tidal, wave) or ‘non-renewable’ 
sources (coal, oil, natural gas, 
nuclear). The grey and black 
portions represent energy used 
for purposes other than electricity 
generation, including transport, 
heating and industry. 
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Energy consumption by sector shows variations in levels of average consumption per 
person and differences in the mix of activities for which energy is used. Energy is used 
at higher proportions in Sub-Saharan Africa for domestic use, especially for cooking and 
lighting, and by the transport sector in North Africa and in the Middle East, reflecting 
high levels of motorisation combined with inexpensive local oil supply. Energy for the 
commercial sector – offices, shops and public services – accounts for less than 10% of  
total consumption, although the proportion is higher in advanced economies. Industrial 
energy use dominates Asian manufacturing hubs in China, South Korea and Thailand. 
Electricity share at home reveals wide variations in household use and the degree of 
electrification. In Saudi Arabia, Australia, New Zealand and Japan, most household energy 
is electric but in other high-income countries other sources, such as gas for heating, 
make up a greater proportion of total consumption. Average consumption per person is 
highest in wealthy parts of Europe and North America, but is also high in Sub-Saharan 
Africa where dependence on biomass sources (such as wood for cooking) explains the 
reasonably high levels of domestic energy use in the absence of electricity infrastructure. 
 
 
Electricity generation by source shows variations in the total amount of electricity 
generation (rather than per capita values as in the other maps). Coal is a major source 
of power in the US, China, India and Germany – some of the world’s biggest economies. 
The oil-rich Middle East and North Africa burn oil and gas, while in South America 
cleaner hydro-sources dominate. Despite recent policy shifts, renewable sources other 
than hydro-electric power – energy generated from wind, solar and geo-thermal sources 
– contribute to only 3 per cent of the world’s electricity generation – with the highest 
proportion in Denmark, where they fuel around a quarter of electricity generation.   
Carbon emissions by sector confirms that fossil-fuel based electricity is an important 
contributor to global climate change. Emissions from electricity generation vary 
depending on fuel source, with coal-dependent countries such as Australia, China and 
South Africa showing high proportions. In contrast, Denmark has lower emissions fom 
electricity due to its high level of renewable generation. Varying levels of emissions from 
transport echo motorisation rates. Global carbon emissions are concentrated in a few 
nations with China and the US alone producing 39% of global emissions. 
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Between January and September 2012 LSE Cities surveyed 
close to 100 city governments from around the world to 
better understand the leading role cities are playing in 
adopting environmental policies and transitioning to a 
green economy. The survey was completed in partnership 
with ICLEI (Local Governments for Sustainability) and the 
Global Green Growth Institute, with results published for 
the Rio+20 Summit in June and the Global Green Growth 
Forum in Copenhagen in October 2012.
The survey included a diverse range of cities 
representing variations in population size, regional location 
and income level. The findings reveal insights on cities’ 
motivations for adopting green policies, their progress in 
integrating complementary economic and environmental 
objectives and their experiences in coordinating governance 
for green policy. While a range of environmental challenges 
and green aspirations were found to be widely shared across 
the world, the results also find important distinctions in 
green policy experiences, particularly associated with the 
substantial differences in wealth across the surveyed cities.  
The results featured on this page summarise key 
findings from the survey, with a more comprehensive set of 
results available at: http://lsecities.net/publications/reports/
going-green/.
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To what extent have the following green policy 
objectives achieved successful outcomes in your city?
Reducing water pollution
Increasing recycling/composting
Increasing green space
Protecting/enhancing biodiversity and ecosystems
Reducing air pollution
Increasing energy efficiency
Reducing greenhouse gas emission
Increasing energy security
Reducing resource consumption
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How significant are the following sectors of the 
green economy for your city’s economic growth?
Green transport (e.g. public transport, low emission vehicles)
Renewable energy
Green retrofitting of existing buildings
New green buildings
Energy distribution and management (e.g. smart grids, district heating)
Green goods and services
Green finance
Which of the following statements best describes 
the way your city approaches green technology 
innovations and investments?
How would you define your city in relation to the 
green agenda?
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How significant are the following barriers to 
achieving your city’s objectives?
Lack of public funding
Lack of national government support
Lack of private investment
Lack of state government support
Lack of private sector support
Lack of skills in the local workforce
Fragmented local governance
Lack of skills in local government
Lack of public support
0 20 40 80
69
67
68
65
61
60
59
58
56
56
55
54
50
49
49
47
46
43
37
37
28
23
19
18
8
6
60
Which of the following technologies is your city 
intending to use as part of its green strategy?
Intelligent traffic management
Other low emission vehicles
Integrated multi-modal transport systems
Electric vehicles
Building control systems
Energy efficient home appliances
Electric vehicle charging infrastructure
Distributed electricity generation (e.g. PV on buildings)
Carsharing
Open information systems
Distributed sensor networks
Demand response power network management
Smart waste management systems
Mobile apps for public transport assistance and routing
Other
Mobile apps for building systems management
Distributed energy storage
Data informatics
Teleconferencing facilities for local governments and community
Smart electrical grid
Public wireless data networks
Open information systems
Smart electrical grid
Public wireless data networks
Bicycle sharing
Distributed energy transformation (e.g. solar water heaters)
0 20 40 1008060
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34 20 29 3 11
16 30 37 9 5
20 17 29 11 20
14 16 26 22 20
6 6 31 19 38
How important were/are the following triggers in  
making green objectives as important part of your 
city’s political agenda?
Public opinion/awareness
A change in local political leadership
Pressure from stakeholders
A specific environmental crisis
Pressure from national/supranational government
A particular crisis (not related to the environment)
ENViroNmENtal challENgEs
The survey responses confirm that environmental problems 
are some of the most pressing challenges facing cities 
today. Many of the most widely experienced problems 
are associated with transport and urban planning and 
include air pollution, road congestion and urban sprawl 
– all significant challenges for more than 60 per cent 
of the surveyed cities. Storms and flooding, solid waste 
management, water pollution and lack of green space are 
also problems for the majority of them.
Cities in middle- and low-income countries face 
additional environmental challenges compared to those 
experienced in high-income countries. Commonly 
reported problems are often associated with inadequate 
infrastructures and include clean water supply, sewage 
treatment and dumped household waste. 
grEEN traNsitioN:
ProgrEss to datE
In a context where many urban environmental problems 
continue to be unresolved, virtually all city governments 
regard green objectives as important components of their 
political agendas. This priority for green issues is a relatively 
recent shift, with 65 per cent of cities reporting that green 
objectives have only become politically important since the 
1992 Rio Earth Summit. 
Although urban environmental problems are significant, 
local environmental crises or tipping points have not been 
the primary drivers of the green transition. Rather, public 
awareness and changing political leadership have been 
more important triggers prompting the adoption of  
green objectives. In middle- and low-income countries,  
pressure from national governments and international 
agencies has also been important in prompting green  
policy development.
Green objectives are widely shared, but progress in 
developing policies varies across sectors. More than half of 
cities report their policies as well-developed in the waste 
(65 per cent), land-use (60 per cent) and water sectors 
(60 per cent), while only one in five cities report having 
well-developed policies for the food sector. For the waste 
and water sectors, comprehensive policies have translated 
into successful outcomes on the ground, with most cities 
increasing waste recycling and reducing water pollution 
– particularly those in high-income countries. Reducing 
resource use and establishing energy security have proved 
more challenging, with less than a quarter of cities 
reporting success in achieving these objectives. 
buildiNg thE grEEN 
EcoNomy
In tackling environmental problems, cities are realising 
the opportunity for considerable economic co-benefits. An 
overwhelming majority of city governments (93 per cent) 
expect their green policies to have a positive economic 
impact. Most cities view economic growth and improved 
environmental outcomes as complementary, with 65 per 
cent describing economic growth as a primary goal of their 
green policies, and a further 31 per cent regarding growth 
as a secondary goal.
Alongside economic growth, cities expect a broad range 
of economic benefits arising from their green policy 
agendas, including attracting investment (78 per cent of 
cities), increasing innovation (76 per cent), creating jobs (72 
per cent), and increasing economic resilience (69 per cent).
Cities identify urban transport, buildings and energy 
as the key sectors for green economic growth. Both new 
green buildings and retrofits of existing buildings are 
seen as making important contributions to green growth, 
while renewable energy generation and energy distribution 
networks, such as smart grids, are identified as particularly 
promising areas within the energy sector.
While city authorities are confident that green policies 
can lead to economic gains as well as environmental 
benefits, economic impact assessments of these policies are 
rare. This presents a major gap. City governments could 
strengthen their case for more effective and efficient green 
economic policies by building a rigorous evidence base for 
the economic impacts delivered.
tEchNology aNd
iNNoVatioN
Cities see technology as playing a key role in the 
transformation to a green economy. New technologies 
are identified as being particularly important for green 
transport, energy generation and green buildings – with 
more than three quarters of surveyed cities agreeing that 
new technology is important in these sectors. A number 
of specific technologies are seen as most relevant for green 
economy strategies including transport technologies, such 
as intelligent traffic management and low-emission vehicles, 
and energy-saving technologies, such as efficient home 
appliances and building control systems.
The surveyed city governments generally believe that they 
should play a leading role in driving green innovation – 
with 81 per cent agreeing that they should lead by example 
and introduce innovations within their own operations. 
Furthermore, 74 per cent of city governments report that 
they are willing to invest in experimental cutting-edge 
projects to stimulate change – while only 15 per cent report 
taking a conservative approach to technological innovation 
and investment. Municipal governments see themselves as 
playing an important role in facilitating innovation, with 
only 6 per cent of respondents agreeing that responsibility 
for driving green innovation should be left solely to the 
private sector. The responses indicate that many cities are 
willing to be first movers and accept some degree of risk in 
fostering green innovation.
challENgEs to goiNg 
grEEN
City governments have bold green aspirations, yet the 
successful implementation of environmental and green 
economy policies is not without challenges. Insufficient 
public funding and lack of support from national-level 
governments emerge as the most important barriers 
thwarting achievement of green objectives – and were 
reported as significant by more than half of the cities 
involved. 
Coordinating government objectives across scales – 
particularly between city and national governments – is 
seen as particularly important for accelerating green 
initiatives. For 60 per cent of cities, national policy 
frameworks currently fall short of supporting cities’ green 
agendas – a problem particularly noted by North American 
and European cities. Policies in the transport and energy 
sectors are most frequently noted as undermining cities’ 
green goals.
While lack of policy expertise or public support for green 
policies do not emerge as a particular challenges across the 
overall sample of surveyed cities, these problems do often 
exist for cities in middle- and low-income cities. Cities in 
these contexts report more challenges to going green and 
commonly identified lack of public support, lack of private-
sector support, and lack of government and workforce 
expertise and skills as important barriers preventing 
progress towards their green agendas.
caN citiEs driVE thE grEEN 
traNsitioN?
The survey highlights a number of common experiences 
for cities around the world as they develop environmental 
policies and build green economies. For instance, problems 
associated with unsustainable transport systems, including 
air pollution and urban sprawl, are widely reported. Cities 
from diverse contexts also report common challenges 
working against their green objectives – with coordination 
and alignment of policy between local- and national-level 
governments emerging as a particular problem. 
Important differences in city governments’ experiences 
also exist, with cities in middle- and low-income problems 
facing a broader range of local environmental problems, 
often associated with poor basic infrastructure, such as 
clean water supply and solid waste management. In working 
to resolve these challenges, poorer cities also unsurprisingly 
report more barriers to developing green policy with lack 
of public- and private-sector support and inadequate skills 
and expertise all being barriers that exist to a far lesser 
degree in high-income cities. 
The survey reveals a promising opportunity for 
transitioning to a greener economy, with cities around 
the world embracing green aspirations. Most cities report 
good local capabilities and a willingness to take risks 
and innovate to achieve green objectives. Green policies 
are widely developed and success has been achieved in 
areas such as cleaning up waterways and increasing waste 
recycling. Cities have the opportunity to build on this 
momentum and take a leading position in driving the green 
transition.
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stocKholm
Stockholm’s population expanded to nearly 850,000 inhabitants  
(1.9 million at metro level) by 2010, and its administration has prioritised 
environmental sustainability for decades. The development of the city’s 
district heating network started over 50 years ago, and now accounts 
for nearly 80 per cent of the city’s demand, with its strict building 
regulations, which exceed Swedish national standards, set by the city 
government. Stockholm has a comprehensive public transport system and 
high quality pedestrian environment, and has been effective at promoting 
high-density development on redundant industrial land. 
coPENhagEN 
Recognised as a world leader in green policies, Copenhagen’s population 
has grown 18 per cent since 1990 to reach 550,000 (1.8 million at metro 
level). In addition to district heating and regional land use planning 
initiatives, Copenhagen is best known for its investment in a wide and 
well-used cycling infrastructure with 370 km (224 miles) of bike lanes 
across the municipality. The city has invested in public transport by 
expanding the new metro system and improving links in the cross-border 
Øresund region, and is promoting a new generation of green buildings 
and housing typologies.
hoNg KoNg
Constrained by mountains and the sea, Hong Kong’s population reached 
nearly 7.1 million in 2011, building on its connections to mainland China 
and its international port activities. The city has achieved a high level of 
integration between land use planning and transport, developing one 
of the world’s most efficient rail networks in one of the world’s densest 
cities. The unitary government structure gives the city extensive powers 
in planning and fiscal policy, maintaining control over land freehold and 
development rights.  
PortlaNd 
The city of Portland in the US north-western state of Oregon forms part 
of a wider urban region integrating several municipalities in a continuous 
built-up area. Grouped in a regional metropolitan authority that controls 
land use planning, these authorities have led the field in environmental 
policy innovation, making the city and its region a radical pioneer 
within the North American context. The implementations of an Urban 
Growth Boundary and allied initiatives have boosted public transport 
demand, with the city developing a light rail network and significant 
cycling provision. Portland is also an innovator in green buildings and 
developing digital tools for civic participation.  
bogotÁ
Bogotá’s population increase has mirrored South American trends, 
expanding nearly seven-fold, from less than 1 million in 1950 to 6.8 
million in 2010. The population lives in a dense urban environment, 
constrained by the city’s mountainous hinterland, with a large and 
growing informal sector. For over a decade, subsequent city mayors have 
invested in innovative transport policies, creating the successful and 
affordable TransMilenio Bus Rapid Transit and Ciclovia cycle network. 
Like many South American countries, over two-thirds of electricity 
production in Colombia is based on hydropower, which significantly 
reduces greenhouse gas emissions for the city.
siNgaPorE
As the leading global port city, Singapore’s population increased by over a 
million between 2000 and 2011, and now totals 5.3 million. With a highly 
integrated and efficient form of city governance, it has implemented 
significant initiatives across all sectors of land use and transport 
planning, housing and public space, and more recently has focused on the 
need to reduce civic waste and improve water use efficiency. In addition, 
Singapore is investing heavily in the digital economy, with many smart 
city initiatives and innovation in green ICT tools. 
stocKholm mEtroPolitaN rEgioN  
1,876,654 people
stocKholm: 14 stadsdElsNÄmNdEr 
847,073 people
coPENhagEN mEtroPolitaN rEgioN  
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coPENhagEN city: 10 bydElE 
549,000 people
hoNg KoNg sPEcial admiNistratiVE rEgioN 
7,072,000 people
hoNg KoNg: 18 districts 
7,072,000 people
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PortlaNd: 7 district coalitioNs
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7,881,156 people
bogotÁ: 20 localidadEs 
6,776,009 people
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5,312,400 people
siNgaPorE: 5 commuNity dEVEloPmENt 
couNcils 
5,312,400 people
loNdoN
London’s population has grown by 900,000 in the last decade and 
reached 8.2 million in 2011. This is close to the city’s historic peak of 
8.6 million, recorded in 1939, and 400,000 more than anticipated by the 
Office of National Statistics. The establishment of an elected mayor has 
seen improved land use and transport coordination – reinforcement of 
the Green Belt and introduction of Congestion Charging – and a range 
of environmental initiatives aimed at reducing carbon emissions and 
improving air quality. 
NEW yorK 
New York City’s population reached a record high of 8.2 million in 2010. 
The city is the core of an extensive metropolitan region of over 19 million 
people. Recent planning policy has focused on improving the quality 
of green spaces and upgrading building energy efficiency, but transport 
improvements have been frustrated by control of the Mass Transit 
Authority by the State of New York. On the economic front, digital sectors 
have been a key component of recent growth, including new media start 
ups concentrated in the high-profile ‘Silicon Alley’ cluster.  
bErliN 
Berlin has undergone modest growth in the last decade and now has over 
3.5 million residents. Despite its fragmentation, the city has an effective 
municipal and regional planning system, which has made the most of its 
dense inner city core and highly integrated multi-modal public transport 
network. Although the city has underperformed economically compared 
to Germany as a whole, it has fostered a significant cluster of digital 
economy and creative industry firms, and remains highly attractive  
to young families and artists due to affordable house prices and good  
quality of life. 
istaNbul 
Istanbul’s population has expanded rapidly in the last decade, from 10 
million in 2000 to 13.6 million in 2011. Strongly committed to achieving 
global city status, the ancient ‘hinge city’ has a large, unified provincial 
and city government, which ensures greater regional coordination in 
transport and economic planning. The city is accommodating large 
numbers of new government-funded housing (TOKI) and has a complex 
public transport network of rail, metro, ferries and trams. The city 
introduced a Bus Rapid Transit system and is completing the first rail link 
across the Bosporus through the Marmaray tunnel.
mumbai 
Mumbai’s population has more than doubled in the last 40 years to reach 
12.5 million within the city boundary, and over 20 million in the wider 
metropolitan region. This extreme growth has placed pressure on the 
city’s infrastructure, with large sections of the population living and 
working in the informal sector. Significant investment is taking place in 
the regional rail network and a new metro, and in a controversial road 
building programme. The regional development authority coordinates 
planning between the seven municipal corporations in the wider 
metropolitan area, but many key policy decisions are taken by the more 
extensive and remote State of Maharashtra.
sÃo Paulo 
Brazil’s economic engine extends horizontally across a vast area that 
cuts across the city and state boundaries of São Paulo, with areas of 
poor infrastructure and informal housing pushed out to the periphery. 
Security and health care are prime concerns of Paulistanos, in a city with 
high crime and inequality rates. São Paulo’s notorious traffic congestion 
can require four hours of daily commuting times for its residents, even 
though there have been recent attempts at both state and city level to 
improve public transport and make the most of Brazil’s leadership in 
sustainable energy initiatives in biofuels and hydro-power. 
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As national governments struggle to agree to environmental targets and objectives, 
greater innovation in sustainable urbanism is becoming more established in cities around 
the globe, regardless of size or geographical location. Here LSE Cities focuses on six cities 
that have provided leadership as ‘green pioneers’. Environmental initiatives can result 
from long-standing policy traditions, as well as through new city programmes that cut 
across different sectors. In this respect, the Scandinavian capitals of Copenhagen and 
Stockholm stand out as having made a big impact in the fields of decentralised energy, 
building efficiency and promoting walking and cycling. 
Other cities have made progress in more specific sectors. Portland is an interesting 
example from the US, where cohesive regional governance has implemented effective 
mechanisms to control sprawl, increase public transport use, and encourage walking and 
cycling. Implementing the policies of strong city mayors, Bogotá is an early developer of 
green transport and cycleway systems, which have transformed travel patterns and road 
safety in the South American city, confirming that innovation from the developing world 
can have major impacts in areas of rapid urban change.
Hyper-dense and affluent cities, like Hong Kong and Singapore, offer a very different 
context for urban sustainability. Both cities have taken advantage of their limited land 
resources and centralised planning structures, promoting compact and well-connected 
urban form to render their cities more efficient and competitive. The highly controlled city-
state Singapore has pioneered congestion charging, and radically improved efficiency in 
water use and in waste production. Hong Kong continues to invest in strong economic 
and social connectivity across the region, creating and sustaining one of the world’s most 
efficient public transport and pedestrian networks.
Since 2005, Urban Age has investigated cities experiencing significant growth and change 
across the globe. As approximately 75 per cent of the world’s energy use and 80 per cent 
of the world’s carbon emissions result from urban activities, cities have an essential role 
in achieving environmental and economic sustainability. These goals need to be achieved 
in tandem with improving quality of life for the world’s 3.5 billion urban residents. This 
analysis explores the overall form, population and administrative boundaries of six 
established Urban Age cities and introduces a further six ‘green pioneer’ cities, noted  
for their innovation in environmental policy and practice.
Strong civic leadership is a critical component in managing urban change and directing 
cities towards a more sustainable future. Governing cities is more challenging where 
the powers of city administrations are limited, and where dynamic urban regions extend 
beyond administrative boundaries. This is especially true in rapidly growing cities.  
In São Paulo, for instance, less than two thirds of the city’s built-up core falls within its 
administrative boundary, and consequently this increases the importance of the State of 
São Paulo, its regional governance body. Metropolitan governance is strong in Berlin and 
Istanbul, enabling better coordination of growth, in contrast to New York and Mumbai, 
where functional regions extend far beyond administrative areas. The devolution of power 
to the Greater London Authority in 2000 has ensured alignment between population 
distribution and political authority, enabling more integrated and strategic planning in  
the UK capital.
33
For full references to data sources, please see: http://ec2012.lsecities.net/references/
Note urban areas in the wider Pearl River Delta region are not shown. 
Note urban areas in Malaysia and Indonesia are not shown.
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as well as increased car ownership rates and traffic congestion, together with increase 
in population and wealth highlight the worrying trends that underlie growth in Mumbai, 
São Paulo and Istanbul. Yet the data also indicate some positive trends in cities that have 
decided to buck the ‘business-as-usual’ trajectory, investing in new policies and initiatives 
that have changed things for the better, and often at a remarkable pace. The success of 
Bogotá’s TransMilenio bus system and corresponding improvements to road safety are 
evidence that innovative thinking and the targeted application of new technologies can 
drastically change the urban experience of millions of people. Such changes in public 
transport provision are not confined to developing world cities. Increasing numbers 
of cyclists on the streets of London and New York, and a rise in public transport use in 
Singapore and Hong Kong demonstrate a growing awareness of the need to move away 
from private vehicle use, with people embracing more efficient and environmentally 
sustainable ways of getting around the city. 
The selected statistics illustrate that all cities, irrespective of their level of development, 
are experiencing profound and far-reaching changes across a variety of sectors. How a 
city changes and at what pace this change takes place is often dependent on targeted 
policies put in place by city, regional or national governments, highlighting the importance 
of a comprehensive and integrated approach to urban planning.
The challenges cities confront in becoming more sustainable places to live and work 
vary depending on the distinct socio-economic, environmental and spatial constraints 
of each of them. Yet all cities are broadly united in their efforts to improve the well-
being of their residents, ideally by raising their income while improving their quality of 
life through accessible social services and environmental amenities. While there are no 
universal approaches, the main objective of sustainable cities is to ensure that continued 
economic and population growth can occur without a commensurate increase in a 
city’s environmental footprint. This so-called ‘decoupling’ of economic prosperity from 
increasing levels of resource consumption impact is increasingly seen as a fundamental 
component of a sustainable future. The graphs below show the diverse patterns of change 
taking place in cities over the past 20 years. Comparing economic and population growth 
to selected environmental indicators provides a sense of the drastic transformations these 
cities have experienced over a relatively short time span. 
Several of the cities profiled below have achieved a remarkable level of positive 
decoupling. This is particularly visible in leading green cities of the industrialised world 
(Portland, Copenhagen, Stockholm), demonstrating a rapid decrease in energy use and 
per capita CO2 emissions, and the proliferation of more sustainable modes of transport. 
On the whole, cities in the emerging economies do not seem to be leapfrogging to a post-
fossil fuel future, appearing at least in part to be following in the developmental footsteps 
of the industrialised world. Rising electricity consumption and per capita CO2 emissions, 
stocKholm
Stockholm’s metropolitan economy grew by 41% between 1993 and 2010, 
while the population increased by 18 % to nearly 1.9 million. Stockholm’s 
is successfully ‘de-coupling’ growth from negative environmental 
impacts, and GHG emissions in the city have declined by 31 %since 
1993 to 3.7 tCO2e per capita, while energy consumption per person has 
fallen by 18 %. Much of this success can be attributed to energy efficiency 
improvements in buildings prompted by strict green building policies at 
the national level. Today, 80% of the energy used for Stockholm’s district 
heating comes from renewable fuels, energy from waste, or residual heat 
from combined heat and power plants. 
coPENhagEN 
Copenhagen’s GVA per capita grew by 30 per cent between 1993 and 
2010, while the metropolitan population grew by 11 per cent to 1.8 
million. The city has been successful in its pursuit of ‘green growth’: in 
the Municipality of Copenhagen carbon emissions halved since 1993 
to 3.5 tCO2 per capita, moving the city closer to its goal of becoming 
carbon neutral by 2025. Replacing coal with biomass for heating and 
power generation, and increasing the use of wind energy have contributed 
substantially to emission reductions. The city’s progress has been further 
accelerated by the increased use of non-motorised transport, with bicycle 
kilometres travelled growing by 43 per cent since 1993. 
hoNg KoNg
Hong Kong has cemented its position as a global hub for trade and finance 
since the 1997 handover from  the UK to Chinese control. Since 1998,  
the city’s per capita GVA experienced rapid growth, increasing by 51%. 
The city’s strong international connections are reflected by continued  
air passenger growth, with numbers more than doubling since 1998. 
Hong Kong is one of the most densely populated cities in the world and  
a sophisticated public transport system efficiently provides mobility for 
the city’s 7 million residents. Expansion of the Mass Rapid Transit system 
has contributed to a doubling in passenger numbers since 1998 and only  
6 %of trips are made by car. 
loNdoN
London’s metropolitan economy has grown strongly over the past 20 
years. Despite the recent global downturn, the economy grew by 47 per 
cent between 1997 and 2011 (measured by Gross Value Added (GVA) 
per capita), accompanied by a 10 per cent increase in the metropolitan 
population. Some sectors of the economy have experienced particularly 
rapid growth: employment in the digital economy has grown by 44 per 
cent since the late 1990s. The majority of recent job growth in the sector 
has been concentrated in Inner East London, where an emerging tech 
cluster now employs nearly 50,000 people – a 400 per cent increase since 
1997. 
NEW yorK 
New York City’s metropolitan economy has grown by 43 per cent since 
1993 and the region’s population by more than 10 per cent to 19 million 
people in 2010. A top global city, New York City’s dense concentrations of 
firms and jobs has long been supported by an extensive public transport 
system. Recent upgrades to the subway and bus systems have contributed 
to a 43 per cent increase in public transport use between 1993 and 2010. 
Cycling still only accounts for 0.7 per cent of all trips, but is growing 
rapidly, with the number of people entering and leaving Manhattan by 
bicycle more than tripling since 1993. 
bErliN 
Berlin’s regional economy contracted slightly, by 2 per cent, between 
1993 and 2010, while the population remained relatively stable at 4.9 
million. During the 1990s, rapid de-industrialisation resulted in the loss 
of more than 150,000 manufacturing jobs, which initially helped reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions. Today Berlin is re-inventing itself as a clean 
technology hub, having cut per capita carbon emissions by more than 30 
per cent since 1993. This trend is in line with Germany’s national-level 
policy ambition for a sweeping energy transformation. Between 1993 
and 2011, the share of renewable energy in Germany’s electricity mix 
increased from 3.9 per cent to 20.3 per cent.
PortlaNd 
Portland’s metropolitan region has experienced rapid economic growth, 
amounting to a 59 per cent increase in GVA per capita between 1993 
and 2010. The region’s population has also grown strongly – by 37 per 
cent over the same time period to reach almost 2.3 million in 2010. A 
comprehensive green policy programme has led to notable achievements, 
with greenhouse gas emissions decreasing by 26 per cent to 10.4 tCO2e per 
capita in Multnomah County. Building energy use has fallen by 5 per cent 
per capita since 1993. Despite this, Portland’s energy and resource use is 
still very high by global standards. .
bogotÁ
Bogotá’s economy grew by 32 per cent between 2001 and 2010, following 
a severe recession in the late 1990s, while the metropolitan population 
increased by 14 per cent to nearly 8 million. Together with Curitiba, the 
city is regarded as pioneering the establishment of Bus Rapid Transit 
(BRT) systems, a cost-effective form of public transport. Bogotá’s 
TransMilenio system has been gradually expanded since opening in 2001 
and now carries 0.5 billion passengers a year. The 40 per cent decrease 
in road fatalities since the introduction of the TransMilenio can partly 
be attributed to improved road safety as a result of fixed bus lanes and 
enclosed stations. 
siNgaPorE
Singapore’s GVA per capita grew by 67 per cent and the population 
by 54 per cent between 1993 and 2010. Public transport use has seen a 
substantial increase at a rate of 270 per cent in passenger trips on the 
rapid transit network since the early 1990s, helping to lower carbon 
emissions. The city-state has managed to dramatically cut emissions by 
60 per cent: from 16.4 tCO2 in 1993 to 6.7 tCO2 per capita in 2008, by 
switching from coal to gas and improving energy efficiency of its urban 
distribution systems. However, Singapore remains almost exclusively 
reliant on imported fossil fuels for its energy needs. 
istaNbul 
Istanbul’s continuous growth over the past two decades has been 
accompanied by rapid motorisation. The population reached 13.6 million 
in 2011, while GVA per capita increased by 44 per cent between 1994 and 
2010. The city’s expanding suburbs and higher car ownership rates have 
led to a 68 per cent increase in Bosporus Bridge crossings and a 37 per 
cent rise in carbon emissions from road transport, despite considerable 
investments in public transport. These developments raise questions 
about the environmental impact of a planned third Bosporus Bridge and a 
new motorway North of the city. 
mumbai 
Mumbai’s metropolitan economy has grown at a strong pace, with 
GVA per capita increasing by 65 per cent over the last 10 years, and 
the population by 23 per cent to reach 20 million. Growth has been 
accompanied by drastically changing consumption habits: peak 
electricity demand in the city increased by more than 90 per cent since 
2001 straining the system beyond its limits. Carbon emissions for India as 
a whole have increased by 30 per cent since 2001, but remain at very low 
levels on a per person basis. Shifting Indian cities’ reliance on coal-fired 
electricity and investing in renewables will become increasingly vital as 
electricity demand continues to rise.
sÃo Paulo 
São Paulo’s GVA per capita has grown by 33 per cent and the population 
by 28 per cent between 1993 and 2010. In this city of nearly 20 million 
people, the number of registered vehicles increased by 82 per cent 
between 1993 and 2010, and the city currently has a motorisation rate of 
368 cars/1,000 people. Unsurprisingly, traffic congestion is a perpetual 
problem: average evening rush hour traffic speeds decreased by 30 
per cent between 1993 and 2007, although recent efforts to restrict 
private vehicle use and improve Metro and Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) 
infrastructure have shown promising success. 
All variables are indexed: 1997=100 All variables are indexed: 1998=100
All variables are indexed: 1994=100 All variables are indexed: 1993=100All variables are indexed: 2001=100 All variables are indexed: 1993=100All variables are indexed: 1993=100 All variables are indexed: 2001=100
All variables are indexed: 1993=100 All variables are indexed: 1993=100All variables are indexed: 1993=100 All variables are indexed: 1993=100
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comparing cities
twelve cities, highlighting their diverse economic and spatial characteristics and varying 
transport infrastructure. Paralleling the trend in CO2 emissions, Portland has the highest 
car ownership rate: 690 cars per 1,000 inhabitants, five times higher than the rate for 
New York. São Paulo has more than ten times as many cars per 1,000 people as Mumbai, 
the second highest figure, although improvements in public transport over the past few 
years are slowing the trend towards private motorised transport. Mumbai is catching up 
fast, with an increase of 35 % in vehicles on the city’s roads in the past 5 years alone. Yet 
the majority of Mumbaikars still get around the city on foot or by bicycle, making it the 
city with the highest non-motorised modal share of the twelve. In contrast, only 11 % of 
all trips in New York are made by walking and cycling, with most people relying on the 
city’s nearly 600 km long rail network. Looking at rail network systems for other cities 
provides an indication of their public transport infrastructure. London and Berlin have by 
far the most extensive network (1,393 km and 984 km respectively), with the average rail 
network length for all cities just below 500 km. This is in stark contrast to Bogotá, famous 
for its TransMilenio bus system, but lacking a rail network, although the Bogotá metro is 
currently under construction with a planned opening date of 2016. 
Looking at water and electricity use highlights the divergent consumption patterns 
of residents in these twelve cities. Mumbai has the smallest consumption footprint, 
using just 90 litres of water per person per day, compared to 572 in New York, 229 in 
Stockholm and 185 in Istanbul. Although electricity consumption is rapidly increasing, the 
average resident of Mumbai or Bogotá still uses less than 1 MWh of electricity per year, 
compared to 12.1 in Portland and 7.8 in Singapore. Stockholm, Copenhagen and Berlin 
have managed to lower their electricity use over the past twenty years and all consume 
less than 2 MWh per capita, largely owing to the widespread use of district heating in 
these cities. How the electricity is generated also differs widely between cities. While 
decentralised power generation is becoming increasingly common, the vast majority 
of energy is still distributed to individual cities via a national grid, which is why energy 
use and renewable energy performance are shown at the country level. Unsurprisingly, 
the United States is by far the biggest energy user, with the average person consuming 
more than ten times as much as someone in India or Colombia. Due to their cold climate, 
Denmark and Sweden also have higher than average per capita energy consumption 
levels. Renewable energy sources make up nearly 90 % of the total national electricity 
generation in Brazil and more than 70 % in Colombia, owing to the predominance of 
hydro-power in these countries. In contrast, Hong Kong and Singapore still rely almost 
exclusively on fossil fuels for their electricity generation. With the exception of Sweden 
(57.7 %) all other countries currently generate less than a quarter of their electricity from 
renewable sources (see the World Maps at the beginning of this section for a more 
detailed discussion of global energy patterns).
Behind the statistics of global city growth lie very different patterns of urbanisation, with 
diverse spatial, social and economic characteristics that dramatically affect the urban 
experience. In addition to standard measures of population growth and the economy, LSE 
Cities has assembled socio-economic and environmental data from a range of official 
sources, allowing for a preliminary assessment of how these twelve cities compare to 
each other on a set of key performance indicators.
The graphic overview of these results highlights some striking differences, especially 
when it comes to these cities’ speed of growth. While São Paulo has grown nearly 
8,000 % since 1900, and London only 16 % (having experienced its major growth spurt 
in the previous century), it is Mumbai that is changing the fastest of the twelve, adding 
54 additional residents every hour. In comparison, Copenhagen and Berlin will only 
gain 1 person per hour, Hong Kong 8 and London 10. These trends are also reflected in 
different patterns of age distribution: around a third of the residents of Mumbai, São 
Paulo, Bogotá and Istanbul are under the age of 20, while in Hong Kong and Berlin the 
younger generations shrink to 20 % or less. Mumbai also leads on economic growth, 
having experienced an average annual increase in GVA of 6.7 % between 1993 and 2010. 
Over the same period, the economies of São Paulo and Bogotá grew at about half that 
speed – nevertheless impressive when compared to Berlin’s nearly stagnant economy. 
Another factor that differs drastically between cities is the proportion of the country’s 
population residing in the metropolitan region and the corresponding contribution to 
national economic growth. Mumbai, with the largest metropolitan population of all twelve 
cities, only makes up 1.3 % of India’s total population, and produces a mere 3.8 % of the 
national GVA. In contrast, 30 % of Denmark’s total population reside in Copenhagen, and 
the capital region accounts for a staggering 38 % of national GVA. However, national 
level economic patterns tell us very little about the differences in wealth between cities. 
Looking at total GVA per capita, Stockholm and New York top the list (US$52,267 and 
US$51,337 respectively), closely followed by Copenhagen (US$48,294) and London 
(US$47,313). People living in these four cities are many times wealthier, on average, than 
in other world cities such as Istanbul and Bogotá (less than US$10,000), which in turn are 
significantly wealthier than the average resident of Mumbai (US$1,550). Despite its low 
per capita GVA, Mumbai’s level of income inequality indicated by the Gini coefficient – a 
measure of income distribution with a higher number representing greater inequality 
– is nearly half that of São Paulo, which is the most unequal of the twelve cities, while 
Copenhagen and Berlin are the most equitable.
London, Hong Kong and Berlin contribute similar levels of CO
2 emissions per person, 
but the number doubles in Portland, where annual per capita carbon emissions exceed 
10 tonnes, mainly owing to emissions related to high car use. Istanbul, with close to 
38 %of its workforce in the manufacturing sector, produces just 2.7 tonnes of CO2 per 
person, while Mumbai’s residents contribute only 0.4 tonnes – less than 10 % of that 
of residents in most other global cities. Car ownership varies drastically between all Measurement years and methodologies used to calculate indicator values may differ between cities and data are not always comparable.  For full references to data sources, please see: http://ec2012.lsecities.net/references/
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residential density employment density
loNdoN  peak 27,100 pp/km2 
London has lower residential densities than other world cities, although 
current policy focusing on the intensification of available urban land is 
affecting this pattern. While the most significant changes are occurring in 
East London (where the 2012 Olympics were held), densities remain highest 
in the West, in areas like Notting Hill and Earl’s Court, but peaking at 27,100 
people per km2 in Pimlico.
loNdoN  peak 141,600 pp/km2 
Peak employment densities in London occur at the core of the financial 
district in the City of London around Bank, reaching 141,600 jobs per 
km2 and in the West End around Oxford Circus. There are also important 
employment sub-centres in Canary Wharf, Croydon and Heathrow, all well 
served by public transport, but not at the same levels of central locations.
coPENhagEN  peak 24,050 pp/km2 
For the last fifty years Copenhagen’s regional planning has been based 
around the ‘Finger Plan’ of development corridors along rail lines that 
radiate out from the dense city centre, which are clearly visible in the above 
map. Peak residential densities reach 24,050 people per km2, closer to 
London levels, which are typical of the European compact city model.
coPENhagEN  peak 40,100 pp/km2 
Relatively high levels of employment clustering are also evident in 
Copenhagen where densities reach 40,100 jobs per km2, with many office 
areas easily accessible by rail, underground or bicycle. As well as financial 
and business services, Copenhagen retains an industrial base, particularly 
in shipping, which is characterised by lower employment levels than the 
tertiary sector. 
NEW yorK  peak 59,150 pp/km2 
New York’s highest residential densities are in Manhattan, peaking at 59,150 
people per km2 in the Upper East Side. High-density living is prevalent 
across New York City, with hotspots in the Bronx, Brooklyn and Queens. 
Outside of the urban core, lower-density suburban patterns dominate in the 
outer boroughs, New Jersey and Long Island.
NEW yorK  peak 151,600 pp/km2 
New York’s employment peak of over 150,000 jobs per km2 is found 
in Midtown Manhattan above West 42nd Street, close to Times Square. 
Downtown, the Lower Manhattan business district around Wall Street 
is returning to pre-9/11 density levels. Outside Manhattan, employment 
activities are relatively low, with few high-density sub-centres.  
stocKholm  peak 24,900 pp/km2  
Stockholm’s form has many similarities to Copenhagen’s, with tightly 
controlled regional development along public transport corridors and 
generous open areas. Stockholm’s peak density is just short of 25,000 people 
per km2. Recent population growth has been accommodated in the inner city 
with the regeneration of dock areas, such as Hammarby Sjöstad.
stocKholm  peak 51,950 pp/km2 
Stockholm’s peak employment density exceeds 50,000 jobs per km2, 
with the city specialising in financial and business services and IT. With 
space restricted in the city centre, planners have promoted a degree of 
decentralisation to well-connected peripheral hubs in regional centres, such 
as Kista Science City to the North of Central Stockholm.
hoNg KoNg  peak 111,100 pp/km2 
Hong Kong’s hyper-dense tall building typology, which reaches peaks of over 
100,000 people per km2 (double New York City’s), is not restricted to Hong 
Kong Island, but can also be found in West Kowloon, Kwun Tong and the 
New Territories. Planning authorities have pursued a ‘Rail plus Property’ 
development model, with extremely high-density development clustered 
around public transport nodes.
hoNg KoNg  peak 120,200 pp/km2 
Peak employment districts in Hong Kong occur at Central and Wan Chai on 
Hong Kong Island, and Tsim Sha Tsui and Kwun Tong in Kowloon, making 
the most of a new generation of super skyscrapers occupied by companies 
and corporations. Hong Kong employment survey data do not include 
government jobs and the actual peak densities are likely to be higher than 
shown.
bogotÁ  peak 55,800 pp/km2 
Some of the highest residential densities in Bogotá occur at the city outskirts, 
to the South, West and North-West of the city centre, with the peak density 
occurring at Patio Bonito to the West. At the fringe of the city the geography 
quickly alters into a steep mountainous landscape, constraining horizontal 
expansion. Data beyond the city boundary are not illustrated.
bogotÁ  peak 61,550 pp/km2 
Bogotá’s employment activities are strongly clustered in the city centre, along 
the main North-South link of Avenue Caracas. While financial and business 
services and retail are located in central districts with densities exceeding 
60,000 jobs per km2, industrial and manufacturing activities remain 
significant on the city outskirts.
The mapping of employment densities provides a very different perspective on urban 
form and dynamics, providing a novel point of comparison with the residential densities 
illustrated on the facing page. These diagrams capture a dimension of urban economic life 
by describing how many people work in different parts of the city on typical working days. 
As with residential densities, the taller spikes in the diagrams represent higher numbers 
of people concentrated in particular locations (CBDs, shopping high streets, business 
districts, etc.), while flatter zones suggest more residential neighbourhoods.  
The diagrams reveal that despite the digital revolution, proximity and face-to-face 
contact remains essential for urban businesses to access labour markets, connect to 
fast-changing information and engage in direct interaction with clients, customers and 
partners. Knowledge economy sectors such as financial and business services and 
creative industries still seek out commercial space in inner city cores, taking advantage  
of good public transport provision (where they exist) and co-location of shops, food, bars, 
entertainment and other facilities. 
London, New York and Hong Kong graphically illustrate that office workers are drawn 
to well-connected central locations, with peaks of over 150,000 jobs per km2 in tightly 
clustered areas in Midtown Manhattan in New York City. London follows closely behind at 
over 140,000 jobs per km2, concentrated in the City of London and the West End. But while 
in both these cases work densities do not coincide with residential densities – fuelling 
the need for intense commuting patterns – Hong Kong has a close integration between 
residential and employment peak densities. This pattern is associated with a strong mix 
of uses and shorter travel distances. Bogotá, Copenhagen and Stockholm also share 
integrated forms, in contrast to London where residential and employment densities are 
highly divergent. 
This section looks in more detail at the density and transport systems of six of the  
twelve case study cities. These six cities are innovators in land-use and transport policies 
across highly varied social and geographical contexts, and insights can be gleaned 
through their comparison.
Density is a fundamental measure of urban structure, and here we map the number 
of residents in each square kilometre of a 100 by 100 kilometres region – the taller the 
bar on the diagram, the higher the density of people living in a particular area of the city. 
Lower urban densities apply to suburban-like neighbourhoods, often characterised by 
houses and garden, or mid- to high-rise buildings surrounded by large areas of open 
space. Higher urban densities – where tall, medium- or even low-rise buildings are 
clustered together in a tighter urban grid – can facilitate more sustainable public transport, 
walking and cycling, improve service delivery efficiency, and promote urban vitality. 
These advantages depend, however, on high-quality urban design and effective city 
management to minimise the negative impacts of overcrowding, stress and pollution. 
Urban density is driven by topographical constraints, the provision of infrastructure, 
and by inherited traditions of urban development. The city that stands out in the mapping 
is Hong Kong, with its extremely high residential densities exceeding 110,000 people 
per km2. Here planners have responded to scarce land availability with very tall (over 30 
storeys), high-density development. Topography and history have also influenced the 
development of New York City, where Manhattan densities peak at 59,000 people per 
km2. London is, in contrast, more spread out, with a heritage of much lower-density urban 
living, with peak levels less than a quarter of Hong Kong’s. Roughly 8 million Londoners 
occupy twice the footprint of the same number of New Yorkers.
Bogotá’s development has been contained by its mountainous hinterland, and parts 
of the city reach peak densities at similar levels to New York, although with lower and 
different building forms. Copenhagen and Stockholm are smaller cities with lower 
densities and significant areas of open space. The Scandinavian capitals are, however, 
leaders in integrated regional planning, as shown by the distinct corridors of development 
radiating along rail lines from their urban centres.
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Connectivity is the lifeblood of cities and urban evolution is intrinsically linked to  
transport infrastructure. These maps display the multi-modal public transport networks 
in six case study cities, revealing stark differences in distribution of transport routes with 
commensurate effects on urban form and accessibility both within cities and to their 
regional hinterlands. 
Given that these cities have been selected as exemplars of sustainability, they do 
not display the dominance of roads and motorways that characterise so many of the 
world’s emerging megacities, as illustrated by São Paulo in earlier pages. Instead they 
demonstrate close connections between land use and public transport, summarised by 
the accessibility indicator graph to the right. 
Hong Kong and Stockholm have uniquely high accessibility, with over 40 per cent  
of their respective populations living within 500 metres’ distance from a rail or 
underground station. London, New York and Copenhagen also perform well, exceeding 
20 per cent of their populations within 500 metres from a rail or underground station. 
Bogotá’s results are lower, at around 12 per cent, yet it substantially outperforms car-
dependent cities such as São Paulo and Los Angeles.
City populations in walking distance of rail and metro stations This section explores the proportion of trips made by different transport modes in the six 
cities, enabling an understanding of how transport infrastructure and policies translate 
into real world behaviour for different user groups. The extensive transport networks 
found in all six cities ensure that public transport use is substantial though varied in 
the modes of public transport most frequently used. In addition, there are significant 
variations in walking and cycling patterns as well as car use, resulting from differing 
planning policies and inherited urban cultures.
After many decades of neglecting walking and cycling as serious transport modes, 
current planning policies view active travel as a key part of creating a vibrant city 
environment and promoting healthier lifestyles. Copenhagen and Stockholm have 
strong traditions of providing high quality infrastructure for walking and cycling, with 
Copenhagen in particular being a world leader in cycling infrastructure provision. London 
and New York are attempting to repeat these achievements on a larger scale, though 
still have a long way to go to meet these standards. Hong Kong in fact has the highest 
proportion of pedestrian movements, with an impressive 45 per cent of trips. The city has 
developed a three-dimensional approach to urban mobility, with an extensive walking 
network on linked bridges above limited road space.
As cities improve from a low economic base, pressures for car use often increase. 
Bogotá is a low-income city, yet is developing quickly and car trips have increased by 
nearly 50 per cent in the last five years, despite investments in public transport. Cities 
seeking to limit car use can do so through a range of policies, including congestion 
charging and taxation (London and Stockholm), high fuel taxes (employed across Europe) 
and car ownership taxes (Hong Kong). 
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loNdoN 
A nineteenth-century ban on railways entering central London led to a ring 
of rail terminals, prompting the development of the underground to link 
them and support London’s outward expansion. London has an extensive, 
albeit ageing rail-based network. Effective lobbying from the Mayor 
has ensured investment into rail, underground and bus networks, with 
improved connections to Continental Europe via St. Pancras and Stratford.
loNdoN 
In terms of total trips, buses provide the most important public transport 
mode in London, and the network has been substantially upgraded in 
the last ten years. While car use has fallen in the last decade, it remains 
substantial, especially in outer London. The success of congestion  
charging suggests it should be expanded further, though this issue has 
proved politically controversial. Bicycle travel is relatively low, but is 
increasingly rapidly.
NEW yorK 
New York City has long established and intricate public transport networks, 
connecting the city to its vast urban hinterland inhabited by 19 million 
people. Penn station is the busiest rail terminal in North America, serving 
300,000 passengers a day. Current infrastructure developments include the 
new World Trade Centre Transportation Hub and further subway and rail 
upgrades for Manhattan.
NEW yorK 
The subway is the most important public transport mode in New York, 
carrying over 40 per cent of commuters. Detailed survey data on non-work 
travel for New York was not available, though we can assume that car and 
walking trips will be considerably more frequent for non-work travel. Like 
London, New York is investing in cycling infrastructure and this is having 
an impact, from a low historic base.
hoNg KoNg 
Hong Kong’s relatively young network has quickly developed into a highly 
efficient system that daily delivers millions of people to their destinations. 
The region achieves the closest integration between land use and transport 
of the six cities, as a result of the clustering of very high-density mixed-use 
development around stations. Future plans include new metro lines, and a 
high-speed link to Shenzhen and Guangzhou in mainland China.
hoNg KoNg 
Hong Kong has one of the lowest rates of car ownership in the world and 
consequently the proportion of car trips is incredibly small at 6 per cent. 
As in London, bus travel is an important means of linking public transport 
networks, and bus and tram trips account for 26 per cent of the total. The 
proportion of walking trips is very high at 45 per cent, making Hong Kong 
a leader in active travel.  
coPENhagEN 
Copenhagen has a well-established regional rail network, closely integrated 
with linear urban development patterns as well as its extensive cycle 
network. The city’s central station provides high-speed services, including 
links to Sweden, with Copenhagen acting as a central node in the cross-
border Øresund urban region. Copenhagen’s recently developed metro 
system is currently limited to a single line, but new routes are planned.
coPENhagEN 
Copenhagen is one of the world’s leading cycling cities with 20 per cent 
of all trips by bike, including 36 per cent of work trips. The authorities 
are investing further in improving these figures. Public transport travel is 
proportionately lower than in the other example cities. The metro system 
is very new and will likely expand in the near future. Car use across the 
region is increasing and improved orbital public transport and demand 
management measures are being considered.
For full references to data sources, please see: http://ec2012.lsecities.net/references/
stocKholm 
Stockholm has excellent multi-modal public transport, with regional rail, 
subway, tram and international high-speed rail networks. The result of 
strong land-use planning and an extensive rail-based service is that 40 
per cent of residents live within 500 metres from a metro station. Several 
subway and tram upgrades are in development, including better orbital 
access outside of the city centre. 
stocKholm 
Both walking and cycling trips are popular in Stockholm, with the city 
second out of our six case studies in both categories. The metro is the 
most frequently used public transport mode at 15 per cent of trips. Car 
use remains significant and Stockholm has severe congestion problems, 
even after the introduction of the city’s congestion tax. Proposed remedies 
include improved public transport and a new bypass.  
bogotÁ 
Bogotá is a pioneering city in the development of a Bus Rapid Transit 
system, which has provided passengers with similar speed and capacity 
advantages to underground rail systems at a significantly lower cost. 
Ambitious plans to further expand the network have been slow to 
implement, though new lines are now under construction. A further 
challenge is to develop regional connections.  
bogotÁ 
Despite having a relatively modest infrastructure, Bogotá has the highest 
rate of public transport travel in all the example cities. The TransMilenio 
BRT network accounts for 11 per cent of trips, bolstered by 42 per cent of 
trips using the standard bus network. There have been significant reductions 
in road casualties through improved transport planning, although further 
progress is needed to improve Bogotá’s pedestrian environment.
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changing london
ENErgy  
London has bold ambitions in the energy sector, with a goal of reducing emissions to 60% below 
1990 levels by 2025. But London today relies heavily on fossil fuels and just 2% of total energy 
comes from renewable sources. London’s residents produce significant carbon emissions – an 
annual average of 5.8 tonnes per capita. As in many cities across the developed world, carbon 
emissions have fallen in recent years thanks to de-industrialisation, efficiency improvements and 
shifts from coal to gas for heating and generating electricity. 
traNsPort aNd PlaNNiNg 
London has seen a marked shift in the way people travel. Car kilometres travelled per person  
are now 25% lower than in 1999, while public transport passenger kilometres have grown by  
40% over the same period on a per capita basis.  London’s shift towards more sustainable  
transport results from coordinated governance strategy and increased investment. Buses now  
offer 33% more service kilometres than in 2000, and tube and rail upgrades are making up for 
decades of under-investment. 
Declining emissions in wealthy cities hide carbon associated with growing consumption of 
imported goods. Counting imported emissions in food and manufactured goods, conventionally 
neglected, doubles Londoners’ overall carbon footprint to 12.1 tonnes per person. A closer look 
at energy use across London shows that average per capita measures hide important variations. 
Mapping household energy use across the city reveals higher-income; suburban areas have the 
highest consumption, while the lowest use is in denser inner London areas.
Cycling has also experienced a renaissance with inner-city cyclist numbers tripling since the late 
1990s. Cities in continental Europe still lead with much higher proportions of transport by bicycle 
– in London only 2% of all trips are by bicycle compared with 20% in Copenhagen. Reflecting the 
commitment to the compact city model, vast majority of new building development over the past 
decade has been located close to railway and underground stations, making the most of London’s 
extensive public transport system and anticipating further improvements such as Crossrail. 
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Cities’ carbon emissions per person compared 
Source: See http://ec2012.lsecities.net/references/ 
London’s carbon emissions by sector
Source: Greater London Authority
Direct and embedded emissions 
Source: Greater London Authority
Domestic energy and gas use (2010 kWh per capita) 
Source: Department of Energy and Climate Change Sub-National Energy Statistics 2010
European cities’ air pollution compared 
Source: Citeair, www.airqualitynow.eu
Digital economy employment share 
Source: ‘London’s Digital Economy’ (2012), Greater London Authority 
ICT jobs density 
Source: Business Register and Employment Survey 2008 – 2011, NOMIS
Cities’ broadband speeds compared 
Source: ‘Broadband Quality Study 2010’ in Greater London Authority ‘London’s Digital 
Economy’ (2012)
Air pollution: nitrogen dioxide 
Source: London Atmospheric Emissions Inventory 2008
Carbon emissions trends compared
Source: See http://ec2012.lsecities.net/references/ 
Car and public transport travel compared 
Source: UK Department for Transport, Transport for London
Proximity of new development to public transport  
Source: London Development Database (2012), Greater London Authority
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Source: Transport for London
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Source: See http://ec2012.lsecities.net/references/ 
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ENViroNmENt 
Environmental policy programmes have led to some success. A comprehensive policy approach 
over the past decade saw average levels of household waste declining by 28% on a per capita basis, 
while recycling and composting rates increased over threefold. Today 34% of household waste 
is recycled or composted, although leaders in the field Austria and Germany have rates of over 
60%. Air pollution remains a problem for Londoners, with only a modest improvement over a 
decade. It threatens health and quality of life, with the European Environment Agency suggesting 
pollution may be responsible for 3,000 premature deaths each year in London. Mapping the 
location of air pollution shows that transport emissions are the major source, with concentrations 
evident around arterial roads and on Heathrow airport’s runways. Average NO2 levels exceed EU 
standards over most of inner London, and along all major roads. PM10 levels are a more localised 
problem, regularly exceeding standards along major roads, but background levels are generally 
within guidelines. 
digital EcoNomy 
London is home to the biggest concentration of digital firms in Europe. Over 23,000 firms, 
390,000 employees, and an estimated GB£1.7 (US$2.73/€2.1) billion of exports can be attributed to 
software development and other tech industries. (See essay by Max Nathan, pp. 11-12)
Policy attention has recently focused on a cluster of digital firms centred on what is dubbed the 
Old Street ‘Silicon Roundabout’. Both national and local level policymakers aim to build on the 
existing cluster to establish a technology centre to rival California’s ‘Silicon Valley’ and New 
York’s ‘Silicon Alley’. Despite these ambitions, growth in the digital economy’s employment share 
appears to have stalled between 2005 and 2010. Recent studies of firms in the Inner East London 
cluster have identified various constraints to continued growth, including access to skilled staff 
and Internet connectivity issues. Indicators allowing for global comparisons of broadband quality 
are limited, however a 2010 study shows London’s Internet infrastructure may slightly lag top 
European cities, and is of a lower standard than in some East Asian cities.
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urbaN agE
The Urban Age Programme, jointly 
organised by LSE Cities at the London 
School of Economics and Deutsche 
Bank’s Alfred Herrhausen Society, is an 
international investigation of the spatial 
and social dynamics of cities centred on 
an annual conference, research initiative 
and publication. Since 2005, more than 
ten conferences have been held in rapidly 
urbanising regions in Africa and Asia, 
as well as in mature urban regions in the 
Americas and Europe. The conferences 
operate as mobile laboratories, testing 
and sampling the social and physical 
characteristics of global cities through 
expert presentations and testimonials, 
research, site visits, mapping and informal 
information exchange.
orgaNisEd by 
lsE cities
LSE Cities is an international centre at 
the London School of Economics and 
Political Science that carries out research, 
education and outreach activities in 
London and abroad. Its mission is to study 
how people and cities interact in a rapidly 
urbanising world, focusing on how the 
design of cities impacts on society, culture 
and the environment. Through research, 
conferences, teaching and projects, the 
centre aims to shape new thinking and 
practice on how to make cities fairer and 
more sustainable for the next generation of 
urban dwellers, who will make up some 70 
per cent of the global population by 2050.
alfred herrhausen society, the 
international Forum of deutsche bank 
The non-profit Alfred Herrhausen Society 
is the international forum of Deutsche 
Bank. Its work focuses on new forms of 
governance as a response to the challenges 
of the twenty-first century. The Alfred 
Herrhausen Society seeks traces of the 
future in the present, and conceptualises 
relevant themes for analysis and debate. 
It works with international partners 
across a range of fields, including policy, 
academia and business, to organise 
forums for discussion worldwide. It 
forges international networks and builds 
temporary institutions to help to find better 
solutions to global challenges. It targets 
future decision-makers, but also attempts 
to make its work accessible to a wide 
public audience. The society is dedicated 
to the work of Alfred Herrhausen, former 
spokesman of the Deutsche Bank board 
of directors, who advocated the idea 
of corporate social responsibility in an 
exemplary manner until his assassination 
by terrorists in 1989. The Alfred Herrhausen 
Society is an expression of Deutsche Bank’s 
worldwide commitment to civil society.
london school of Economics and 
Political science
LSE is a specialist university with an 
international intake and a global reach. 
Its research and teaching span the full 
breadth of the social sciences. Founded in 
1895 by Beatrice and Sidney Webb, and set 
up to improve society and to “understand 
the causes of things”, LSE has always put 
engagement with the wider world at the
heart of its mission.
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New forms of energy generation are powering cities 
and their institutions (Combined heat and energy plant, 
Guy’s Hospital, London)
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